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Adoptando uma abordagem baseada na fenomenologia e na semiótica cognitiva, a 
dissertação define e discute a empatia e o processo empático destacando o seu papel em 
contextos e encontros intersubjectivos, bem como enquanto instrumento para a compreensão 
da ligação entre observador e objecto artístico. Esta forma particular de conhecimento 
pertence à experiência original da percepção dos objectos exteriores, que é influenciada pela 
memória de conhecimentos anteriores, reservatório de significado na unidade fenomenal 
com o outro (Zahavi 2010, 2012), e diferentes dispositivos cognitivos (metáforas, domínios 
narrativos e semânticos) que contribuem para a passagem da observação à compreensão. A 
dissertação visa explicar como a atitude epistémica da empatia permite uma forma 
coporealizada (embodied) de compreensão, que ocorre na experiência narratológica dos 
estados de outro sujeito e na contemplação estética das obras artísticas. Neste contexto, o 
significado está profundamente ligado às dimensões emocional, física e mental do processo 
de fazer sentido: a dissertação analisa as reacções visuais, corporais e cognitivas evocadas 
pelos estímulos estéticos e a forma como os padrões de consciência dos espectadores são 
capazes de responder emocionalmente à experiência das obras de arte.  
Além disso, o estudo teórico sobre empatia é aplicado ao estudo da tragédia, reconhecendo 
a sua relevância na forma de evolução desta representação literária e performativa ao longo 
do tempo. Abordando as particularidades significativas da tragédia e das suas personagens, 
este trabalho centrar-se-á no mito de Medeia ao longo da história, tanto na sua representação 
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Adopting a phenomenological and cognitive semiotic approach, the dissertation defines and 
discusses empathy and the empathic process highlighting its role in intersubjective contexts 
and encounters, as well as a tool for comprehension of the unity between observer and artistic 
object. This peculiar form of knowledge pertains to the original experience of outer objects’ 
perception, which is influenced by memory of previous knowledge, reservoir of meaning in 
the phenomenal unity with the other (Zahavi 2010, 2012), and different cognitive devices 
(metaphors, narrative and semantic domains) which contribute to the shift from observation 
to comprehension. The dissertation aims to explain how empathy’s epistemic attitude allows 
an embodied form of understanding, which occurs in the narratological experience of 
another subject’s states and the aesthetic contemplation of artistic works. In this context, 
meaning is profoundly linked with emotional, physical and mental dimensions of sense-
making: the dissertation analyses visual, embodied and cognitive reactions evoked by 
aesthetic stimuli and the way spectators’ patterns of consciousness are able to emotionally 
respond to the experience of artworks.  
Furthermore, the theoretical study on empathy is applied to the examination of tragedy, 
acknowledging its relevance in shaping the evolution of literary and performative 
representation through time. Addressing the significative particularities of tragedy and its 
characters, the research will focus on the myth of Medea across history, both in its literary 
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In order to understand the outer world from a human perspective it is essential to 
analyse the way we perceive it, precisely conceiving perception as the experience of making 
sense of what surrounds us. Explaining the manner in which we grasp objects, people and 
contexts we observe every day to comprehend what pertains to the world around us, has been 
attempted by different methodologies and disciplines, among which philosophy, cognitive 
science and psychology. 
Since the 20th century, the concept of empathy has been addressed as central in this 
context. Referring to empathy as the response of feeling into the psychophysical experience 
of someone else, consistently in opposition to what is defined as sympathy, namely being 
moved by or feeling for what we observe, this idea has been applied in the definition of 
perception in both an intersubjective and an aesthetic framework. In particular, American 
philosopher Shaun Gallagher claims that our social cognition is “a form of empathy” in its 
entirety, since it “is our basic and default way of understanding others” (Gallagher 2012, 
358). The sensorial data that we empathically collect throughout the examination of the 
world are fundamental when discussing the human mind, the mechanisms involved in its 
functioning and how it makes sense of its surroundings. 
Thus, this dissertation aims to analyse the concept of empathy not as a mere 
emotional condition, but a fundamental tool in the process of sense-making. As Hanenberg 
suggests in his work Cognitive Culture Studies (2018), cognitive and cultural studies can 
meet to complete each other approaching the physical and mental dimension of culture, its 
principles and experience, as well as introduce and address the influence of culture in 
cognitive perception. In this frame, this dissertation aims to focus on the analysis of tragedy, 
and in particular the myth of Medea in its forms and practices, bringing together its cultural 
understanding together with cognitive and neural findings on which this perspective, 
crossing boundaries between disciplines, is grounded. Moreover, bridging the historical 
perspective on a cultural object, upon which contemporary forms of literary and 
performative artistic expression are grounded, with a cognitive vision of the mind permits 
not only to address a specific genre with more recent findings and methodologies, but also 
to re-mediate a form of artistic practice which cannot be neglected when considering the 




In fact, on the one hand empathy is considered in this dissertation in its epistemically 
essential role played in understanding, considering with a phenomenological perspective the 
relevance of individual and collective experiences, perception and intentionality. On the 
other hand, sense-making is studied acknowledging the centrality of its process itself, 
following a cognitive semiotic approach focused on the relevance of meaning and the 
expressive and embodied mechanisms involved. The research questions leading this project 
focus on the relation between empathy and the aesthetic experience, and specifically the case 
of tragedy. What is the role of empathy in aesthetic perception and comprehension? In what 
way does the empathic process influence the aesthetic experience, and which are the 
cognitive mechanisms involved? How does this process apply to the specific case of tragedy, 
both considering it as a literary work and a performative actors-audience exchange? 
This research does not intend to be limited to the interpersonal dimension of empathy 
exclusively in subject-object relations, but it aims to address as well the role of empathy in 
the aesthetic experience, focusing on its influence and function in artistic perception and 
narratives. The methodology involved bridges a systematic literary review which approaches 
disciplines and compares them with an analysis of the experience of the world, which starts 
from a first- and second-person perception of empathy and the empathic experience to reach 
a shared conception of the phenomenon. Specifically, the particular case of the Greek 
tragedy is addressed as the central case study, in an analysis that gives particular emphasis 
to the audience and its experience. Adopting the example of Medea, both the literary work 
by Euripides (432 BC) and its film adaptation by director Pier Paolo Pasolini (1969), 
empathy and sense-making will be framed in this particular context of perceptive experience. 
In fact, tragedy by its mimetic essence and unique way of depicting human nature represents 
a significative example in the analysis of the audience’s psychophysical experience, 
especially considering the role of empathy in the relationship between spectators and tragic 
heroes. 
The first chapter of the dissertation discusses empathy and the empathic experience, 
specifically focusing on intersubjective contexts. To start, several conceptions of empathy 
are presented following multiple theories, approaches and authors, so as to trace how the 
concept has been described and perceived until reaching today’s interpretation. After 
distinguishing empathy as a “cognitive state resulting from efforts to understand the other” 




first section goes through essential theorists who delineate empathy as a cognitive 
phenomenon, an approach followed through this dissertation (Husserl 1982, 1989, Stein 
1989, Stueber 2006). Then, highlighting the essential role played by empathy in 
intersubjective relations, the chapter proceeds by describing the mechanisms involved in 
interpersonal processes and oriented to meaning making. In fact, since perception and 
comprehension are deeply connected, the chapter develops a comprehensive pattern on the 
mechanisms implied in understanding, addressing corporeal actions and physical 
manifestations as embodied field of individual expression (Schutz 1967, Lakoff and Johnson 
1999). In conclusion, the third section of this chapter deals with the reception and 
understanding of others’ psychophysical states, both through the entanglement of semantic 
domains (Brandt 2004), recollection (Bruner and Kalmar 1998) and emphasising the key 
function of simulation. From this theoretical framework there emerges a definition of 
empathy as a multifaceted concept that encompasses both physical and mental processes that 
are portrayed in an extensive and coherent picture of this cognitive phenomenon. 
The second chapter shifts the focus from an intersubjective perspective to aesthetic 
appreciation. Maintaining a central attention on empathy and the claim that empathy is 
essential in meaning making, this section questions the role played by empathy in the 
reception of artistic works and performances. Starting from the acknowledgement of the 
situatedness of art in the outer world, as both a product of human culture and an object of 
intensified attention and observation, this chapter questions aesthetic perception and the 
intangible, bridging the gap between the physicality of art as a product and the temporary 
duration of its experience. In particular, defining empathic perception on both an individual 
and collective level, the chapter continues suggesting that the mediated experience of 
aesthetic appreciation along with the intermediary role of art and the simulative participation 
of the spectators embodies those essential elements that constitute the tangible dimension in 
the intangibility of aesthetic perception. The third section concludes referring to empathy as 
the spectators’ response to characters, whether literary or performed, through whom the 
audience is able to vicariously experience the vicissitudes of the depicted story. 
The third chapter discusses tragedy as an example of how empathy is involved in 
sense-making in the context of artistic expressions. In particular, after a brief introduction 
on the historical and cultural context in which tragedy developed and its philosophical 




experience of tragedy, as it contributes in the aesthetic expression as a bridge between mental 
and bodily simulation while shaping narratives and representations to be empathically 
accessible for the audience. The analysis of tragedy’s textual structure, poetic form and the 
representative tools implied in the portrayal of its characters are applied and questioned 
through the study of Medea, both in its literary version by Euripides (staged in Athens for 
the first time in 431 BC) and the cinematic adaptation by Pasolini (1969). Empathy and 
empathic understanding, as addressed in the first two chapters, are tackled in the tragic 
context as essential paths to meaning making in the reception of these works. 
 In order to shape an effective practice for the study of empathy and its application to 
artistic comprehension, it is crucial in this dissertation to follow a suitable methodological 
perspective to frame the research in the multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary field of 
culture studies. In particular, the process of perception and comprehension is considered in 
relation to body, mind and the emotional dimension, since the variety of “phenomena of 
human consciousness, memory, empathy, and intersubjectivity have profoundly altered our 
collective understanding of the nature of our psychic and physical lives, as well as the 
seamless interface between those two aspects of experience” (Gallese and Wojciehowski 
2011, 3). Aiming to bridge the theoretical and philosophical approach, on the one hand, with 
the cognitive study on perception, this dissertation intends to structure a procedure of 
analysis adequate for a system of comprehension deeply grounded on bodily experiences 
and expressions, involving conceptual frameworks and social and cultural contexts. 
Empathy is conceptually defined through different approaches (philosophy, narrative and 
aesthetics) through a systematic literary review grounded on a multiplicity of disciplines 
(Assmann 2012). Later, the process of meaning making drawn from the comparison of 
disciplinary and cultural traditions is examined in correlation with the particular context of 
the aesthetic experience and meaning making in art. 
Moreover, addressing cognition and perception through a phenomenological 
perspective, a certain degree of subjectivity (first-person) and intersubjectivity (second-
person) is involved in the methodological approach of analysis. In this specific context, this 
dissertation employs what Gallagher (2007) defines an approach on “phenomenology that 
understands intentionality as a form of being-in-the-world, and recognizes the importance 
of embodied action for shaping perception, offers an interpretational framework different 




272). In this research, predominantly following a cognition-based method, semiotics plays a 
fundamental role in its way of studying interpretation and comprehension. In particular, 
addressing empathy, a cognitive semiotic perspective highlights the relevance of operative 
knowledge, which Sonesson (2007) defines as a specific sort of consciousness “that must 
exist at some, probably low, level of awareness, in order to render behaviour understandable 
(and thus explainable)” (Sonesson 2007, 91). 
In the analysis of the case study, the methodology will be oriented to the 
phenomenological understanding of the aesthetic experience of tragedy, bridging its 
philosophical interpretation with the actual cognitive process involved in the reception of 
both the literary and cinematic versions of Medea. The selected field of study, tragedy, 
specifically following these two mediations of Medea is analysed in its narrative and textual 
expression employing tools from narratology and reception theory, as well as in its 
performativity, direction and storytelling using methods of visual analysis from theatre 
theory and film studies. The object of analysis in the encounter with the theoretical baggage 
brought into discussion is approached taking into account the visual, cognitive and 
psychophysical experience of it. For this reason, when discussing tragedy and its forms of 
representation the experience of empathy in aesthetic perception and comprehension is 
approached with tools grounded on new ethnography. In fact, this method of investigation 
allows highlighting the both subjective and relational nature of this aesthetic experience, 
giving a prominent importance to the object of analysis as perceived through individual 
experiences. Specifically, this methodology “is particularly interested in modes of 
experiencing the world, such as emotions […], embodiment […] or the sacred […], which 
have often been neglected by rationalistically oriented modes of social scientific inquiry” 
(Saukko 2003, 57). In this context, dialogic, collective and intersubjective paths of 
understanding, as well as mental, emotional and corporeal forms of sense-making are 
enhanced and implemented. On the one hand, this work addresses tragedy as a literary, social 
and philosophical phenomenon, focusing on its way of portraying the specific Athenian and 
the generic human condition. On the other hand, the tragic experience is investigated 
following the role of perception between imagination and mimetic expression, the empathic 
reaction of the audience arisen by the actors on stage and the portrayed characters, as well 




 In brief, this dissertation aims to elaborate a comprehensive definition of empathy 
and an exhaustive characterisation of its mechanisms. Starting from the study of empathic 
perception in intersubjective experiences, the research aims to understand the role played by 
empathy in aesthetic comprehension, when observing artistic works in the variety of forms 
they can assume. Through the case of Medea and the possibility of exploring literary tools 
and cinematic means of expression, this dissertation questions the way empathy influences 
aesthetic perception and the mechanisms involved in meaning making processes. 
 The research conducted throughout this work addresses the specific features of 
empathy as both an intersubjective and artistic form of understanding. In particular, empathy 
is tackled in its cognitive dimension as an essential tool in perception and comprehension. 
Both in interpersonal and aesthetic contexts, empathy is proved throughout this dissertation 
to be deeply grounded on bodily and simulative processes, in which domains of experience, 
hermeneutic background and narrative devices play a crucial role. In the particular context 
of tragedy, and specifically in the case of the myth of Medea, empathy is found to be an 
essential mechanism to decipher the mimetic representation of events, the portrayed 
characters and their psychophysical states through the as if perspective of the audience, able 
to fully understand and feel into the depicted reality. 
 The study of empathy and its cognitive relevance are increasingly central in the 
analysis of cultural objects, their manifestations and comprehension. This work aims to 
follow the recent developments in the field of cultural analysis claiming the importance of 
empathy in the study of tragedy, a genre that spans from antiquity to the present day. This 
dissertation addresses the understanding of tragedy and its experience, which seem timeless 





1. Empathy and Sense-Making 
 
1.1. A Multidisciplinary Genealogy of the Concept of Empathy: Definition and Relevance 
 
Defining multifaceted concepts is a complicated process in research, especially when 
their common sense is employed (and often misleading) in everyday expressions. 
Frequently, we see a shift from an academic use of terms to a more generic and 
encompassing one. Empathy is undoubtedly one of these terms. Often included in day-to-
day conversations, the use of the concept of empathy in ordinary circumstances is often 
mistaken for other mental and emotional states, such as sympathy, compassion, affinity, and 
even pity. However, in the most varied contexts, terminological discrepancies and 
involuntary inaccuracy are commonplace. For instance, in contrast with what many people 
think, specifically in the philosophical and semiotic fields, shared views (Stein 1989, 109; 
Gallese 2003, 519; Gallagher 2012, 357; Zlatev 2008, 223) on empathy agree that it does 
require a congruent emotional participation of the subjects involved in order to take place. 
In fact, as opposed to sympathy, empathy implies sharing an actual psychophysical state or 
condition with the other, in a shift from a feeling for to a feeling into. 
However, describing and constructing the relation between the common conception 
of empathy and its philosophical and scientific understanding can be intricate and misleading 
at times, considering that many definitions have been given from various perspectives: 
psychological, cognitive, neuroscientific and behavioural. This universally known form of 
experience is not only intrinsically present in everyone’s day-to-day intersubjective social 
relations, but in the last century it has also been playing a key role in the phenomenological 
study of meaning. In fact, in her work On the Problem of Empathy (1989), Stein claims the 
essential role of empathy in phenomenology, whose final goal “is to clarify and thereby to 
find the ultimate basis of all knowledge” (Stein 1989, 3). Nevertheless, both in the 
experiential context of intersubjective exchanges and the philosophical investigation on the 
study of meaning, “what counts in the strict sense as empathy are those experiential acts in 
which a foreign subject is not merely hypothesized or inferred, but rather given and 
experienced” (Jardine 2014, 274). Limiting empathy to an emotional state or a sensory 
perception would be simplistic and reductive. Empathy allows every subject to “understand 
other persons as minded creatures, to recognize others’ states of mind, and to make sense of 




developed capacity allows every subject to effectively perceive and understand other 
individuals in the outer world, as well as it enables to constitute “the psychological 
foundation of our ability to be social animals and to become full members of society” (Ibid.). 
Before analysing the empathic process and its features, it is crucial to bear in mind 
that each interpersonal relation is multifaceted and singular. In fact, “there is no uniform 
way in which we relate to others, but […] our relations are mediated through the various 
pragmatic circumstances of our encounters” (Gallagher and Hutto 2008, 23). This is to say 
that empathy constitutively depends on circumstances which facilitates and affect the 
intensity of the empathic experience, like language, cultural backgrounds and social 
practices. Furthermore, the study of intersubjective processes, including empathy, has 
always been complicated and problematic, given that they presume the investigation and 
comprehension of other individuals’ minds. The epistemological issue of “how I can know 
there are any minds that are not mine […] given the way I know that I have a mind” 
(Avramides 2001, 2), has always found disparate ways to be answered, involving behavior, 
knowledge and cognition-based methodologies, which are grounded on the direct study of 
experience, intentionality and emotional and semantic models of comprehension. For these 
reasons, in order to properly understand empathy and its peculiarities, it is essential to claim 
in the first place that due to its intersubjective nature, which has been (and still is) long 
discussed as an element of comprehension of foreign subjects’ mental states, empathy is 
strongly affected by the question of conceptualisation, accessibility and opportunity to grasp 
foreign individuals’ minds. In fact, empathy can subsist only when two subjects are involved 
and confronted, and a specific form of interpersonal relation is experienced. In this frame, 
both parts concerned are actively and spontaneously taking part in the process of living a 
particularly involved feeling, emotion or mental state, but they are related to it on different 
levels of experiential proximity. The different “facets of empathy include involuntary 
copying mechanisms; emotional mimicry; feeling distress when observing the suffering of 
others; mind reading; deciphering others’ thoughts, states, or emotions” (Breithaupt 2011, 
1), making the empathic mechanism central in intersubjective understanding. 
When empathy takes place, two subjects are implicated with different modes of 
experience. On the one hand, one individual is pragmatically performing a set of actions, 
and going through a particular mental and emotional state: he or she is directly involved in 




the considered relevant state pertains to that psycho-physical persona as part of his or her 
empirical immediate practice. On the other hand, the other subject involved is able to live 
the same psycho-emotional condition through observation, recognition and inner imitation. 
The simulative action of using one’s self as a model for deciphering external subjects allows 
a mere observative action to shift to an actual emotional share. The potentiality of 
psychophysical sharing becomes effective as a result of empathic engagement, which is 
achieved through imagination, bodily and linguistic communication and mental recollection 
of previous experiences, patterns that is investigated and discussed across the chapter and 
entire dissertation. 
In empathy, the link between observer and observed is first of all visual, but the 
ability of developing a mechanism of recognition about an emotional state is equally mental. 
This emotional participation involves a proper perspective shift, which consists in assuming 
another person’s point of view in the experience of a psychophysical state. In order to make 
sense of what is perceived, “the observer must rely on his or her own internal motor 
knowledge”, since “[w]hen we observe an action, our motor system becomes active as if we 
were executing the very same action that we are observing, that is, we simulate the action” 
(Zahavi 2012, 219-220). This process of scrutiny allows an implicit and effective emotional 
and behavioural sharing, but in order for the observer to identify and clarify the empathic 
process’s meaning, it is necessary that the new non-primarily performed state of the other 
makes sense in the context of a fully comprehensive experiential synthesis. The transition of 
perspective has the function not only of elucidating the peculiarities of a grasped element, 
but also of predicting, following a personal point of view, what that specific action or mental 
state could lead to. Indeed, the entirety of the first-person experienced state “serves as the 
basis for my third-person ascription of the emotion to the other” (Zahavi 2010, 5). In fact, 
observation, as the phenomenologist Zahavi suggests, opens an automatic mechanism of 
external experiencing (third-person perspective) starting with the consciousness of what has 
been directly lived (first-person participation). When empathising with another individual, 
one is able to confer to the other an explainable mental state from a third-person perspective, 
while first-personally experiencing one’s own mind. Perceiving the other, “[w]e assume that 
our access to our own mind is more direct and in some way epistemically privileged than 
our access to the mind of another […], but we recognize each other as same-minded and as 




In other words, the way we dispose of direct access to our mind ensures the employment of 
individual information as a model to comprehend the personal state of the person we are 
empathising with, assuming a general equivalent functioning on a mental level shared by all 
human beings. 
In this sense it is crucial to acknowledge the temporal dimension in the chronological 
relation between primary and secondary experiencing. In fact, empathy is primordial in its 
being present, even if it is not primordial in its content, precisely because the subject of the 
empathised experience is different from the one empathising (Stein 1989, 7). Namely, 
empathically experienced states are unprecedented in their way of being perceived and 
experienced through simulation, while the state itself is only primarily experienced in its 
original form by the empathised subject. To illustrate, we need to consider that “as our own 
individual is announced in our own perceived experiences, so the foreign individual is 
announced in empathized ones [… ]: in one case there is a primordial, while in the other a 
non-primordial, givenness of the constituting experience” (Stein 1989, 34). The personal 
state that is empathically experienced is always perceived in a mediated form, which relates 
in essence with how one discerns what he or she is observing from the act of observation. 
Different theoretical proposals1 have tried to classify and define the cognitive process of 
empathy and they seem to agree that referring to empathy implies addressing a “primary, 
embodied, non-inferential, way of knowing another’s mental state” (Gangopadhyay 2014, 
117). Specifically, following a phenomenological perspective, this knowledge-oriented 
mechanism can only be guaranteed through a directly experienced access to a subject’s 
mental state, which does not depend on the development of theoretical formulation on what 
observed. Namely, the heterogeneity of shapes of the experience of empathy can assume a 
variety of experiential possibilities, which required to be personally experienced to 
cognitively make sense, since the experience of the other subject’s state does not coincide 
with the other’s own direct experience. 
From the perspective of cognitive science, de Vignemont and Singer (2006) compile 
a list of the sufficient combination of conditions for empathy to take place. The authors state 
that “[t]here is empathy if: (i) one is in an affective state; (ii) this state is isomorphic2 to 
 
1 E.g., simulation theory (Gallagher 2012), theory of mind (Zunshine 2006) or phenomenology-based 
approaches (Stein 1989). 




another person’s state; (iii) this state is elicited by the observation or imagination of another 
person’s affective state; (iv) one knows that the other person is the source of one’s own 
affective state” (Vignemont and Singer 2006, 435). However, even if the observing subject’s 
state has an essential relevance, empathy is first and foremost an other-oriented 
phenomenon, placing emphasis on the primary generated condition: the focus is on the other 
and his/her psycho-physical condition. As explained by the philosopher Stein3 (1989), “how 
we perceive foreign consciousness has usually taken the turn of how in one psycho-physical 
individual the perception of another such occurs” (Stein 1989, 21). In other words, empathy 
allows us to realise that the world around us is constituted not only by extraneous physical 
bodies, but also foreign subjects who are in their turn psycho-physical individuals with a 
personal psychic life, external but accessible to whoever observes it. 
As a first step to understand the empathic process, it is fundamental to comprehend 
that it is possible to share and perform a specific set of emotions, but it is essential to make 
sense of them first. When empathically participating in one’s personal state, foreign subjects 
and their mental complexity cannot be simply supposed or speculated, they need to be 
perceived and experienced as a whole. As stated by Gallese (2003), when interpersonal 
relations are associated with the understanding of emotions and actions, they are built on 
“automatic, unconscious embodied simulation routines” (Gallese 2003, 517). Along with the 
reception of personal feelings, “internal representations of the body states associated with 
the other’s actions, emotions and sensations are evoked in us, and it is “as if” we were doing 
a similar action or experiencing a similar emotion or sensation” (Zahavi 2012, 220). 
Considering the as if element described by Zahavi, it is of primary importance to understand 
how the psychophysical sharing is performed in the relationship with other individuals 
observed. 
As highlighted by Jardine (2014), “phenomenologists have classically attempted to 
identify and describe a form of experience, empathy (Einfühlung), in which other embodied 
minds are grasped as such, and which more complex and cognitive forms of intersubjectivity 
take as their point of departure” (Jardine 2014, 273). The corporeal manifestation of 
psychophysical states is addressed as essential in the way it constitutes the first and 
immediate visual stimulus that the observer approaches. In fact, “the role of the other’s 
 
3 Edith Stein was Edmund Husserl’s student at University of Göttingen, where she pursues a doctoral thesis on 




embodied expressivity in intersubjectivity is to engage one’s perceptual cognition in such a 
way that it results in the subsequent perceptual awareness of the other’s mental state” 
(Gangopadhyay 2014, 124). For this very reason, Schutz (1967), in his work The 
Phenomenology of the Social World, bridging philosophy and social sciences, claims that 
empathy is first and foremost a perceptual phenomenon able to shape the cognition of the 
world surrounding us, in the context of which other individual’s body ceases to be a mere 
physical entity, giving room to an embodied possibility to communicate and transmit 
personal states of the inner self (Schutz 1967, 20). However, it is opportune to take into 
account that, even if perceptual observation plays a fundamental role in intersubjectivity, it 
is not a sufficient condition for empathy to properly function. As it will be further unfolded, 
the activation and accomplishment of a sense-making process is essential for the observing 
individual. 
Defined by Zlatev as bodily mimesis (Zlatev 2008, 216), the shared ability to 
communicate and represent personal states through the body is essential for intersubjective 
cognition, both in episodic situations and broader cultural frames (Donald 1991, 168), since 
to one’s own body pertains “attitude, beliefs and dispositions” (Gallagher 2005, 37). We are 
able to perceive other people’s states, intentions and feelings because their embodied 
expression is explicit in behaviours and actions. Our instantaneous perception of individuals 
around us is “fast, automatic, irresistible and highly stimulus-driven” (Scholl and Tremoulet 
2000, 299), given that the common interpersonal mode of interaction is instantaneous and 
non-mentalised (Gallagher and Hutto 2008, 21). In fact, as a first approach to make sense of 
others’ inner state, “[t]he perception of emotion in the movement of others […] does not 
involve taking a theoretical stance […] of some inner state” but “[i]t is a perceptual 
experience of embodied comportment” (Ibid., 22). 
Likewise, Husserl (1982) emphasises the relevance of intuition as the major tool for 
comprehension and judgement in its prima facie dimension. In the study and definition of 
the concept of empathy, Husserl is one of the fundamental philosophers who have 
contributed to the shift from an emotional perspective to a phenomenological one. He not 
only was a precursor of many studies conducted in most recent times (Zahavi 2012 or Jardine 
2014), but his theories formulated during the beginning of the twentieth century are still 
recognised as crucial and valuable in the conduction and development of contemporary 




experiential references attributed by the observing subject to the foreign perceived condition. 
If for the observed individual, Husserl claims, feelings, emotions and actions are self-given 
as original, for the observing subject they are not performed in the same way. Actually, our 
experience of the other, even if bodily given in propria persona (Husserl 1973, as cited in 
Zahavi 2010, 10), cannot be completely conveyed in its original formula since the access to 
individual consciousness is limited: every time empathy is experienced, it is impossible to 
discern it from the ‘I’ experiencing it. For this reason, empathy is not only reduced to an 
understanding process: as an all-encompassing phenomenon, it requires an experience-based 
enacting oriented to “live” in first person the affective state that has been recognised in the 
other. The observed individual ceases to be experienced as a foreign subjectivity and “[t]he 
achievement of objective observation – of empathy – is therefore to operate as a projection 
apparatus that glorifies the other and elevates them to the status of a self” (Breithaupt 2019, 
48). Specifically, “[i]t is precisely because of this difference, precisely because of this 
asymmetry, that we can claim that the minds we experience are other minds”, since if “I had 
the same access to the consciousness of the other as I have to my own, the other would cease 
being an other and would instead become a part of myself” (Zahavi 2010, 12). In brief, 
empathy strongly depends on the acknowledgement that the experienced state belongs to an 
outer subject. In fact, the peculiarly empathic condition of feeling into does not preclude the 
awareness about the external nature of the concerned state, but rather it takes place by virtue 
of this clear separation between the self and the other: without a definite separation between 
the observing and the observed subject, there would be no other to empathise with. 
According to Husserl, empathy consists in the unitary experience of expression (a 
certain state, a feeling or emotion, an action, …) and the expressed (the other subject itself), 
since what is grasped from the outside is an already mediated combination of these 
undiscernible two. In other words, “[i]n a certain way, I also experience (and there is a self-
givenness here) the other’s lived experiences; i.e., to the extent that the empathy 
(comprehensio) accomplished as one with the originary experience of the Body is indeed a 
kind of presentification, one that nevertheless serves to ground the character of co-existence 
in the flesh. To that extent, what we have here is thus experience, perception” (Husserl 1989, 
208). In other words, Husserl claims that the comprehension-oriented direction pursued by 
empathy profoundly relies on the physical expressivity derived from the embodied 




step for empathy and empathic understanding to happen. However, “this co-existence […] 
does not, in principle, allow itself to be transformed into immediate originary existence 
(primal presence). It is characteristic of empathy that it refers to an originary Body-spirit-
consciousness but one I cannot myself accomplish originarily, I who am not the other and 
who only function, in regard to him, as a comprehending analog” (Ibid.). In this context, 
physicality plays a key role in the success of the empathic phenomenon. In fact, individuals’ 
physicality represents the first and most direct contact with the other, manifesting through 
bodily expression a particular and personal state. “For Husserl”, Gallagher (2007) explains, 
“understanding another person is not a matter of intellectual inference but a matter of sensory 
activations that are unified in or by the animate organism or lived body that is perceiving 
another animate organism” (Gallagher 2007, 286). 
Each individual’s empathic capacity is developed from an “innate, instinctual, and, 
beyond that, ultimately inexplicable human tendency to motor mimicry” (Stueber 2006, 8). 
This particular sort of bodily identification and impulsive drive to another’s thoughts and 
behaviours denotes the peculiar impulsive and non-theoretical nature of empathy, 
considering the empathic encounter itself the context in which the other’s mental states and 
emotions achieve such validity (Stein 1989). Empathy does not look at the other as a 
simplified representation from a neutral positioning, but, throughout a cognitive process, it 
gains sense in the foreign experience. Similarly, the empirical process in question allows to 
grasp at the same time the entity and consciousness of the other self in his or her entirety. 
Those psychophysical states that are able to give rise to episodes of empathic binding 
function as interpersonal channels for a comprehensive experience of understanding other 
subjects. Both Husserl and Stein support empathy as an interpersonal category “of reciprocal 
intersubjectivity between minded individuals” (Stueber 2006, 9). Gaining sense in its 
peculiar reciprocity, “[e]mpathy not only allows me to solve the basic problem of other 
minds; that is, it not only allows me to recognize another person as being minded”, but “[i]t 
also enables me to develop myself more fully as a reflective and self-critical individual, since 
it enables me to recognize the opinions of others about myself” (Ibid.). Thanks to its mutual 
nature of action, empathy constitutes a relational process and effective source of knowledge, 
not only about the other but also about myself. 
In addition, Husserl emphasises how the far-reaching consciousness of a certain 




features with Lévinas’ theories (1979), stating that the presence of the other rests on his/her 
absence as other4. Following this standpoint, Husserl agrees that in order to attribute 
meaning to a present subject, it is essential to refer to absent elements of his or her 
distinguishingly personal identity, since developing a complete awareness of a foreign 
subject requires more than what is only explicitly given. In every form of perception, and 
empathy, appresentation (Appräsentation5), intended as the perception of the other subject 
as a present being by completing what is grasped by the interpretation of a single experience, 
is crucial. The ‘I’ is able to experience the other precisely because of the element of otherness 
that clearly sets the two individuals apart as two distinct bodies and minds. In fact, Husserl 
(1989) suggests, “[i]t is only with empathy and the constant orientation of empirical 
reflection onto the psychic life which is appresented along with the other’s Body and which 
is continually taken Objectively, together with the Body, that the closed unity, man, is 
constituted, and I transfer this unity subsequently to myself” (Husserl 1989, 175). This is 
essentially because we need to understand origins and intentions of what we perceive in 
order to grasp and understand an experience as given. Others are appreciated not only as 
physical and psychological individuals, a part of the perceived world around the subject who 
observes, but also as subjects who are existing in a world they directly experience as well. 
Empathy was addressed in this first section emphasising its multifaceted nature, 
which has been central in different authors’ works, and the complexity with which it involves 
the accessibility of other people’s mind. As shown, empathy in its philosophical and 
cognitive definition profoundly differs from the general notion of the term. The crucial role 
of subjectivity and its ascription to other subjects as well as the recognition of intentionality 
in individuals we empathise with are fundamental for the as if empathic experience to take 
place. The distinction of the two involved subjectivities as distinct entities has been proven 
as essential, leading to the awareness that empathically experienced states belong to the other 
and can only be grasped in a non-primary form. Moreover, following the works of Husserl, 
Gallagher and then Gallese, the embodied nature of empathy and the empathic experience 
has been acknowledged as crucial for the functioning of this cognitive process. 
 
4 Lévinas (1979) theorises the other as what is absent in the présence-absence spectrum. Without explicitly 
referring to subjects as physical or conscious entities, he states that what is other, distinct from an individual is 
what cannot be grasped or possessed, what is absent in his/her spectrum of possibilities. 
5 Essential concept in phenomenology, appresentation is crucial for empathy in the way the other’s subjectivity 




This first section aimed to give a first explanatory introduction about the 
phenomenon of empathy, as a phenomenological concept and its fundamental features. To 
summarise, empathy can be conceived “as being (1) a primary, non-reducible, other-directed 
feeling of concern or interest that (2) is characterized by a clear distinction between 
empathizer and the other person, that (3) targets the other’s situated experience and (4) 
consciously ascribes that experience specifically to that other” (Gallagher 2012, 376-377). 
While both philosophers and neuroscientists have been trying to exhaustively define this 
phenomenon, the next sections of this chapter deal with the specificities of empathy as an 
intersubjective mechanism and its role in sense-making processes. 
 
1.2. Cognition and Empathic Sense-Making: An Embodied Form of Understanding 
 
Empathic perception is a broad phenomenon that moves from the elementary 
conception of an “unmediated quasi-perceptual ability to recognize other creatures directly 
as minded creatures and to recognize them implicitly as creatures that are fundamentally like 
us” (Stueber 2006, 20), to a more exhaustive capacity to “conceive of another person’s more 
complex social behavior as the behavior of a rational agent who acts for a reason” (Ibid., 
21). In other words, empathy is a large-scale phenomenon which not only allows the 
involvement and participation in states belonging other subjects, but also the recognition of 
their subjectivity and the intentionality in their actions. However, empathy is not only a 
process of perception, but also a tool for comprehension. Or, inverting the perspective, 
empathy “also requires a minimal and more explicit comprehension of the mental state” 
(Gallagher 2012, 356) of a person. In this specific context, understanding and empathy are 
mutually essential to each other, and they subsist in a frame of reciprocal support. In fact, 
intersubjective understanding is not only consequential to empathy, but empathic processes 
can achieve a deeper and more complete stage when inter-personal knowledge is profound, 
personal and concrete6. As shown, empathy is crucial when understanding states belonging 
to external subjects, since through the experience of feeling into it is possible to recognise 
and acknowledge external subjectivities and their intentionality. According to Stueber 
(2006), it is “epistemically essential” (Stueber 2006, 131) for the comprehension of agents 
 
6 In the case of empathy, understanding as such is central, whereas with regard to sympathy care, interest and 




other than us. Understanding, intended as a sense-making process oriented to fully 
comprehend the other, is not an automatic result of experiencing empathy, but an inherent 
brain-based activity common to every human being. Mental processes, behaviours, emotions 
and any other psycho-physical activity non-primordially experienced contribute to the 
formation of personal knowledge through the other about us in primis, other individuals and 
the outer world. As highlighted by Zeki (2009), “a central and primordial function of the 
brain is the seeking of knowledge and […] it does so through the formation of concepts [… 
:] a solution that evolution has devised to solve the problem of acquiring all sensory 
knowledge” (Zeki 2009, 1-2). In other words, Zeki claims that concepts formation is 
essential for the acquisition of knowledge, since the way we make sense of the outer world 
relies on the mental abstraction of what we observe. In fact, the form of the comprehension 
of what is sensorially grasped depends on the way it is shaped into ideas and assimilated by 
our mind. These recently formed concepts are not static and permanent. On the contrary, 
they are subject to alteration in light of what is subsequently experienced. In fact, the process 
of understanding does not rely only on “what is available in the world outside”, but on “what 
is available in the brain as well” (Zeki 2009, 52). Since the only form of “direct and non-
inferential knowledge is my own” (Zahavi 2010, 5), I have the chance to make sense of what 
is present in other subjects’ minds solely by projecting what I have access to (that is, what 
is already framed in my mind and I consciously know). In fact, the mind of the observing 
subject, with its structured knowledge, serves as model to simulate intentions, feelings and 
beliefs of the other, playing a key role in the successful constitution of meaning. When 
observing what is other for us, it is possible to make sense of the elements that pertain to the 
outer world only in the way they are reconstructed by the brain as concepts. 
In this particular form of understanding the subjectivity of the empathised individual 
is a central source of meaning, at a point where the actual experience of the observed person 
and its embodied state becomes a direct source of awareness of the other as an active subject. 
Or, alternatively, as a possible intuition of ‘what is meant’, intended as an attempt of unity 
within the diverse possible interpretative meanings (Husserl 2001). As a result, empathy 
constitutes an as intuitive as powerful instrument, enabling one to perceive another 
subjectivity external to the subject experiencing it. Indeed, 
“[i]f the perceived material object is, in a sense, relatively unproblematic as an example 
of the intuitively given, […] the other personal-subjective life is intuitively present only 




experience by which the subject achieves, through the two moments of perception and 
explication, a sui generis7 grasp of a transcendent personal-subjective life, in its 
transcendence and yet also, to a certain extent, its determinate comportment” (Jardine 
2014, 285). 
A unique form of understanding, empathy is characterised as sui generis, depicted as such 
at first by Lipps (1907, as cited in Zahavi 2010, 4), who refers to the empathic process as a 
proper “modality of knowledge […] as irreducible and original as our perceptual experience 
of objects or our memory of our past experiences” (Zahavi 2010, 4). After years of research, 
Lipps (1907) published one of the most relevant studies on the specificity of empathic 
understanding, describing it as genuine as the original sensorial experience of formerly 
perceived elements that currently belong to our memory. Coined by Vischer (1994) in the 
first place, Lipps employs the notion of Einfühlung not only to address the perception of 
inanimate objects, but also psychophysical states of other subjects. For the first time, Lipps 
expands this definition of feeling into experience from a mere aesthetic perspective to a 
phenomenological sphere comprehensive of interpersonal relations. 
Jardine explains empathy as the fundamental passage that allows whoever observes 
to translate a momentary perception in a concept, able to simultaneously explain the 
psychophysical state of an individual and the individual himself or herself. Asserting that it 
is possible to derive meaning from the encounter with and perception of the other 
“presupposes a theory of the knowability of the other self and therewith a theory of the 
latter’s pregiveness” (Schutz 1967, 20). According to the philosopher, this assumption 
depends foremost on the certainty that a particular meaning belongs to the observed person’s 
state, and that the meaning under consideration can be grasped with the same degree of 
understanding that would pertain to any observing individual’s behaviour. 
In this frame, the way we constitute our knowledge of others is singular and specific. 
Phenomenologically, making sense of others and the perceived world “takes as its point of 
departure the way things make sense to us, that is, how they mean” (Sonesson 2007, 89). 
This meaning-oriented reduction is essential to acknowledge that sense-making is always 
related to the observing perspective. 
 
7 Empathy is defined as a form of knowledge sui generis referring to is peculiarly unique modes of operation. 
Phenomenologically and cognitively, it cannot be reduced to any simpler concept or phenomenon previously 




The first procedural step of the sense-making process “is to recognize the existence 
of configurations within our conscious life” and, “[h]owever diverse the lived experiences 
may be, they are bound together by the fact that they are mine [… ,] unity conferred by the 
reflective glance, the unity of meaning” (Schutz 1967, 74-75). On the contrary, when 
empathy is experienced, this unitarian consciousness on meaning leaves room to a more 
complex and intricated field of experience, which involves the dual relationship of two 
minds intersubjectively bound, which requires to be consciously acknowledged by the 
observer. In fact, Zahavi continues, Lipps theorises that this developed awareness is 
fundamental for the encounter with another subject to gain meaning. This awareness is 
validated by the recollection of the observer with personal prior self-experience, which 
serves “as a reservoir of meaning that is transferred onto the other in a purely passive 
manner”, establishing an unprecedented “phenomenal unity” (Zahavi 2012, 235). Facing the 
interpretation of an outer personal state, every observing subject spontaneously tends to 
distinguish within the variety of past experiences available the ones that can jointly assemble 
a meaningful interpretation of what is perceived and recognised. Thanks to the resemblances 
to recollected memories, it is possible to detach what is empathically grasped from a 
mentally abstracted form of the involved emotions and move to the concreteness of the 
other’s experience in question. In this context, it is fundamental to be aware that the empathic 
drive is oriented towards the reproduction and expression of a specific grasped mental state, 
and not to the pure ascription of a commonly defined and generalised feeling. Empathy 
assumes the form of inner participation to a foreign state. 
Following this Schutz (1967) raises a fundamental issue, questioning the role of 
involvement in social relations: “[i]f we become participants, do we lose our objectivity? If 
we remain mere observers, do we lose the […] subjective meaning of the action?” (Schutz 
1967, xxii). However, empathic participation does not consist in a literal reproduction of 
what is understood, but in a unique and personalised version which can be affected by the 
emotional and corporeal consciousness derived by preceding experiences. In fact, referring 
to specific entities other than us, and specifically to other individuals’ states, it is 
fundamental to consciously acknowledge that the “world I glimpse empathically is an 
existing world, posited as having being like the world primordially perceived” within which 
“[t]he perceived world and the world given empathically are the same world differently 




spontaneous in the manner our body generates it, the way we perceive and interact with other 
entities always includes a certain degree of consciousness about the dynamics taking place. 
Being aware of the social conventions that are involved in a particular framework of 
experience ensures a more effective understanding of foreign subjects and relative states. 
Indeed, sense-making of other psycho-physical individuals during empathic 
processes cannot be discerned from recollection, since understanding is constructed along 
similarities and analogous references generated by what has been already lived in the past. 
This formerly assembled collection of experiences “by its very nature is built up before our 
eyes in continuous and discrete synthesis of manifold experiences and in the shifting 
appearance of ever new sides and phases that are peculiar to it as an individual” (Schutz 
1967, 76). In particular, comprehension of what is other than us depends on “certain modes 
of thought and feeling that are common to many because our brains, at a certain fundamental 
level, are organized along very similar and common lines” (Zeki 2009, 5). The observing 
subject does not rationalise the process of understanding, producing theoretical knowledge 
on the individual empathising with, but he or she employs himself or herself as an instrument 
to make sense of the other, with a “distinction between the genuine understanding of the 
other person and the abstract conceptualization of his actions or thoughts as being of such 
and such a type” (Schutz 1967, xxv). That is, “[i]t is not true that a person uses only a 
sensory-cognitive apparatus to perceive things and people, and then shares this information 
with other mental systems. The implication is rather that one must prepare one’s entire self 
for the act of perceiving and recognizing […] the fundamental property of the objective 
person in perception” (Breithaupt 2019, 43). In other words, the framing and understanding 
of other people’s psychophysical states deeply depend on the self and on the way the 
observer mind is capable of shaping and giving meaning to what is perceived. 
Moreover, Schutz (1967) questions how intersubjective knowledge can be effective 
and universal, basing his analysis on interpersonal relations. In the first place, it is essential 
to remember that meaning is substantially personal and subjective, and “the meaning I give 
to your experiences cannot be precisely the same as the meaning you give to them when you 
proceed to interpret them” (Schutz 1967, 99). During the intersubjective understanding 
process, both individuals involved are in the same position: while experiencing the other 
(and, simultaneously, a secondary state that is both new and their own), they can only refer 




“I could be aware of your whole experience, you and I would be the same person” (Ibid., 
106). On the contrary, “everything I know about your conscious life is really based on my 
knowledge of my own lived experiences” which are “constituted in simultaneity or 
quasisimultaneity with your lived experience, to which they are intentionally related” (Ibid.). 
Through observation and empathic understanding, it is possible to grasp other’s people 
experiences in their ‘continuity’, but never in their ‘completeness’. That is, the interpretation 
of other people’s acts is an approximate projection of the intended meaning elaborated from 
what is available within our previously perceived and experienced personal knowledge, 
since a complete access to foreign minds is precluded. Therefore, the observing individual 
“knows perfectly well from the total context of his own experience that, corresponding to 
the outer objective and public meaning which he has just deciphered, there is this other, 
inner, subjective meaning” (Ibid., 113). 
In the definition of the empathic experience, many authors highlight the role of co-
presence between observing and observed subject in a shared space. In fact, empathy can be 
more profoundly experienced if the given content expressed by an individual to another is 
articulated in a context of proximity, since a consistent part of the meaning transfer takes 
place through the embodiment (which can assume different forms, from expressive 
phenomena to more complex behavioural elements) of a specific state. When studies on 
semiotics and phenomenology began to approach embodiment as a key element of 
interpersonal comprehension, an actual shift in the understanding of intersubjective 
empathic experiences took place. Since then, meaning making practices have been addressed 
with a deeper consciousness of embodied cognition’s situated nature, accentuating the role 
of bodies, their relations, but also the “interaction with the physical and sociocultural 
environment” (Lindblom and Ziemke 2007, 132). 
Starting from the Heideggerian phenomenal dimension of being-in-the-world 
(Heidegger 1962), this newly developed situated approach on the study of physical and 
performative articulations opens an embodied perspective on the mind ant its capability of 
interacting with the surrounding environment. “[T]through the history of its phylogenetic 
and ontogenetic interactions with the environment” (Lindblom and Ziemke 2007, 138), the 
body develops an autonomous and unique capacity to behave, react and perform what is only 
mentally and internally experienced. In fact, both as individuals and collective groups, we 




of skills determined by “by practice [,] without ever having to represent to ourselves our 
body as an object, our culture as a set of beliefs, or our propensities as situation-action rules” 
(Dreyfus 1979, 52-52). Thus, we are able to personally disclose mental states expressed in 
bodily representations, “viewed as based on a correspondence or mapping between elements 
of the external world and their internal correspondents” (Ibid., 142), which become 
fundamental in the mental conceptualisation of the relationship between internal and 
external point of view. The Husserlian (1989) theory on interpersonal understanding 
“involves processes that happen on the level of bodily sensation” (Gallagher 2007, 286), 
guaranteeing “access to others that predates or prefigures anything that would involve 
inference or analogy” (Ibid.). Husserl describes the way we act and react to different mental 
and emotional stimuli as ‘body-schematic system’, which responds to intersubjective 
interfacing with primary in the understanding process of the other. The bodily appearance 
of the individual we are empathising with, besides constituting the immediate element 
coming into sight, completes the system of relations between psychological and mental 
interior state and the external expression of it. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999), 
embodiment is not only limited to the neural structuring of cognitive processes, but also 
phenomenological classification of daily bodily schemes, “everything we can be aware of, 
especially our own mental states, our bodies, our environment and our physical and social 
interactions”, in essence the level we refer to as “the “feel” of experience” (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999, 103). This embodied representation is simply a flexible scheme that permits 
the understanding of organism-environment relations. 
In addition, Schutz (1967) describes the foreign body as a field of expression (Schutz 
1967, 22), considering ‘expression’ in the way “the external behaviour of the other person 
functions as an indication of his inner subjective experience” (Ibid.), or as an intentionally 
deliberated physical manifestation of a voluntary expression. While I don’t consciously 
perceive my body as an active entity, a much more pragmatic intentionality can be grasped 
about the subject performing a certain action. Hence, “detailed aspects of movement […], 
even if we are not aware of them (even if they are not explicitly intentional), are intentional 
insofar as they are part of a longer intentional action” (Gallagher 2007, 277). In particular, 
because of the peculiarity of some of bodily features, such as physical manifestations and 




relying on ontogenetic8 mechanisms. In this context, ontogenesis is addressed referring to a 
developmental anthropology-based approach, according to which every human being 
embodies the manifestation of his or her personal historical and experiential making in his 
or her corporeal expressivity (Toren 2002, 188). However, the experienced consciousness 
about actions and movements is the first way to understand bodies and their performatively 
expressed meanings. Before the observed object can be rationalised and developed as a 
mentally defined notion, emotions, feelings and ideas are conveyed in many different forms, 
among which bodily expression is one of the most essential one. The first provided 
possibility of understanding others through empathy is guaranteed from our “access to their 
embodied actions and the rich worldly contexts within which they act” (Gallagher 2002, 
377). 
In fact, as claimed by Schutz (1967), movements of foreign bodies are not only seen 
as “physical events but also as a sign that the other person is having certain lived experiences 
which he is expressing through those movements” (Schutz 1967, 101). Signs that we are 
able to perceive form another subject’s behaviour depend for the observer on a certain 
codification, charged with a personally developed level of indexicality. Our perception has 
the ability to interpret specific foreign states only when expressed through bodily features, 
and they begin to be addressed as signs in the moment in which they are embodied and 
ultimately accessible for being grasped (Sonesson 2010, 149). From the observer’s 
perspective, bodily actions in all forms bring to light both traces of the lived experiences and 
elements of conceived meaning. In fact, Schutz (1967) continues, “the man in the natural 
attitude perceives changes in that external object which is known to him as the other’s body” 
and he “interprets these changes just as he interprets changes in inanimate objects, namely, 
by interpretation of his own lived experiences of the events and processes in question” 
(Schutz 1967, 108). The construction of meaning concerning what is bodily performed 
requires the (at times spontaneous) semiotic deciphering of physical expressions, through a 
system of signs that is interpreted and employed following a personal and socially shared set 
of meanings. In fact, throughout both collective and individual evolution it becomes 
spontaneously possible as individuals to decipher all those corporeal mimetic symbols which 
immediately recall to both mental and emotional specific expressions. 
 




Making sense of other people’s actions and mental states requires these to be framed 
at the “most appropriate pragmatic level possible”, since “we see actions as meaningful in 
the context of the physical and intersubjective environment” (Gallagher and Hutto 2008, 24). 
First medium of expression of each individual, the body of the other person is “[t]he very 
first of all cultural objects, and the one by which all the rest exist, […] as the vehicle of a 
form of behaviour” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 406), and the embodied simulation constitutes the 
primordial key access to the observed mental state (Gallese 2003, 525). In fact, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, the body’s role is not only relevant in its way of being present in the 
experience of the other, but it is precisely the tool which shapes the experience itself in its 
way of participating in the space of action. The body is both subject (the observer) and object 
(the observed individual) of perception, and it constitutes the key situated element which 
actively take part in the empathic process. While for the observed subject the core content 
(or the origin from which a behaviour results) of an action is separated and independent from 
its expression, in the eyes of the observer these two elements are not disconnected, but 
mutually influenced and equally essential for the purpose of understanding. After observing 
the manifested behaviour of another subject, we position it within a wider context of 
meaning, psychophysically given through the recollection of previously experienced 
schemata. Phenomenologically, we make sense of those experiences through sequential self-
interpretative processes, which are constituted by the understanding of what has been lived 
in the past “from the point of view of a new lived experience” (Schutz 1967, 78). This 
complex and articulated set of formerly developed interpretative contexts is a necessary 
condition upon which what is in question and every lately shaped meaning rest. In this 
context, namely the one which is available for the observer, self-experience functions as a 
model for oneself, as long as understanding is accomplished through the projection of those 
pre-experienced paths into the other. Comprehension, as intended and explained by Gallese, 
stands on the individuals’ natural tendency of matching what is observed with a set of 
behaviours and reactions that the observer could perform, in conformity with consolidated 
personal patterns. 
Moreover, Gallese (2003) explains that empathy resides in the understanding of other 
people’s feelings, “be it a particular emotion or sensory state” (Gallese 2003, 517). This 
particular scenario of comprehension takes place in an intersubjectively shared framework, 




display. The actions of people around us detain an ‘expressive power’, allowing empathy to 
take place in the establishment of “an affective meaningful interpersonal link” (Ibid., 519). 
If empathy (considering its Einfühlung conception, namely the experience of feeling into and 
understanding other subjects’ psychophysical states) is intended as an ‘inner imitation’ and 
not an inferential condition, a shared space is necessary for the expressive power to perform 
embodied signs of the state experienced by the observed subject. As explained by Gallagher 
(2007), “I perceive the emotions and the intentions of the other person in their bodily 
movements and gestural expressions, and in doing so, my own embodiment acts as template 
for understanding” (Gallagher 2007, 288). In fact, “in everyday life we are able to ‘decode’ 
the quality of the sensations or emotions embedded in the witnessed behaviour of others 
without the need to exert any conscious cognitive effort” (Ibid.). The lack of cognitive efforts 
that we experience in everyday empathic simulation process does not depend on conscious 
and intended actions, which on the contrary are pre-reflexive and spontaneous. The 
establishment and development of cognitive interpersonal relations is supported, according 
to Gallese (2003), by the formulation of a common range of similarities, including a ‘shared 
manifold’, in the context of which “we recognize other human beings as similar to us that 
intersubjective communication, social imitation, and the ascription of intentions become 
possible” (Gallese 2003, 524)9. That is, Gallese highlights the relevance of common grounds 
and similarities, acknowledging that “[a]ctions, emotions, and sensations experienced by 
others become meaningful to us because we can share their underlying basic format with 
others” (Ibid., 525). 
The phenomenologically perceived sense of similarity among past and present 
experiences is projected on a functional level, developing and defining original models of 
‘simulation routines’. Also, collective understanding of perpetuated typical subjects’ 
behaviours has a fundamental impact on recalling similar paths to shape the comprehension 
of empathised subjects. In this way, those schemata are comprehended and validated by 
collectively and individually consolidated mechanisms of sense-making, among which 
 
9 Gallese (2003) defines empathic shared manifold on three different levels. First, the phenomenological level 
“is responsible for the sense of similarity, of being individuals within a larger social community of people like 
us, which we experience whenever we confront other human beings” (Gallese 2003, 525). Second, the 
functional level is grounded on embodied simulation habits, allowing as if based interpersonal connections to 
take place. Last, the sub-personal level admits, on the contrary, the constitution of shared spaces that allow to 
appreciate, experience and understand the actions we observe, the emotions and the sensations we take others 
to experience. On these levels, embodied simulation comprises the elementary structure constituting an 




mutual influence shapes and affects singular processes of understanding. Hence, even when 
deeply rooted cultural habits and social praxis are strongly present and ingrained, the 
perception of the other in itself is sufficient for the sense-making process to produce new 
knowledge about another’s mental state, often following unprecedented patterns. Moreover, 
comprehending others through empathy does not only allow us to increment our 
understanding of the outer world, but it is also a constitutional segment of an exhaustive 
knowledge on ourselves, in both the roles of subjects and objects. The empathic experience 
allows a reciprocal uncovering of hidden elements pertaining to different individualities, 
which are able to emerge thanks to the acquisition of new tools for sense-making. 
Hence, Stein (1989) maps the steps that empathy follows from the observation of 
another individual to the brain-based concept formation. The philosopher explains that 
empathy evolves throughout three levels, from the incidental intersubjective interaction to 
the conscious development of new forms of meaning. As she illustrates, in the first place the 
experience ‘emerges’, whether oriented toward a stranger or somebody we are familiar with. 
At the end of the empathic process’s entire duration, the ‘fulfilling explication’ is achieved, 
as result of the acquisition of new forms of understanding. Lastly, the experience is 
‘comprehensively objectified’, with a conscious acknowledgment of new meanings derived 
from it (Stein 1989, xviii). If taking a cognitive approach toward the phenomenon, empathy 
can also be defined a “as the understanding of the other’s emotions, thoughts, states, desires, 
and preferences” (Breithaupt 2019, 23). 
This second section of the first chapter addressed the role of empathy in sense-
making. The way meaning is structured by individuals’ perception has been discussed 
following all those elements that comprise empathic participation: embodiment, social and 
cultural symbolic codes as well as emotional involvement. The process of empathy, 
grounded on the mediation role of the body to the counter-subjectivity (Makkreel 2010, 202) 
of the empathised other, leads to the understanding of external individuals and his or her 
experienced states. In fact, empathy allows the re-experience of external realities, which are 
understood through the complexity of acquired structures of experience. This shared 
condition, in light of what grasped about the other, personal recollection and the 
confrontation between the two, supports understanding through the participation of the self 
in the other individuals’ states. As shown, the process of empathic understanding relies on 




experienced state, is implemented by those mimetic symbols that can be deciphered by 
personal and collective experience. To conclude, the next and last subchapter tackles how 
intersubjective experiences and empathic comprehension are decoded and clarified on a both 
personal and narrative level. 
 
1.3. Domains of Experience and Hermeneutic Backgrounds in Narrative 
 
In the work The Architecture of Semantic Domains (2004), Brandt highlights the 
relevance of context in the process of meaning making. In fact, he claims, what is 
“meaningful is meaningful in a ‘context’; contexts supply relevant frames for the contents 
of our consciousness, and they thereby allow us to draw inferences form these contents” 
(Brandt 2004, 30). The single empathic experience is effective only if a broader 
understanding takes place, besides the comprehensive grasp of a single psychophysical state. 
As claimed by Stueber (2006), the knowledge of a larger whole is necessary to appreciate 
an isolated element, but the entirety of certain circumstances makes complete sense only “in 
light of the overall consistency of its parts” (Stueber 2006, 12). In the same way, “in order 
to understand the significance of a particular act of an individual I must inherently grasp the 
context to which that act belongs, as well as how it fits into this context and vice versa” 
(Ibid.). Elementary contexts of meaning are essential for the observing subject to trace and 
construct the primary sense of what is observed. All the contexts that each subject involves 
in the understanding process are organised upon semantic domains, based on ‘bodily 
experience’, intended as both proper physical motion and “stable articulation of our life-
world as an experienceable whole” (Ibid.). As product of our actions and interactions with 
both human and non-human subjects which are part of our environment (more in general, 
the totality of the fields of interplay that we develop in different environments of the outer 
world), bodily experience allows abstract concepts to be linked in broader domains. Since 
“understanding takes place in terms of entire domains of experience and not in terms of 
isolated concepts” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 117), elementary domains in their entirety 
constitute a structured whole that allows experience to get organised and grouped according 
to areas of meaning. However, the role of bodily experiences is not only fundamental in the 
formation of personal and shared domains: those same domains are in return essential to 




Brandt (2004), “our understanding of social, mental and abstract domains […] is formed on 
our understanding of spatial and bodily stories onto social, mental and abstract stories” 
(Brandt 2004, 33). 
Furthermore, these semantic domains, or domains of experience, are constant 
references for our mind to schematically make sense of new experienced realities. In fact, 
“metaphors allow us to understand one domain of experience in terms of another”, and the 
situations we experience in our everyday life “are then conceptualized and defined in terms 
of other basic domains of experience” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 117). Moreover, they 
emphasise that “[e]ach such domain is a structured whole within our experience that is 
conceptualized as what we have called an experimental gestalt” and it is able to characterise 
a “structured whole within recurrent human experiences” (Ibid.). Their approach, in short, 
underlines the essential role of metaphors in understanding human experiences, making them 
coherent “in terms of such multidimensional gestalts” (Ibid., 81). In fact, the symbolic 
transposition of reality is fundamental to classify categories of experience that allow us to 
elaborate newly perceived meaning of foreign mental, emotional and psychological states. 
The symbols that we collect throughout the participation in different experiences, intended 
as an index of signifiers and signified, essentially constitute icons that authentically represent 
“internalized imitations” (Zlatev 2008, 323). Specifically, these agreed and shared links to 
mentally assimilated concepts are characterised by an experiential nature, since they are 
phenomenologically accessible to observers’ consciousness, and their representational pre-
reflexive way of symbolising the state they stand for. Individually, we tend to express in a 
personal and unique position an individual state, which in most cases matches with a 
conventionally agreed significance, immediately perceived as positioned on top of the 
meanings’ hierarchy. 
Domains of experience and semantic metaphors are crucial for empathy in a 
narratological way. As suggested by Breithaupt (2011), empathy plays a key role in 
influencing and shaping sense-making processes “producing a narrative order” (Breithaupt 
2011, 5). In general terms, narrative should not be conceived here as a pre-structured 
regulated sequence, but precisely as the path that we shape when empathising with other 
subjects. For this reason, individual comprehension follows the causal and spatiotemporal 
model that empathically conceived narratives attribute to actions and intentions. On the one 




previous section, we rely on the categories developed from personal experiences, namely 
subjective domains, to make sense of what observed. On the other hand, semantic domains 
gain sense in each individual’s mind only if continuously confirmed by personal 
(interactions with subjects pertaining to the outer world) and collective (cultural 
practicalities, what we generally define as common knowledge or common ground, social 
and political structures, or linguistic habits) experiences. Semantic memory, as illustrated by 
Donald (1991), is constituted by a multiplicity of units which, combined and ordered in 
diverse sequences, can construct a variety of narratives, from personal practices of 
representing reality to shared mythological repertories. In fact, the evolutionary psychologist 
claims that what distinguishes human subjects from other mammals is precisely the 
secondary usage of episodic memory, namely derived from everyday observation and 
events, in favour of semantic memory, which depends on the structuring of categories of 
meaning deeply grounded on symbolic deciphering, becoming “the dominant form of 
memory in human culture” (Donald 1991, 152). It is important (and not contradictory) to 
highlight the role of both personal and contextual perception in the empathic process, 
considering subjects, environments and objects are differently approached in the way we 
learn to understand them. In particular, “[t]he environment, the situation, or the pragmatic 
context is never perceived neutrally (without meaning), either in regard to our own possible 
actions, or in regard to the actions and possibilities of others” (Gallagher and Hutto 2008, 
24). In fact, human subjects behave and interact in a shared environment that is so dense of 
cultural features that artificial structures are almost indiscernible and undistinguishable from 
natural ones (Tomasello 1999, 54). Not considering collective elements in a socially shared 
context would limit the overall understanding of what is experienced within its boundaries. 
Therefore, the process of understanding through empathy, if understood under a 
simulationist approach, “involves imagining the experience of a narrative from that other 
person’s point of view” (Goldie 2000, 178). In case of consistent cultural and social 
discrepancies, and also considering biographical divergences that can be traced to each 
individual’s background, it is essential not to neglect that understanding cannot always be 
limited to basic actions and cannot only be attributable to elementary mental states. When 
making sense of other people and their actions, it is indispensable to acknowledge that “mere 
biological similarity among humans” is not sufficient to confer “a sufficient degree of 




thought” (Stueber 2006, 205). The multifaceted complexity of the variety of contexts of 
meaning, both commonly shared and personal ones, opens a debate on the question of 
projectionism and its dangers. Considering that the hermeneutic nature of empathy relies on 
the instant effect of interpretative actions, the structure of knowledge derived from empathic 
approaches may by essence not be ‘self-verifying’, but, on the contrary, deeply personal and 
questionable. 
Hence, Stueber continues, “[r]eenacting another person’s thoughts requires keeping 
in mind differences in our central background assumptions, since those background 
assumptions might influence our inferential behavior, which aspects of a situation we count 
as salient and relevant to our practical deliberation, and what reaction we would regard as 
appropriate” (Ibid., 207). Normatively evaluating habits pertain to every subject on the basis 
of one’s social, cultural and personal formation as specifically located individual in a 
spatiotemporal context. At the same time, also sets of thoughts, emotions, mental states and 
behaviours that one is spontaneously called to comprehend are products of definite beliefs 
and perspectives which have a solid impact on the subjective rationality that belongs to not 
necessarily immediately accessible to the observing subject actions. In this matter, cultural 
and identitary peculiar features are entitled to model processes and responses, and it is thus 
crucial for one to recognise “that a difference in evaluative beliefs also concerns a difference 
in how such beliefs are integrated with our emotional responses” (Ibid., 210). The way we 
approach others and the outer world follows ‘fundamental parameters’ to which we are 
culturally and even sentimentally related. Unconsciously shaping the variety of different 
narratives that we build about what surrounds us, these parameters affect each individual as 
both emotionally and analytically active subject, since “reenactment is essential for 
understanding intentional agency because it is only in this manner that we are able to 
conceive of agents as situated in certain environments and as responding in a rational manner 
to the demands of this environment” (Ibid., 216). 
Moreover, narratives are important in the way they allow the observer to position 
different objects of empathy within the most suitable domain of experience to make sense 
of what newly grasped. And, conversely, everything grasped throughout multiple 
experiences permits all of us to shape narratives increasingly comprehensive and more and 
more accurate. As suggested by Gallagher and Hutto (2008), “the pervasive presence of 




can provide a more parsimonious alternative to theory or simulation approaches, and a better 
way to account for the more nuanced understandings […] we have of others” (Gallagher and 
Hutto 2008, 28). In this sense, the capacity of building and enriching personal narratives of 
the outer world is directly associated with the capacity of comprehending others. It is 
possible to empathise with individuals close to us and others far away, but “only when we 
know their stories – only when we can frame their behaviour in a narrative that informs us 
about their history or their situation” (Gallagher 2012, 370). Narrative’s role is not only 
restricted to the purpose of shaping a context to frame what is observed. Most importantly, 
they provide structures within which it is possible to make sense of other people and outer 
bodily expressions. As explained by Gallagher, narratives are translated from contexts “that 
operate to widen or make more specific the meaning/significance of actions and expressive 
movements” (Ibid., 377). 
In the case of empathy, contexts of meaning are necessary for the observing subject 
to make sense of what is perceived. In The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation 
(1957), Weber aims to illustrate the foundations of the contemporary order and highlights 
the crucial role of contexts of meaning, describing them as “a plurality of elements which 
form a coherent whole on the level of meaning. There are several possible modes of 
meaningful relation between such elements, such as logical consistency, the esthetic 
harmony of a style or the appropriateness of means to an end” (Weber 1957, 95). In the same 
way, as expressed by Schutz (1967), in order to understand actions, intentions, and whys of 
other subjects, observation of embodied peculiarities (behaviours, facial expressions, 
movements, …) is not sufficient. Reversely, for our mind it is indispensable to structure an 
exhaustively detailed context of meaning capable of making sense of what is examined. In 
fact, the sphere of perception of an individual is operative in a ‘perceptual field’, a specific 
setting, “and the way it is given to us is influenced by what is co-given with it” (Zahavi 2010, 
19). Fragmented and discontinuous elements come together into every subject’s mind to 
constitute individually shaped meaning contexts, or configurations of meaning. In order to 
ensure the effectiveness of these configurations, it is essential to consider that “our lived 
experiences […] stand in a meaning-context if and only if, once they have been lived through 
in separate steps, they are then constituted into a synthesis of a higher order, becoming 




In other words, these configurations of meaning are essentially schemes elaborated 
from situations that individuals have formerly faced, enhanced contexts aimed to understand 
new elements that differ from what is already known. They are built following a rigorous 
sequential order, namely the “temporal dimension in narrative” (Lamarque 2004, 394) 
structured along a chronological relation between events, “even if just that of simultaneity” 
(Ibid.). The collection of knowledge and experiences organised in narrative sequences 
allows each individual to develop a personal judgment not only in the comprehension of 
other people’s actions, but also the perceptive capacity to foresee what to expect from 
themselves and others in similar to previously encountered situations. In their composition, 
narratives include a multiplicity of different narratives that gain sense and effectiveness 
consolidating through repetition and similarity. 
As highlighted by Schutz (1967), a “scheme of experience is a meaning context 
which is a configuration of our past experiences embracing conceptually the experiential 
objects to be found in the latter” (Schutz 1967, 82). This process of making order of lived 
experiences through synthetic schemes according to means complements a proper 
“interpretation of the lived experience” (Ibid., 84). Nevertheless, since our experience is 
multiple and diverse, it becomes fundamental to select a specific scheme out of the 
interpretative combinations available in our brain. To make narratively sense of what is 
empathically grasped, it is necessary to already dispose of relatable possibilities which we 
can access with cognitive immediacy. However, individuals do not carry with themselves 
contexts of meaning that are only individually developed: as regarding experiential 
metaphors and settings, we dispose and address a consistent number of elements that 
comprises historically and culturally shared components, and which pertain to every 
individual as material of belonging to a certain collective group of people. To every temporal 
fragment specifically located in a (not only geographical but also social) context a particular 
selection of narratives, synthesis, and relevant elements of agency that are significant on a 
spatiotemporal frame applies (which we can individually dispose in an almost automatic and 
non-inferential way). 
This is precisely the role of narratives: it is through narratives that we learn how to 




narratives contribute to the sense-making process with a solid ‘hermeneutical background’10, 
which “consists of a learned set of skills and practical knowledge concerning what to expect 
from people, and how to deal with them” (Gallagher 2012, 371). At the same time, as 
claimed by Sternberg (1990), narratological structures are produced and constantly 
systematised in their organisation by the wholeness of sense-making process that we 
continuously face during our experiences. 
Notwithstanding, as indicated before, each individual’s background plays an 
essential role in shaping narratives to understand other people. A specific mental state 
experienced and performed in a certain situation can be differently perceived and interpreted 
by different subjects who dispose of different interpretative tools. Or, as defined by Zeman 
(2016), different perspectives, described by the author as the unique “relation between an 
evaluating eye, bound to an origo11, and an object focused on” (Zeman 2016, 18). 
Perspective is fundamental, Zeman clarifies, because every act of evaluation and 
understanding is bond to a subjective ‘here and now”, which was necessarily shaped by a 
definite personal path constituted by individually framed segments that led to that singular 
‘here and now’ perspective. In fact, in the event that a personal perspective is subject to 
change, “the perceived aspects in focus can be considered a consequence of the observer’s 
spatio-temporal viewpoint” (Ibid., 19). Conceivably, there are as many perspectives 
available as individuals observing a specific frame (equal in moment place), and many others 
pertaining the same subject but different in time (Zunshine 2006, 17). 
The involvement of perspective-taking in empathy allows a definite separation 
between subject and object, in the context of which the observer is able to project himself or 
herself in the situation in which the observed individual stands (Preston and de Waal 2002, 
18). The key role of perspective allows each of us to consciously separate what pertains to 
our personal sphere and what is external to our individual dimension, projecting comparable 
circumstances on the other to understand what he or she is experiencing in a specific frame 
(Zlatev 2008, 225). 
 
10 In this context, hermeneutics is intended as the discipline concerning “interpretation and understanding, 
theory that tries to determine the manner in which we grasp and explicate the meaning of another person’s 
utterances” (Stueber 2006, 9). 
11 The term ‘origo’ refers to the point of origin, namely the source, from which a diegetic relation is started. It 




Oriented to intersubjective understanding, empathy is not limited to routine 
circumstances within the frame of our immediate circle. Narrative schemes, contexts of 
experiences and hermeneutical backgrounds, as presented in the sections before, effectively 
adhere to many more frameworks with effective interpretative tools. Cultural and artistic 
products are among them. This first chapter of the dissertation addressed empathy in its 
intersubjective nature. Discussed as a cognitive sense-making process between individuals, 
this phenomenon was deployed highlighting the essential peculiarities of empathy: 
embodiment and simulation, but also the fundamental role of semantic domains, narrative 
and personal experience. The next chapter deals with the modalities with which empathy 
constitutes a crucial tool in meaning making when discussing artistic comprehension, 
focusing on the peculiarities of performed narratives and the forms and mechanisms the 





2. Aesthetic Empathy and Artistic Understanding 
 
2.1. An Empathy-Based Approach on Aesthetic Perception and Appreciation 
 
Addressed in the first chapter of this dissertation for its significant role in 
intersubjective understanding, empathy represents a powerful and effective mechanism of 
both intentional and involuntary reciprocal comprehension. As claimed by Stueber (2006), 
“[e]mpathy’s emergence as one of the primary concepts for solving the problem of other 
minds and as a central concept in the discussion about the foundation of the human sciences 
is best understood as a convergence of two rather independent philosophical traditions or 
discourses at the beginning of the twentieth century: the hermeneutic tradition of the 
‘philological sciences’ (Boeckh 1886), which focussed predominantly on the concept of 
understanding (Verstehen), and the discussion within philosophical aesthetics, which was 
responsible for introducing the concept of empathy (Einfühlung)” (Stueber 2006, 5). In this 
context, the author refers to the primary relevance of Theodor Lipps’ forerunner work 
(1907), which bridges empathic understanding and aesthetic perception as problems 
fundamentally related. In fact, Stueber continues, “[s]ince both traditions took themselves to 
be addressing the peculiarity of our grasp of phenomena whose external appearance 
‘expresses’ in some sense an inner mental or ‘spiritual’ reality in bodily acts, artefacts, texts, 
or social institutions, it is perhaps not surprising that at times understanding and empathy 
have been seen as nearly identical” (Stueber 2006, 6). In other words, Stueber suggests that 
empathy, pervasively addressed as a central solution for the other minds’ problem, deeply 
depends on the observation and comprehension of other subjects’ external manifestations in 
the same way aesthetic perception allows us to predict and enhance our consciousness on 
the elements pertaining to the social and cultural environment which surrounds us. For this 
reason, aesthetic perception deeply relies on physical and mental interaction, and it is 
possible to analyse this specific form of appreciation along the cognitive mechanisms proper 
to empathy. 
Up to this point, empathy was addressed and discussed as an intersubjective practice 
involving individuals and the comprehension of their psycho-physical states. However, the 
concept of Einfühlung as previously described, suggests “a common psychological 




Hünefeldt and Olivetti Belardinelli 2018, 141) in its perception and definition. If to this 
extent empathic sense-making was only considered in its interpersonal exception, it is still 
fundamental to acknowledge that our common being-in-the-world (Heidegger 1962) 
condition is also affected by the constant presence of non-human elements surrounding us, 
including art. While on the one hand life constitutes an individual and immediate experience, 
and most of all unrepeatable in the way it is constantly subject to growth and evolution, on 
the other hand artistic works, even if faithful representation of observed realities, are 
characterised by their fixed and outward (and even public) nature. Living contexts, intended 
as domestic and familial environments, are privileged milieu for effective sense-making, 
since they contribute to make communicative codes and social structures recognisable to the 
observing subjects. Indeed, “empathy is instead an inexhaustible subject for the practices of 
contemplation, exploration, and creation” (Jurecic 2011, 24), in contexts in which the role 
of culture is essential for cognition. In this framework, artistic products can be assimilated 
in other cultural and physical (spontaneous and intentional) expressions of human nature, 
which require empathy to be fully grasped. In fact, “[a]esthetic and interpersonal “empathy” 
therefore differs mainly in that interpersonal “empathy” concerns other human beings, 
whereas aesthetic “empathy” concern human artefacts, especially those representing human 
beings or human environments” (Ganczarek, Hünefeldt and Olivetti Belardinelli 2018, 142). 
First coined by Vischer (1994), the concept of Einfühlung was originally employed 
exclusively in the context of aesthetic reflection, addressing the experience of feeling into a 
figurative representation external to the observing individual. The term was only later used 
to address intersubjective experiences and the psychophysical share of someone else’s state. 
In short, what distinguishes intersubjective empathy from aesthetic empathy is the directness 
with which human states are experienced by the observed individual, in the first case. On the 
contrary, in the second case, the human element is only represented. For this reason, 
conceiving artificial objects and creative production at first as human artefacts is essential in 
order to claim the relevance of empathy in understanding them. Also, each artistic work, 
alongside its specific (creative and material) source of production, is geographically and 
historically located in a cultural and social environment which could not possibly be ignored 
in its reception. The evaluation of artistic objects is facilitated by normatively established 
rules of judgement, providing contextual and historical keys to identify the generally 




the perceptual systems and allow the construction and selection of better organised 
categories of understanding. However, fundamental cognitive mechanisms of empathy, as 
highlighted in the previous chapter, develop throughout the different stages of each 
individual’s life, and the elaboration and awareness of our daily perception is only partially 
shaped and affected by the context we are living in, the interactions we experience and the 
cultural and social environment that influences us. 
Together with this framing process, aesthetic empathy presupposes the conscious 
notion that artistic objects are first and foremost physical implementation of human ideas 
and mental states, mirroring expressions of personal conditions. In his work, Clifford (1968) 
highlights the deep relation between meaning and sensations when it comes to appreciate 
aesthetic features of an object. In fact, as with interpersonal understanding, when trying to 
decipher a reaction or an emotion evoked by a work of art, we rely on the comparative 
similarities that we had the opportunity to grasp from previously acknowledged states. These 
recognised similarities are fundamental for sense-making, since they have already been 
processed and accepted, and they belong to the experiential schemata followed by our mind. 
In this context, on the basis of collected practices, the mind organises familiar emotions 
depending upon segments ordered by contexts of experience and analogies of sense, which 
in turn shape the mind as a product of former understandings. 
Embodiment, as relevant as for intersubjective comprehension, plays a key role when 
it comes to aesthetic perception. As suggested by Plantinga (2009), the spectator is addressed 
as a hypothetical entity that can be abstracted in his or her mental position, from which 
specific reactions or ideal responses are expected by specifically set categories (demographic 
positioning, social background or geographical affiliation) of belonging. 
Starting from the concept of embodied simulation in its most basic appreciation, the 
empathic sense-making processes also comprises aesthetic perception, since the 
sensorimotor synchrony allowed by experiential proximity permits perception and 
comprehension. In this circumstance, “viewers reinterpret a component of their own bodies 
to serve as a correlate […] for something outside of the self, specifically, some quality of an 
art work or its production” (Ganczarek, Hünefeldt and Olivetti Belardinelli 2018, 144). 
Visual perception can be enlarged if some perceptive senses, for instance touch and 
proprioception12, have the opportunity to rely on detailed insights of sensorial notions such 
 




as materiality, dimension, and position, for example. Once a specific object is observed and 
comprehensively grasped, the result of its perception starts to influence how we shape the 
idea of the object itself in the frame of our experiential consciousness, and its nature and 
image are impacted and designed by our emotionally charged knowledge. Trying to mentally 
eliminate uncertainty on a personal level, the mind produces schemes of meaning following 
a structural repetition-oriented perspective: the dynamics of the past are conceived as 
susceptible to recur in the future. Cause-effect common patterns are characterised by 
standardised criteria that allow us to survive every day: the logic we establish while 
experiencing situations and objects in our daily life functions as a guide to our sensory 
apparatus to approach and grasp what is upcoming. 
For this reason, when it comes to artistic practices and creations, even if the artist 
first shapes with his or her vision the product of his or her work, the spectator is entitled to 
mentally mould in a coherent idea what is being observed. In essence, while the attributes 
that pertain to the artistic object shape its physical appearance, the entirety of its perception 
and singular construction belongs to the emotional and mental cognition of the observing 
one. The process of conceptualisation, implementation and physical creation done by the 
artist needs to be completed by the cognitive experience of the observer, who constructs 
through recollection the newly perceived object’s meaning. Following a radical structuralist 
approach, this perspective has gone as far as to believe that it would be possible to categorise 
art as only defined by its observer’s perspective and respective categories. First introduced 
at the end on the 1960s and strongly supported by the sociologist and cultural theorist Stuart 
Hall (1973), this reception-based approach stresses the relevance and validity of each 
individual perception and reception. In the definition of reception theory, Hall claims that 
the modality “with which the viewer decodes the signs” (Hall 1973, 11) is a constitutive and 
essential step in the process of production and conceptualisation of the object itself. Despite 
“suggesting that aesthetic appreciation is experienced as belonging to the work of art rather 
than to the observer” (Hagtvedt, Reidar and Patrick 2008, 200), the entire setting of 
experienced psychophysical states and emotions which belong to the spectator have a solid 
impact on shaping the artistic cognition and subjective value of the object. 
As for intersubjective contexts, cognitive processes in aesthetic appreciation are 




and bodily features are crucial to the orientation of our sensitivity and cognitive mechanisms 
of understanding. 
Therefore, “artworks may be identified as works perceived as embodying human 
expression, where a perceived main feature of the work is the manner of its creation and/or 
execution rather than just a concept, idea, or message underlying it or conveyed by it, and 
where this manner is not primarily driven by any other contrived function or utility” (Ibid., 
199). In fact, even if it would be impossible to claim that the cognitive grasping of a certain 
artistic object depends only on the emotional reaction to it, it is also essential to acknowledge 
its influence on the judgement. For this reason, it is crucial to understand which cognitive 
and emotional components are involved in artistic perception and to which extent they 
impact understanding. In this frame, perceptive understanding “affects the supervenience 
base of aesthetic reaction by affecting […] phenomenal content” (Stokes 2014, 24). All 
experiences collected through time make us develop a conscious expertise to such an extent 
that “knowledge about art changes how one aesthetically evaluates artwork” (Ibid., 1). In 
this respect, “[d]ifferences in aesthetic evaluation may follow, either because high-level 
aesthetic properties can be perceptually represented or because they causally depend on low-
level perceptible properties” (Ibid.). Since cognition is deeply influenced by our background, 
knowledge, beliefs and traditional habits profoundly affect appreciation, including when it 
comes to approaching artworks. 
Specifically, in the context of aesthetic comprehension, knowledge cannot be limited 
to the learning process around a certain subject or matter related to the object itself, but it 
also includes the combination of all “accurate unbiased information about the world” that 
“perception must provide” (Ibid., 3). In fact, the observation of artistic objects cannot be 
conceived as independent and autonomous, since “perception of works is sometimes affected 
by beliefs, concepts and other cognitive states about art and artworks, and this may 
sometimes be out of the perceiver’s control” (Ibid., 31). In this context, it is essential to 
discern and unambiguously separate the level of perception to the culturally shaped 
judgemental one. In fact, aesthetic perception is inherently rooted in the interaction with the 
object of observation which entails a range of potential emotional reactions that directly 
depend on empathy. The repetition of this perceptive activity, which enables each individual 




evaluation of what grasped, which only constitutes a successive step and follows culturally 
and educationally assimilated schemata. 
This conception of aesthetic understanding comes from a conscious shift in the study 
of aesthetics. As claimed by Francès (1976), the peculiarities attributed to an artwork are 
divided in intrafigural information (namely all the elements that pertain to the object itself) 
and intraserial information (in essence the complexity of characterisation derived from the 
observer’s past experience evoked by the contemplation of the work). The most traditional 
approach to understand artistic products, formalism, “claims that works are to be appreciated 
and valued merely on the basis of their perceptible properties” (Stokes 2014, 7). The 
formalist perspective on aesthetics finds the meaning of objects within them. Bringing into 
focus the object per se, formalism positions the value on the analysed work, whether in its 
significant form (Bell 1914, 6-7) which belongs to only particular objects (and detectable 
only by few observers) or in the aesthetic dimension that follows the canons of a social 
environment in a certain historical period (Marcuse 1978, ix). In essence, the formalist 
approach attributes a higher relevance to the work itself, highlighting its features and the 
role of the artist’s abilities applied to the artefact. On the other hand, the relativist school put 
more emphasis on intraserial information, arguing that each collected meaning attributed to 
a certain object creates a valid and unique sense about the piece of art. According to 
relativism, meaning as a unique and fixed interpretation is put into discussion, and the idea 
of critically discussion of the possibility of defining an absolute truth is completely 
abandoned in favour of perceptive analytical discrepancies (Hume 2007, 158). Assuming a 
relativist approach would mean exclusively privileging the observer’s perspective and 
judgement about the questioned object. 
While it would be an incomplete position to stand with only one of the two 
approaches, empathy represents an effective way to bridge the two elements involved in the 
process of sense-making with regards to cognitive paths for understanding that are addressed 
in this research. Essential paths to understand artistic works are based on cognitive processes 
more than mere physical attributes, and for this reason in the aesthetic scenario it is important 
to not isolate the viewer or the object in themselves, pondering instead the human discourse 




signs that, however expressed13, composes the variety of forms of communication, it is 
crucial to inscribe artistic expressions as cognitively intelligible symbols which sustain the 
interaction between delivering subject and receptor. In this context, artistic works stimulate 
a spontaneous reaction in the observing subject who, cognitively stimulated, is able to 
empathically engage in the process of understanding. In this frame, empathy is essential for 
subjects to respond to external stimuli which are able to internally evoke aesthetic response. 
However, it is essential to claim that, even if the physical observation of an aesthetic object 
could be neutrally experienced in an identical fashion by everyone, the empathic stimulus 
also involves an experience-based response that makes the aesthetic perception individual. 
For this reason, it is possible and not contradictory to claim that aesthetic perception is 
concurrently both personal and universal. Since “differences in the perceptual experience of 
a work can make for differences in aesthetic reaction to the work” (Stokes 2014, 8), it is 
essential to recognise that this perception “can be profoundly affected by the category under 
which the work is perceived” (Ibid.). These categories, specifically artistic ones, are 
constructed along practices that cannot be isolated or considered a-contextual, but they 
evolve through the composition of visual experiences. In this context, “[t]he work as a visual 
stimulus and the qualities of the artist and the culture that contributed to its particular form 
function as two distinct yet intertwined points of attentional focus between the viewer must 
move” (Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson 1990, 135). In other words, the definition of 
aesthetic perception and its spontaneous cognitive nature raises the question about the 
possible impact of other elements to culturally, contextually or artistically influence the 
cognition of the observed object. However, what is central in aesthetic perception is that, 
given the unidirectional and non-reciprocal nature of the observative act, the unfolding role 
of empathy permits the aesthetic experience to lean on the primal and emerging 
psychophysical reception of the object under attention. In fact, the empathic response to 
artistic stimuli takes place on this unconscious and elementary level of aesthetic perception. 
Often, artistic products represent elements of the real world as seen, studied and reshaped 
through a specific perspective. Interpretative judgement and subjectively grounded context 
of meaning (Schutz 1967, 86), as well as more general knowledge of the social world, 
influence aesthetic appreciation. Along with a more personal perspective on artistic 
 





practices, the “perceptual field” (Zahavi 2010, 19) in which items are located contributes 
with the co-given peculiarities of the setting to the characterisation of the objects implicated 
in action. 
After focusing on the main features of perception and its embodied nature, the next 
subchapter addresses aesthetic appreciation on a visual level as the immediate form of 
understanding for a viewer. In particular, an approach to aesthetic perception of visual works 
is adopted in relation to artistic observation and representation. The role of empathy in this 
framework is closely tied to those mechanisms that have been addressed in the first chapter, 
related to intersubjective contexts of experience. In fact, aesthetic perception is not 
exclusively grounded on the represented object within the limits of the portrayed signified, 
but also on agency, considering artistic works as most importantly human products. Abstract 
elements of representation, such as rhythm in music or the composition of lines in abstract 
painting, evoke movements and configuration reflecting authorial intentionality. Following 
this approach, the next section addresses representation, its perception and response in the 
context of artistic expression. 
 
2.1.1. Artistic Representation and Visual Perception 
 
The peculiar ability of understanding inanimate objects without the necessity of 
linguistic or psycho-physical exchanges is fundamental for the aesthetic evaluation of 
artefacts. The capacity of looking at specific items and being able to associate them to ideas, 
concepts and experienced meanings ensures that the sensorial and especially mental 
predisposition of seeing constitutes a remarkable evolutionary breakthrough (Campbell 
1976, 413). In the specific context of visual understanding and artistic practices, “[t]he 
aesthetic experience occurs when information coming from the artwork interacts with 
information already stored in the viewer’s mind. […] The information in the work of art 
fuses with information in the viewer’s memory – followed by the expansion of the viewer’s 
consciousness. This process of fusion we will refer to as the structure of the aesthetic 
experience” (Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson 1990, 18). This experience does not pertain 
only to the observer-object relationship, but it is also deeply interpersonal in the way the 
authorship and manual production of the item confers to the spectator some level of 




there cannot be a notion of art as mere representation of nature, as claimed by Gettings (1982, 
85), primarily for the complexity and unknown variable of the outer world, and then for the 
non-negligible presence of the artist in the conception and creation of his or her work. 
However, as claimed by Brandt (2004), different domains of experience exist along with 
different categories of meaning. Together with the natural and cultural domains, which 
involve the biological, geological, collective and symbolic elements of the perceptual 
environment, the semiotician includes the category of spiritual domains, which comprises 
“the sphere of direct interaction with other minds by expressive contact, allowing for the 
sharing of thoughts and feelings with individuals” (Brandt 2004, 19). Also, no art per se is 
solely conceived and created with pure representational intentions. Artworks are mimetic 
depictions of perceived scenarios, symbols, expressions and even diegetic portraits of 
experienced objects, people, contexts and situations. As Gibbs explains, since visuality is 
both a perceptive and social process, mimesis appears “as the primary mode of apprehension 
utilized by the body [… and] the affective basis for ethical dealings with others” (Gibbs 
2010, 202). 
In this frame, aesthetic perception involves empathy in the process of assimilation 
and meaning making. Or, more accurately, “in the interplay of author, performer and 
audience, empathetic participation is the common ground from which all arts - including the 
art of understanding - spring” (Morrison 1988, xxiii). When it comes to observing the 
product of artistic practices, Morrison introduces the concept of hermeneutic gap, as the 
ensemble of assumptions and information that are necessary to “complete the pattern 
emerging before him” (Ibid., 34). To accomplish understanding (but even to finalise a 
miscalculated judgement) about what is expressed or, rather, to conclude the conjoint 
expression of artistic practices, the spectator needs to find a path to bridge this gap. Through 
perception, consideration and intuition, the observer is able to understand the object thanks 
to association and recollection. Empathy is thus essential in aesthetic perception in all those 
domains of experience to which we refer in sense-making processes. In particular, it is 
crucial to consider that figurative abstraction and non-realistic representation is not excluded 
from those mental categories to which we refer in the context of empathic comprehension. 
In fact, even the de-contextualisation from realistic representation of geometric shapes and 
colours still pertain to the natural and cultural world in which they are depicted, not only in 




which they are portrayed. Despite being separated from the context of belonging, geometries 
and their combinations are deeply natural, as well as the mechanical forces that are implied 
to create them and the mental conceptualisation behind their implementation. Every artistic 
object, Morrison follows, disposes of a certain degree of emptiness, which the spectator is 
supposed to fill. Moreover, since the viewer’s role in sense formation is essential, the process 
of meaning shaping shall take into consideration that elements of misstructuring or even 
misunderstanding may be present, especially when facing the aesthetic unknown. In fact, 
“art is contingent, occasionally accidental; and works of art express an isolated, or alien, 
self-consciousness. For this reason, art, as a speculative (or theoretical) enterprise, is 
dependent upon the cognitive strategies of language to record, explain, and interpret what 
words cannot express” (Morrison 1988, 273). In other words, art is grasped not only in its 
form of expression, but also according to all those domains of experience that are involved 
in its interpretation, essentially depending on those mental codes and ideas that we employ 
to decipher what we observe. 
The visual representation of existing scenarios through aesthetic symbols allows the 
spectator to experience in a mediated form the depiction of something else, phenomenon 
which, as claimed before, implicates an empathic relation between the observing subject and 
the addressed object. Morrison classifies this contribution as a discernment process of what 
is invisible in the arts, a deciphering procedure of the visual codes implemented by the artist. 
These figurative metaphors are not explained in the moment they are conceived or designed, 
and not even in the moment they are observed: these codes can be fully grasped only at the 
time when they are deeply felt and personally translated. The fallacies of meaning which 
belong to aesthetic products can be empathically overcome when “the viewer eliminates 
barriers between himself and the thing symbolized […] and finally becomes one with it” 
(Ibid., 279). The aesthetic bond generated between the observing subject and the object of 
scrutiny requires an affective contemplation to be sustained. Verbal, bodily or visual 
representations need a cognitive intervention in order to disclose the latent meaning behind 
the hermeneutic gap. In fact, Morrison continues, this particular form of affective, 
decipherment-oriented bonding belongs exclusively to the observer-object encounter. This 
required dimension does not specify any feature of the spatial context in which this encounter 
must occur, but classifies the personal, intimate aspects that characterise each individual 




that every individual can reproduce in a personal but also collective form14. The caused 
reaction consists in an emotional response, a “feeling, that is, an emotion with a virtual action 
tendency, because the action repertoire is essentially empty” (Tan 2000, 6). The generation 
of meaning is displaced from a physically exact transposition of the representative features 
of the object of observation to an emotional conception of comprehension. The emotional 
dimension of this hermeneutic gap allows an “affective participation between the viewer 
(including the artist as a viewer) and the subject that escaped the finitude of time” (Morrison 
1988, 334). As for interpersonal relations, also visual comprehension moves around 
representations that can be ascribed in specific semantic domains, since the way artefacts are 
grasped and fully understood depends on the constant reference to their experiential meaning 
present in one’s mind. In fact, mental and visual codes are different symbols of the same 
repertories which together compose the representative totality of the outer world. 
In conclusion, both contexts of cognitive and cultural studies address how 
understanding occurs in the case of visual work, considering the role of perception more and 
more central. In particular, the tendency of analysis shifted its focus on the signifying 
expression and its visual structure and composition. Representation started being perceived 
more than a mere portrayal standing for something else, but each medium gained relevance 
in itself. For this reason, when a semiotics-based approach is adopted in aesthetic analysis, 
the act of seeing is per se the way understanding has to be addressed, since an object’s 
features can only be acknowledged in the moment they are perceived. The act of seeing, its 
perspective and positioning, as was discussed is this section, do not only shape the singular 
act of perceiving but, on a larger scale, forms of collective and cultural definition of the 
object in question. The role of experience and semantic domains in the process of aesthetic 
perception and comprehension is addressed in the next subchapter. 
 
2.1.2. Semantic Domains and Experiential Knowledge 
 
In the creation of artistic products, the presence of peculiar themes has been recurrent 
throughout history. In particular, many artists have been employing specific leitmotifs which 
 
14 The collective sensorial action can be both experienced in a simultaneous form, which is the case of a 
theatrical performance, or in an asynchronous dimension, like the perception of a painting by a multiplicity of 




rely on “materials available in the physical and cultural world that have an emotion potential, 
that are already on people's minds, ready as it were to be launched wrapped up in some 
representation” (Tan 2000, 7). Either because they are based on traditional myths and beliefs 
or commonly shared emotions, these patterns are frequently involved in artistic metaphors 
to consolidate the conceptualisation and production of works. All these domains share “a 
potential of eliciting emotion, because they can be hypothesized to touch on basic concerns 
and contain core components of emotional meaning” (Ibid., 8). Experiential knowledge 
about these recurrent themes may permit a more efficient process of appraisal, to shape a 
better comprehension of artistic intentions, aesthetic works and specific evoked emotions in 
the spectator. Detecting and analysing the various cultural and social-related elements that 
successfully evoke personally grounded emotional reactions is fundamental to recognise and 
evaluate the impact of art. In this context, the role of repetition and familiarity comes into 
play. Through the action of genres, intended as fixed forms of structuring artistic expression 
in recognisable ways for the observer, styles and techniques, the recurrence of specific 
archetypes allows bindings to get more solid, not only between individuals and works but 
also among individuals and within different works. For instance, in Tan’s critical approach 
style “is shown to interact with theme and cultural context in shaping the aesthetic emotion” 
(Ibid., 13). 
While individually based artistic production has the power to create and develop 
particular and personal variations in the unitary ensemble of its category, the presence of 
frequent themes and common modalities of expression allows the public to trace mental 
paths that facilitate cognitive comprehension and empathic involvement. The way ideas are 
represented, mediated and conveyed, along with the codes which relate to the specific 
symbols employed in certain aesthetic depictions, allows the viewer to grasp not only the 
object under observation but also to easily decode the superstructures that pertain to the 
artistic medium through which it is expressed. 
As for intersubjective empathic relations, not all forms of expression are equally 
effective for all the possible spectators. Represented contexts, cultural references and 
personal experiences affect the way specific stimuli are more or less effective in provoking 
a reaction in the public. In this way, the emotional significance of a certain piece is malleable 
in its reception, which does not mean that an object is supposed to realistically resemble a 




ones. The value of reality does not pertain only to the realistic authenticity of the 
appearance’s features but to the accuracy of the stimulus. For empathy to take place the 
visual experience needs to respond to the viewer’s domains of experience. Art tends to 
represent conventions, Tan continues, which need to be previously internalised by the 
observing subjects in order to efficiently decode a certain symbology. In this context, 
domains of experience are related to conventions in the way they consistently shape 
communicative patterns in artistic expressions. The mapping of these conventions, through 
repetition, shapes one’s domains of experience, which are continuously influenced by 
recently acquired experiential knowledge. To this realistic side, a more imaginary one 
follows: art holds a dimension of make-believe (Walton 1990, 34) which can reach a 
dimension so vivid to become a new reality for the observer. Empathic feelings are so strong 
that “imagining is not always a deliberate choice, [and] the beholder cannot help but engage 
in it” (Tan 2000, 15). In fact, this stimulated imaginative act permits to suspend the 
dimension of reality during the time of perception, while the empathic process of sense-
making still follows its actual mechanisms as experienced in everyday circumstances. In this 
context, the observed object serves as representation in the process of deciphering its 
meaning, in which the comprehension of the aesthetic emotions needs the complete 
understanding of possible variants that different forms of communication can assume. 
Meaning and its vehicle need to interface in order to be empathically comprehensible to the 
observer, who is entitled to explore meanings from its repertoire of experiences to 
individually translate the conceived message. 
Emotional responses always involve a certain degree of understanding, empathic 
reaction to artistic work none the less. In fact, this form of perception following its 
spontaneous nature leads to the comprehensive understanding of the observed object. In 
particular, “discovering the meaning of art works is, as a cognitively complex and variable 
process, subject to influences from other beholders […], as the pleasure of experiencing art 
is in larger part discovering meanings, and the humanist's view implies that an exchange of 
ideas is an essential part of the appraisal process, if only because polyvalence and multiple 
interpretation is in the humanist's view the hallmark of all art” (Tan 2000, 22). In other 
words, the process of comprehension in artistic observation is grounded on cognitive 




and judgement. For this reason, the exchange of ideas and interpretations is the most 
effective path to a complete and shared comprehension. 
So far, empathy has been addressed as essential in aesthetic perception. Specifically, 
its crucial action lies in the cognitive bridging of meaning and its embodied form of 
expression, a process which is achieved in the procedural combination of artistic 
representation, observation and experiential knowledge. This section addressed the 
emotional potential in reaction to aesthetic stimuli, and the central role in understanding of 
recurrent patterns in the conceptualisation and production of artistic works. Commonly 
shared myths and beliefs, as well as the involved emotional charge, in combination with 
individual experiences shape those domains of experiential knowledge that are personally 
grounded in each subject. These paths are essential in the way they facilitate empathic 
involvement and comprehension, contributing through similarities and repetitions to the 
deciphering of the observed object, both in its medium of expression and conveyed meaning, 
shaping and internalising the experience of new realities. 
The following sections will focus on specific art forms, namely performative 
representations implemented by actors, which find particular expression in theatre and 
cinema. These forms of aesthetic expressions are particularly relevant examples of the role 
of empathy especially for two reasons. On the one hand, empathy is central in the context in 
which audience observes unfolding human emotions, whether directly expressed or 
projected on a screen. In fact, the conception of the empathy as a process of feeling into 
allows the spectator to emotionally and cognitively share the portrayed subjects’ states. For 
this reason, even if spectators and actors are not directly involved in an intersubjective 
relation, the empathic connection remains a shared dimension between human subjects. On 
the other hand, these representations tend to involve anthropological forms of expression. 
Gestural manifestations and languages, but also represented contexts and depicted relational 
structures are easily recognisable as emotional and mental forms of expression. For this 
reason, this dimension facilitates an immediately addressable stimulus to be empathically 
addressed. That is, the represented other, characterised by his or her own consciousness, 
expressivity and a structured psychophysical persona, is addressed and recognised by the 
public as the originary source of an experience that can be empathically grasped and shared 





2.2. Empathy and the Intangible in Performative Arts 
 
As the impact of empathy on aesthetic understanding has been considered 
fundamental, its role is also extremely relevant when art tends to reproduce human and social 
systems, contexts and behaviours. In particular, it is the case of performed representations 
of realities such as theatre and cinema, in which intersubjective relations are depicted in their 
narratives in a verisimilar way, namely the social, cultural or historical context in which the 
represented reality is set is plausibly portrayed, within the framework of imaginary or 
plausible worlds. These two forms of artistic practices present some similarities, related 
especially to their performative nature. In particular, they share the involvement of actors 
personifying specific characters, the often central role of dialogues and the temporary 
engagement of the audience in the represented story. However, they also present some 
peculiar differences. First, the suspension of the spectator’s reality (Tan 2000, 15) is more 
challenging in theatre, in which the simulation of an authentical actuality presents more 
difficulties than in film. Lacking the complexity of contextual details and the possibility of 
nearer or further framing typical of films, the theatrical acting has to compensate in vocal 
and bodily expressivity the impossibility of such wider changes in audience’s perspective. 
At the same time, the physical proximity of actors in the theatre hall makes the characters’ 
presence significant for the audience which is collectively experiencing an unrepeatable 
shared moment. On the other hand, the cinematic experience, whether individual or 
collective, still represents a significant object of study on aesthetic perception, since the 
possibility of identically reproduce the same work makes the analysis of the object of 
observation more comparable. In fact, different subjects in different moments and contexts 
have the opportunity to experience the reproduction of the same movie. The verisimilitude 
employed in the conception and realisation of cinematic representations allows empathy to 
be triggered in numerous spectators, whether they are sharing the experience in the same 
instant or distant in space and time. For this reason, “empathy has special significance for 
the study of cinema as a narrative art form because, from its inception, empathy has been 
seen as an integral aspect of how people engage with art and come to understand the inner 
life and emotions of others” (Stadler 2017, 1). 
Central in performative representations, empathy is essential to grasp the 




process that characterises aesthetic perception, the spectator has to observe, imagine and 
discern other people’s actions (under the guise of impersonated protagonists’ movements) 
to be able to indirectly experience what is shared and depicted by the artistic product. As 
seen in the previous section, the importance of empathy can be extended to the peculiar 
artistic forms of theatre and cinema, without strictly relying only on the aesthetic perception 
of the object itself, but rather in relation to spectatorship, intended as the contemplative 
positioning of the public towards the work. In fact, as Lipps (1903) claims, when I 
contemplate an aesthetic object “I become progressively less aware of muscular tensions or 
of sense-feelings in general” (Lipps 1903, 376). In this suspended frame the spectator is able 
to directly access to the artistic work, through the involuntary empathic projection into the 
portrayed reality. 
As claimed before, performed situations, whether fictional or real, are expressions of 
mediated subjectivity. In fact, the medium functions as a vehicle establishing a relation 
between the conveyed object, its intentions of representation and the observing audience. In 
fact, according to Gallese and Guerra (2012), “to grasp our primordial contact with the film 
[…w]e should thus get back to the brain-body” (Gallese and Guerra 2012, 187). Embodied 
perception and cognition are essential in the way we sense our understanding of the reality 
of everyday life in both intersubjective and artistic experiences. The importance of the body 
in both contexts, Gallese and Guerra follow, is to shape the spatial definition of the context 
of observation, including objects and persons, whether they are real, impersonated or 
fictional. When part of the audience, the spectator immediately and involuntary participates 
to the action in a physical and emotional way, before engaging in the mental elaboration of 
what is observed. In the same way that “[i]ntersubjectivity should thus be viewed first and 
foremost as intercorporeality” (Ibid., 193), the empathic reaction to aesthetic perception 
leads the spectator to respond to the visually represented bodily stimuli. That is, the 
relevance of bodily expressivity in the context of aesthetic perception is as primal as in actual 
interpersonal contexts. In fact, the sharing relation between audience and represented 
environment of thoughts, emotions and intentions is deeply physical in its implications and 
responses. Since audience and protagonists are separated in their contexts of actions, the role 
of direction and staging is to spatially mediate and regulate relations and interactions. Hence, 
to empirically examine the psychophysical states of the explored characters, but also 




processes represented within a bodily format in functionally attributing them to others” 
(Ibid., 206). 
 Highlighting the function of the body and corporeal expression in aesthetic 
perception and comprehension, it is essential to consider body’s situatedness and spatial 
dimension both from the perspectives of the spectatorial observing position and the space as 
actual frame for artistic representation. In this context, D’Aloia (2012b) emphasises the 
function of spatiality when understanding an environment we are not part of, as in the case 
of spectators assisting a performed representation. For instance, in the context of theatre the 
construction of this dimension necessitates to integrate the depicted world and the one of 
reality in co-existing grounds of interaction. According to D’Aloia, “the spectator 
experiences a tangible relationship” (D’Aloia 2012b, 220) with all those subjects, milieus 
and objects en scène. In fact, the author claims that the observer’s body, while watching a 
character bodily facing the portrayed experience, is able to perceptually interpret it thanks 
to a reflexive reading of the performed action. In particular, the audience’s sensorimotor 
reaction as highlighted by Gallese and Guerra (2012) is essential “to sense a contact” with 
the depicted world and “act through the character” (D’Aloia 2012b, 222). This 
harmonisation of emotional and physical reactions ensures that the visually experienced 
information compensates its discontinuity with the tactile experience. In this context, the 
perceived optical information does not correspond with what can be experienced to the 
touch. However, D’Aloia claims that the mediated experience of aesthetic observation and 
the viewer’s simulative participation allow the object of observation to gain tangibility. The 
represented reality, within its spatial frame, constitutes an integrated dimension which can 
be explored as if it were corporeally reachable, through the vicarious action of characters 
and their perspectives in context. As proper instruments of facilitation, media, supported by 
the simulation tendencies of the audience, succeed in turning what is intangible in something 
perceivable. In sum, D’Aloia concludes, the spatial dimension in artistic contemplation is 
crucial in the way its perception is experienced is new forms. The physical tangibility and 
its corporeal references are temporarily suspended in favour of a new substitutive dimension 
which orients the viewer into the artistic depicted reality. 
 This section addressed the perception of depicted representations adopting as 
perspective of analysis the observational position of the audience. In particular, in the 




cognition and the context of observation with the spatial dimension of the artistic object and 
its represented reality (and the way they relate in different aspects of location, positioning 
and tangibility) permit the stimulation of an observative empathic reaction. The next 
subchapter tackles narrative and its essential role in the empathic response to aesthetic 
perception. 
 
2.2.1. Narrative, Mimicry and the Embodied Response to the Medium 
 
Discussing aesthetic perception and empathic response requires a specific focus on 
narrative. In a broad sense, narrative is the presentation of events, characters, contexts and 
their expressions as constructed in a semantic relation between each other, with the aim of 
being conveyed to an audience. The role of narrative is essential in embodied simulation, 
given that it is able to shape the perception process affecting the traits of narrative empathy. 
In aesthetic perception, empathy is influenced by the trajectory of narrative both on a 
temporal and order level. In particular, “temporal progression and suggested causality” as 
well as “narrative calculations that causally connect events and intentions” (Breithaupt 2011, 
6) influence the way spectators direct perspective-taking and emotional partaking. In 
particular, given the fundamental function of motor mimicry, narrative stimuli work in a 
continuum with gained experience, shaping both protagonists’ and situational features. 
Narrative shapes the path to understanding, allowing the audience to address contexts and 
situations different from its own. In fact, if we consider aesthetic perception as a simulative 
form of cognition, it is important to comprehend empathy as bound to specific features that 
are provided by narrative. 
Since the construction of performative stories relies on how spectators are able to 
respond with personal assumptions, it is essential to comprehend the ability of fictional 
representation to simulate mental and emotional processes. This mechanism functions as a 
sensory stimulus: our perceptual impression brings to light segments of our consciousness 
that are necessary to frame what is observed. Through time, we develop the ability of 
cognitively deciphering increasingly complex narratives, capacity which plays a consistent 
role in understanding. The relationship created with the fictional story implies empathy to 
address the “the conditions of reproduction” which “serve in some way to mold the object” 




of simulating ordinary perceptual experiences is essential for the viewer, who unconsciously 
operates a proper decoding process acknowledging semiotic meaning of represented 
symbols. This practice is constructed as a projection of the self: if the collection of symbols 
through time has the power to shape who we are and how we make sense of what surrounds 
us, it is precisely this composed form of the self that we project in symbolic transposition. 
On the other hand, the grasped reality is grounded on personal experience and acquires 
meaning from it, but it is also able to provide an original element suitable to being added to 
the spectator’s personal reservoir. Freed from spatial and subjective constraints, empathy 
permits the observer to expand his or her sensorial and emotional perspective towards new 
directions, both suggested and emphasised by the media’s intermediary role. In fact, the 
spectator employing “real-world knowledge and awareness of narrative conventions” 
(Bordwell 2013, 49) is consequently capable of establishing effective suppositions, 
inferential observations and successful interpretations. In fact, D’Aloia (2012b) argues that 
narrative “often negotiates the conflict between loss of position and proprioceptive 
sensibility on behalf of the spectator, embodying in its stylistic and formal solutions the 
spectator’s natural tendency towards psychophysical equilibrium” (D’Aloia 2012b, 234). In 
other words, narrative plays a crucial mediation role between the reality from which the 
public is experiencing aesthetic perception and the new position it assumes into the portrayed 
environment, orienting the observing subjects on matters of intentionality, sensitivity and 
direction. 
In the context of fictional representation, Plantinga (2013) addresses film as “a 
particularly sensual medium with the capacity to affect spectators in direct ways through the 
perceptual qualities of images and sounds (Plantinga 2013, 94). These suggestions of 
direction, provided by the elements which contribute to the structure of the work (director, 
photography, light, …), orient the spectator to a specific embodied response, a supposed 
emotional reaction to the newly created reality. In fact, Plantinga continues, “[w]atching and 
hearing movies is a sensual, visceral experience, and from this characteristic stems much of 
their affective power” (Ibid., 99). However, emotions are universally presented, to make 
intuitions accessible in the same way to everyone in the audience. Even if personal 
knowledge is an essential pre-assumption to unconscious responsiveness, “viewers have 
different life experiences, levels of maturity, and degree of patience” and narratives must be 




cultural backgrounds would eventually apply a variety of diverse interpretations to what 
experienced, but a deep involvement and concern at a general basic level is automatically 
shared. 
According to the literary scholar Marie-Laure Ryan (2004), the medium of 
expression affects narratives in the way they are structured and implemented. Central in a 
cultural studies-based approach, Ryan associates with narrativity the capability of evoking 
mental images, going beyond the limit of linguistic medium. Approaching the medium as 
material vehicles of communication, Ryan takes a departure to from the lexical composition 
of narratives highlighting the relevance of cognition and interaction. In the case of 
represented stories and realities, the narrative structure and its development are supported 
by the medium of expression together with the strategies adopted to represent them. Audio-
visual tools and linguistic devices are employed in combined paths to convey messages and 
intentions. As suggested by Tan (1996) the emotional involvement constitutes the most 
elementary and common mental state among the public. Thus, the perceptual experience of 
performative arts is at the same time an individual and collective practice. In fact, the 
experience of empathy towards commonly perceived objects allows a crowd of people to 
respond at the same time to the same emotional stimulus. The deployment of the medium 
and narrative construction permit the audience to access the story and decipher its elements 
and meaning. Hence, Plantinga (2013, 100) claims that the interaction audience-object of 
contemplation is both bottom up, depending on individual interpretations and interpretative 
judgments, and top down, deeply influenced by the schemes attributed to the narrative for 
its comprehension to be specifically directed. 
Moreover, narrative intentions of the represented reality are often conveyed through 
the bodily and emotional expression of the individual and intersubjective dimension of the 
states experienced by portrayed characters. In fact, emotional signals permit the spectators 
to perceive how the portrayed character is making sense of the events he or she is 
experiencing and the spontaneous or intentional reaction to them. Claimed at first by Lipps 
(1907), mimicry is deeply related to emotional contagion and is a form of embodied 
communication, serving as functional stimulator of empathy. At the same time, mimicry 
“primarily functions to regulate social affiliation” (Hess, Houde and Fischer 2014, 104): its 
ability of stimulating empathy also depends on the reciprocal contagion between the member 




In addition, Tan (2013) investigates to which extent spectators experience empathy 
as a conscious effort or it mainly represents an involuntary state. In fact, while “emotional 
contagion and mimicry […] lack of any significant appraisal” (Tan 2013, 339), empathy 
necessarily implicates a degree of comprehension of the observed character’s mind. This 
knowledge is structured in the frame of narrative, involved to guide the audience in 
understanding. Throughout the story, appraisal is designed with different expedients, for 
instance privileging certain perspectives instead of others or providing an incongruence 
between the variety of information delivered to the public and the one available to each 
character. Alternatively, in the case of films, the repetitive shifting of contexts, situations 
and actions, Tan explains, makes spectators’ perspective multifaceted and far wider than any 
of the characters. The way in which the observing experience is synchronised within the 
members of the audience “reflects similarity of processes for all viewers in principle, and 
thus […] controls responses of individual viewers” (Ibid., 346). In this suspended dimension 
of performative representation, empathy is continuously stimulated and balanced through 
narrative expedients. 
Grounding the aesthetic practice on the spectator is essential on a phenomenological 
level. Embodiment, emotions, and their perception are deeply rooted on a personal 
positioning, and the communication of those states in both theatrical and cinematic context 
relies on the basis of interpersonal structures. Optical, emotional and even hearing 
perspectives are destined to an audience subjectively deployed, and they are designed to 
meet individual imageries able to complete contexts and characters’ portrayals, as well as 
internal ideas and emotions. Embodied simulation is relevant in spectators’ empathic 
experience as an inner form of response. At the mind level, embodied simulation “does not 
entail inference of […] imaginative substitution [… , r]ather, it is pre-logical and pre-
reflexive, rooted at the sensory-motor and neurophysiological level” (D’Aloia 2015, 190-
91). On the contrary, emotional and sensorial mimicry is induced by visual, linguistic, 
acoustic, expressive and gestural elements that depict different characters in their expressive 
identity. These mechanisms of interpersonal understanding in fictional contexts can be 
explored and understood starting from general notions on intersubjective empathy, but they 
can also be employed as models to deepen everyday situations. In essence, the fictional 
bodily and expressional portrayals to which spectators assist are grounded on the 




corporeal and emotional manifestations that shape the observed characters, their actions and 
psychophysical states are addressed thanks to the experiential knowledge of the audience, 
but they also reinforce such experience with further aesthetic involvement. Intersubjective 
and aesthetic forms of perception mutually affect and strengthen the experiential knowledge 
we detain about the outer world. 
However, a complete control on empathy by the medium is not conceivable. While 
a stimulus can be perfectly designed and calculated, expectations about the spectator’s 
response, depending on private background and experiences, can only be putative. The way 
in which each one mentally investigates explanations and meaning production is deeply 
personal. For instance, the construction of characters’ modes of experiencing the outer world 
is necessarily influenced by the subjective approach of the audience while analysing them. 
Narrative and aesthetic endeavours play an essential role in structuring sense and empathic 
response, but a personal approach is essential in “resolving uncertainty, ambiguity, or other 
lack of information in a stimulus” (Tan 2013, 360). 
In the field of cognitive narratology, Balázs (1952) focuses on the role of embodied 
response to emotions experienced and expressed by actors. The development and 
characterisation of performed states does not require a completely exhaustive explanation: 
all the personally recollected elements induce the spectator to fully understand “happenings, 
characters, emotions, moods […] without the need for many words” (Balázs 1952, 41). In 
fact, following this perspective, Ward (2015) sustains that the audience experiences the 
emotions suggested on stage (or on screen) through embodied cognition, since the way we 
imagine, elaborate and conceptualise our thinking and meaning construction depends on the 
sensorimotor interactions with the reality around us. For this reason, the perceived content 
is grounded on “our body’s innate capacity for ‘feeling into’ another’s affective state, 
offering an embodied and noncognitive route to empathy, even if that other is fictional” 
(Ward 2015, 185). All the features attributed to the represented characters and their forms 
of action shape the central object of the spectators’ attention, which is able to focus on the 
emotions experienced in the context of the portrayed scenario. For this reason, empathy is 
not only essential when it comes to other subjects: its role is crucial also in relation to a wide 
range of inanimate elements, such as objects, environments and components peculiarly 




Furthermore, the two levels of embodiment involved, the artist thoughtful presence 
in the object and the meaning itself when embodied in modes of expression (cinema and 
theatre, in this case), necessitate of mental mapping to reason about emotional paths when 
approaching them in bodily forms. Likewise, embodied simulation requires mimetic 
consciousness to be fully grasped and interpreted. As already claimed, the abstract 
dimension of concepts and symbols needs to be sustained by something less arbitrary to 
make sense for the observer. For this reason, the cultural dimension of embodiment ensures 
that “[i]mage schemas […] are grounded in human, sensory-motor experience” (Hampe 
2005, 1). What we tend to mentally develop in metaphoric forms is physically grounded in 
everyday experiences, since what we learn from bodily perception constitutes the base to 
abstract reasoning. In fact, the way meaning is organised in artistic expressions follows the 
same embodied structure of intersubjective comprehension. For this reason, embodied 
simulation is essential also when related to performative arts: since every form of expression 
deals with a process of re-conceptualisation in the way we tend to phrase it in our mind, the 
performative medium presupposes its bodily supported codes to be deciphered and mentally 
assimilated. In particular, in the performative framework, bodily expressions need to appear 
as similar to reality as possible to be fully understandable. However, it does not mean that 
representations have to be figuratively realistic and strictly conforming to the portrayed 
object. On the contrary, our wealth of experiences enables us to recognise shapes and their 
related significance, conceptual configurations and the modalities in which the repetition of 
patterns formulates the general conveyed meaning in different combination. Approaching 
the mediated meaning through represented emotions and actions, “[v]iewers are able to 
connect up with the expressive acts of others […], because simulations mechanisms in the 
human brain allow for such connections” (Ibid., 7). 
As shown, “the structures used to put together our conceptual systems grow out of 
bodily experience and make sense in terms of it” since “the core of our conceptual system is 
directly grounded in perception, bodily movements, and experience of a physical and social 
character” (Lakoff 1987, xiv). As for everyday intersubjective contexts, the same structure 
of sense-making applies to fictional characters and impersonated protagonists. Like Gallese 
and Wojciehowski (2011) state, “[w]hen we see someone acting or expressing a given 
emotional or somatosensory state, we can directly grasp its content without the need to 




empathy needs to be related to cognitive mechanisms across different forms of expressions 
to claim its significance in aesthetic perception, despite the way of representing and 
implementing the conveyed narrative. For instance, in the particular case of theatrical 
representation, the multiple forms of narratives involved (dialogues and corporeal gestures, 
but also scenography and music) are able to deliver meaning to the spectators through a 
variety of systems of expression. 
This second section of the chapter tackled the peculiarities of fictional 
representations with their specificities in cinematic and theatrical expressions. In particular, 
addressing empathy and its key role in aesthetic perception, narrative, embodiment and 
mimicry where discussed and emphasised as essential in comprehension. In their depicted 
narratives, performed representations depend on empathy to succeed in the portrayals of 
psychophysical characters and their actions, intentions, and intersubjective relations. 
Embodied cognition allows simple contemplation to arise an empathic reaction in the 
spectator, grounded on spatiality, corporeal manifestation and emotional signals. Following, 
the next section will analyse the audience-actors relationship, as a fundamental tool to further 
investigate empathic understanding in the context of performativity and aesthetic 
appreciation. 
 
2.3. Embodiment and Perspective Taking: The Audience and the Character 
 
Even if mostly oriented to affective and communicative states, when related to 
performative genres empathy has a fundamental role in expanding one’s social interactions 
“extending the range of people, experiences, and cultures that an individual may have 
occasion to empathize with” (Stadler 2013, 31). Specifically, the role of empathy in sense-
making related to performative genres is deeply rooted in the perception of the protagonists 
and their actions. 
In performative contexts, intercorporeal empathy is replaced by an extended and 
mediated version, which “is directed to imagined or completely fictious persons” (Fuchs 
2014, 152). Fuchs addresses qualities of expression, intentionality and interactions as 
examples of circumstances able to awake fictional empathy. Representational media assume 
a catalyst role accompanying and stimulating the as if model of consciousness, which applies 




in physical relations, despite its deeply bodily features. In fact, our mind can, consciously 
and unconsciously, grasp and make sense of information even when mental or emotional 
states are produced by subjects who do not exist in real life or are simply unrelated to our 
personal environment. This natural human ability derives from the predisposition of each 
individual’s imagination to envision and construct both non-present and non-existent 
objects, persons, and even contexts and worlds. Considering that everything we observe and 
experience is subsequently projected into ideas by our brain (Zeki 2009, 1-2, as addressed 
in the first chapter), the involvement of subjective schemata mentally simulated can be 
equally applied to physically performed circumstances or only mentally grasped ones. Our 
indistinct inclination to fully perceive both tangible and fictious individuals suggests that 
“empathy and social understanding are regarded as projections onto others of inner 
representations or models” (Fuchs 2014, 155). This hypothesis on inner mental reproduction 
implies that “the person who perceives the other is not actually interacting with him, but 
rather with his own internal models or simulations of the other’s actions” (Ibid.). In other 
words, the models of interactions that we dispose are so influential and embedded in our 
mind that even when focusing on fictional characters and environments we are able to 
recognise the domains of experience implied. In fact, the direct interaction with the outer 
world primarily evokes the models of comprehension upon which we rely to decipher 
external objects and intersubjective contexts. 
In order for understanding to be effective, the forms and means of representation are 
fundamental. On the one hand, as languages of communication, performative media 
intervene between the audience and the represented scenario, positioning themselves as tools 
for interceding realities. In fact, representation has the power to bridge mental conception 
(namely, one’s mind reality) with the physical outside world, intervening as a support in its 
unfolding. On the other hand, they are also instruments of understanding, in the way they 
portray subjects and contexts as entities to be deconstructed and comprehended. Ways of 
depiction transcend, even if they support, intersubjective relations in a narrowest sense, and 
provide in their integrity a range of elements that reinforce cognition and emotional 
subjectivity (and its understanding). This means that the form of representation is not 
influenced by the way it serves intersubjective communication, but on the contrary it affects 





In the context of fictional representation, fiction allows the spectator to suspend his 
or her relationship with reality and fully connect with the represented dimension. However, 
as for the as if experience of foreign states belonging to subjects near to us, empathy implies 
by its nature a certain degree of imagination. If in intersubjective relations we tend to 
envision mental and emotional states as if they were ours, when it comes to fictional 
characters and contexts the entire experience is set on a virtual level. For this reason, media 
provide effective cognitive support to expand the viewer’s possibilities of perception. 
In the case of theatrical representation, the actions on stage are essential in shaping 
the emotional content of the play, in a way that our empathic resonance depends on the 
previous experience of our body moving and acting in association with particular emotional 
state. In particular, this experience follows the typical mechanisms of empathy, process 
during which “we rely on mediation by the representation of the actions associated with the 
emotions we are witnessing and on a brain network that includes structures supporting 
communication between action representation circuits and circuits dedicated to emotional 
processing” (Iacoboni 2005, 98-99). In the specific frame of theatre, the spectator’s mind is 
led to respond to the actor’s presence, movements and bodily manifestations. On the other 
side, actors play embodying those physical expression immediately recognisable by the 
present audience (Blair 2009, 102), with the goal of empathically evoking the feeling 
experienced by the characters on stage. The empathic imagination of the spectator into the 
characters on stage is essential not only in the understanding within the limits of the action, 
but also to foresee what the protagonist might feel and how he or she might act in the 
following scenes. In fact, characters and their development deeply rely on the analogy that 
the audience is able to recollect with previous experiences (among which also earlier 
attended plays) about analogous stories, other people and characters. Performers on stage 
act seeking to stimulate an emotional reaction, evoke and regulate empathy through the 
plausibility of the represented reality. 
 On the contrary, when approaching the cinematic representation of a story actors do 
not only impersonate characters, but their performance is shaped to construct a specific mise-
en-scène able to modify the expression and perception of actions and intersubjective 
exchanges (Donaldson 2012, 159). In particular, Donaldson suggests that our access to the 
mental and emotional state of a character in films depends on the possibility to access to him 




the camera in relation to the performer and how close it is to them, expressivity of voice or 
expression” (Ibid., 161). In this frame, the spatial context of the experience as well as the 
emotional and physical involvement are affected by the medium (movements of the camera, 
proximity to the characters’ expressivity, accentuation of kinaesthetic attention and 
information) in the way they are perceived by the audience. The use of camera and filmic 
techniques plays a role as essential as the acting one, revealing particular aspects of 
psychophysical expression. The relationship between bodies takes place on multiple levels 
(between characters and between characters and spectators), and this connection can be 
understood “as a response directed by the complexities of filmed performance: the quality 
of movement and characteristics of different efforts understood by it and our spatial access 
and physical alignment to the performer” (Ibid., 171). For this reason, the connection 
between realisation and perception in the cinematic experience is empathically grounded on 
embodied expression and its understanding. 
Moreover, D’Aloia (2012a) claims that the audio-visual experience of the audience 
during films leads to both an external perception of the characters’ bodies and an inner 
feeling supported by what observed. Cinematic empathy is, according to D’Aloia, grounded 
on this dichotomy, an “ontological separation that, nonetheless, represents the constitutive 
act of the film experience as a paradoxical ‘proximity at a distance’”. (D’Aloia 2012a, 106). 
In fact, between separation and proximity, the spectator-character empathic relation is 
described by D’Aloia “as the primordial experience (in the spectator’s lived-body) of non- 
primordial movements and emotions (those that are performed and felt by the character’s 
quasi-body)” (Ibid., 100). 
When empathy is extended to imaginative contexts, whether real or fictive, 
“employing some form of […] perspective taking or imaginative transposition […,] I 
imagine then how I would feel and react if in the same situation” (Fuchs 2014, 158). This 
particular form of as if scenario transcends a strict adhesion to the mere physical level, and 
it requires envisioning a distant situation experienced by somebody else. Non-personal and 
fictional agents are still perceived as real, as if they were part the observing individual’s 
personal world of experience. This contextual difference is irrelevant on a symbolic level, 
in which while being aware of what is real and what is not, one is simultaneously fully 
conscious of the existence of these two realities. Even if “fictional consciousness posits the 




irrational attitude or on any sort of illusion, rather on the peculiarity of fictional 
consciousness to oscillate with split awareness between both conceptions of the perceived 
character or event” (Ibid. 161-62). In other words, even if a form of disembodiment is 
involved since the physical experience is reduced to the minimum, a fictional form of bodily 
mirroring is present in the portrayed experience of the represented others. In this context, 
empathy and its spontaneous mechanisms of action do not approach fiction as not credible 
if the subjects shaped by it come close enough to reality to substitute it for a short period of 
time. Perceiving what is represented on stage (or on screen), our mind tends to minimise its 
opposition to these narrative media as mere artificial and artistic construction and the 
emotional encounter starts being experienced placing more emphasis to the human nature of 
the characters, emotions and contexts of action. As suggested by Fuchs, the figure of the 
other, present or not, is so powerful for our consciousness to transcend the necessity of being 
physically given. In fact, empathy continues to play a key role in the understanding of 
external subjects, even if not directly given, mediated or fictious. 
When empathising with a character, both during a play or on screen, each spectator 
is able to encounter some peculiarities that match with his or her personal states. Whether in 
an identitary (sex, origin, social condition) or experiential (the fact of having lived certain 
situations and contexts more than others) way, matching to some degree with the 
psychophysical characterisation of a depicted personality helps the audience to share and 
understand the observed portrayal. However, what helps in the process of sense-making is 
the way characters and their states are underdescribed (McFee 2011) in the narrative 
evolution. In fact, since emotional and mental states attributed to represented characters are 
ascribed in the construction and combination of selected passages of the storyline, the 
perspective oriented development of narratives (and narration itself) is essential in creating 
a path aimed to reveal specific assumptions, adopt certain positions and ultimately share the 
portrayed states. These intentional guidelines are concerned with shaping in a narrow time 
frame a simplified but convincing character’s psychology, as well as “how the ‘other’ 
understands his life” (McFee 2011, 202). 
 The structuring of audience’s empathic response to represented characters take place 
though diverse modalities. First, to intensify the process of spectator-character identification, 
a “range of different emotive relations between audiences and fictional characters” (Carroll 




experienced. This identification does not directly involve another subject as in interpersonal 
relations, but the other is mediated to the ones observing through the construction of effective 
narratives. In other words, the members of the audience are “in the emotional state in 
question because that is the state they think that the characters are in” (Ibid., 167). However, 
the depicted states do not always coincide with spectators. Often, in fact, there is a solid 
divergence between a character’s emotional portrait and what the audience is experiencing, 
and the main reason behind this discrepancy is the different amount of information at 
disposal of each character and the audience. Even if “our emotional states have different 
causes and take different objects than the putative mental states of the protagonists” (Ibid., 
168) it does not mean that empathy cannot take place. On the contrary, to fully understand, 
and therefore empathise, with the observed characters it is essential to complete the 
knowledge that the time of narration would provide if the time of experience and the one of 
representation would coincide. For the purpose of experiencing through empathy the same 
state of a portrayed protagonist, we do not only need to fully grasp the unchanged path that 
led the character to that same state, but the fact of him or her being in that specific condition 
is the ultimate but essential requirement to experience the same. For this very reason, the 
audience-character relationship is an empathic one. Despite the potential variety of 
spectators, “the fiction, by means of either visual depiction, enactment, and/or verbal 
description, organizes or filters the situations and events it presents in such a way that […] 
our states are in broad categorical agreement and we are in that vectorially converging state 
with the state of the characters” (Ibid., 169-172). Among these expedient, embodied 
simulation plays an essential role also in aesthetic empathy, including all the elements that 
contribute to ‘mirror reflexes’ (Wispé 1991), for instance postures and facial reaction and 
expressions. In fact, these reflexes are significant because they manage to “supply us with 
clues to the way in which we should size-up the situation in which characters find 
themselves” (Carroll 2011, 179). 
In brief, the body plays an essential part in the empathic process between audience 
and characters, both in the theatrical context, in which bodily expression shapes the 
emotional content of the story as the main access for the public to the represented reality, 
and in cinematic expression, in which the characters’ bodies contribute to the constitution of 
the filmic portrait in its form. In particular, expanding the interactions of the spectators with 




employed to convey stories, allowing the amplification of perspective taking and thus the 
comprehension of the aesthetic experience. In addition, metaphors are also central for the 
empathic process to take place, and they will be addressed, along with embodied simulation, 
in the next section. 
 
2.3.1. Metaphors and Simulation in Represented Realities 
 
In the relationship between spectator and played character/actor, a form of ethical 
understanding is fundamental “to bridge the distance between self and other” (Stadler 2013, 
27). Defined by Stadler as compassionate gaze, the audience’s involvement consists of a 
cognitively and affectively perceptual embodied experience. This shift from individual 
subjectivity to a position of comprehending another’s situation requires a shared perspective 
taking. Both aesthetic and narrative elements are employed by the medium of expression to 
nourish an intersubjective gaze within the audience. Mirroring an emotional resonance of 
the observed subjects, empathy allows the spectator to embody different individuals’ states, 
becoming a ‘surrogate body’ (Voss 2011, 145) of non-existing and impersonated characters. 
As an other-oriented experience, empathy and its related emotions depend on our ability to 
imagine which beliefs, intentions and feelings are at the foundations of the grasped states. 
In the case of fictious characters, it is necessary to ‘borrow’ a significant amount of our 
personal background to construct a meaningful reaction. Empathy functions, Krueger (2009) 
explains, as “a kind of extended bodily-perceptual process”, in which “certain aspects of the 
mind […] are present […] via the expressive dynamics of the social body” (Krueger 2009, 
676-683). Since a wide range of emotional and mental elements is not directly available to 
the audience, Krueger follows, the external and physical appearance of the experienced 
states is essential in performative contexts, supported by both cognitive perception and a sort 
of involuntary (and even pre-cognitive) mimic response. 
Embodied simulation is an essential element in the attribution of subjective states to 
portrayed characters. The representations grounded in fictional portraits are embodied “in 
such a way as to activate the viewers’ own sensory-motor experience world” (Coëgnarts 
2017, 8). Characters in fiction present their own individual complexity as concerns 
personality, mind, emotional sphere and life, more in general. The construction of these 




states. For this reason, it is necessary to understand physical forms of perception, spatial 
interactions, mental constructions and all the other essential elements which are considered 
essential to define one’s psychophysical states. 
Moreover, since the formation of concepts relies on conceptual metaphors (namely 
abstractions grounded on embodied experience), addressing mental comprehension also 
implies the analysis of such perceptual domains. The cognitive role of metaphors was first 
suggested by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), who claim a departure from a mere linguistic 
notion of metaphors and instead propose that metaphor is first and foremost a conceptual 
strategy. In the same way, metaphors are implied in artistic objects to support, through the 
employment of a more familiar conceptual domain, the understanding of the represented 
content. In fact, even if the bodily and experiential common core that human beings share is 
relevant in understanding what is observed, metaphors have the ability of enlarge the field 
of comprehension towards new perspectives, even if never experienced before. Metaphors 
do not limit their role of carriers of meaning, but they also imply a performative dimension, 
for instance when modelling the expressed meaning under different domains of experience, 
and thus reconceptualising both what is metaphorically explained and the shape of the 
evoked experience itself. In addition, metaphors are, according to Tseng (2010), involved in 
shaping the collective, since the communal process of meaning making “depends on shared 
assumptions and a common fund of knowledge between two persons, among a small group, 
among a speech community, or among users of the same language who might be from 
different cultural backgrounds” (Tseng 2010, 122). Metaphors are also fundamental in the 
construction and constant support of the represented world, whether real or fictional, 
contributing to mimetically shape new symbolic orders. In the discussed cases of cinematic 
and theatrical representations, metaphors gain a performative role in the way they are 
embodied and addressed to an observing audience. In this way, metaphors are profoundly 
experiential, giving a new shape to the semantic domains to which the audience refers and 
gaining an intersubjective role of expression. In brief, metaphors guide perception and 
understanding following both cognitive and intersubjective mechanisms of comprehension, 
gaining in this frame particular relevance on a physical and mental level. 
However, Coëgnarts (2017), focusing on the specific features of audience perception, 
claims that there is “a crucial difference between the mapping of image schemas onto 




(Coëgnarts 2017, 10). In fact, he follows, in the latter context “we have to rely on knowledge 
that was already stored in working memory” (Ibid.). On a receptive level of analysis, we rely 
on two layers of bodily conveyed representation: the actors performing and the direction of 
the fictional story (filmic techniques or creative direction of the actors on stage). Following 
the intentions attributed to the object, we tend to qualify the character “with general 
emotional labels […] to specific physiological and expressive responses” (Ibid.). Once 
again, this process of ascription is grounded on the correspondence with viewers’ 
experiences and characters’ embodied states, both in their acting and in the representative 
features of the work in its entirety. In the mental formation of concepts, language, whether 
verbal or symbolical, is an essential support in identification and comprehension. All these 
elements are fundamental for the spectators to simulate characters’ mental state, 
implementing a relatable setting in the context of which it is possible to empathise from 
different perspectives, to the point where “we cannot help but lose ourselves in a character” 
(Tan 2013, 337). 
As approached in the entirety of this chapter, artistic understanding works as “a 
special kind of experiential understanding […] knowledge by acquaintance” (Zahavi 2014, 
151). In fact, relational approaches, both personal and towards fictional characters, are first 
and foremost bodily grounded, depending on “a mandatory, pre-rational, non-introspective 
process” (Gallese and Wojciehowski 2011, 16). However, when it comes to specific 
narrative forms, “our embodied simulation becomes liberated” (Ibid., 19) and empathy 
allows an actual suspension of the world of reality to focus perception to aesthetic 
appreciation. Even if not real, whether fictional or not, representations are essential for a 
comprehensive understanding of the world we live in, as well as of ourselves. 
This chapter moved from a strictly intersubjective context of understanding to 
address the processes involved in aesthetic perception. In particular, the analysis of this 
section discussed the relation between cognition and response in the relation established 
between artist and viewer, mediated by the actual artistic object. The perspective of the 
audience has been claimed as central in both individual and collective experience, evoking 
the centrality of embodiment and domains of experience, but also stating the crucial role of 
narrative and metaphors. These mechanisms of perception, analysis and ultimately 
comprehension have been particularly oriented to the context of fictional stories and their 




experienced in the theatrical space, tragedy, and the specific case of Medea’s myth and 
portrayals, will be addressed in the next chapter in its literary depiction by Euripides (431 





3. Empathy and Tragedy: A Mimetic Experience 
 
3.1. Mimesis and the As If Representation on the Tragic Stage 
 
Approaching the performative genre in Western culture, it would be incomplete not 
to give enough emphasis to tragedy. Model of writing and performing on stage, this form of 
aesthetic depiction has been continuously represented from its peak in 5th century BC Athens 
to contemporary days. A complex and at times enigmatic genre, many angles could be 
adopted “in order to find our way through what we are bound to describe as the labyrinth of 
the origin of Greek tragedy” (Nietzsche 1999, 36). 
This third chapter will address spectatorship and its perception in relation to the tragic 
genre and the active participation in its performative expression through empathic 
observation. In particular, the focus will be oriented to those cognitive processes that, 
involving embodied simulation, domains of experience and narrative mechanisms, allow 
comprehension of the observed object. Bodily and mental aspects of perception, as they have 
been theoretically described in the preceding chapters, will be directed here to the 
specificities of this particular literary form designed to be performed on stage. Metaphors, 
domains of experience and semantic categories will be analysed with respect to those 
peculiarities that make the understanding of tragedy possible. In particular, special attention 
will be given to Medea, the protagonist of the homonymous dramatic work by Euripides 
(431 BC), in both her poetic portrayal and in the 1969 cinematic adaptation by Pier Paolo 
Pasolini. As suggested by the philosophy scholar Tobón (2019), a cognitive perspective on 
artistic perception and comprehension “encouraged the revitalization of empathy-research 
in aesthetics, giving it a new conceptual framework and a new understanding of its processes 
and objects, for simulation can be directed to any aspect of other people’s mental life, not 
only emotions and affects but also thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, desires, decisions, and so 
on” (Tobón 2019, 875-876). 
In his work The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings (1999), Nietzsche approaches 
this dramatic genre in relation to its central object of representation: the human condition. 
Conceived as a mimetic representation of humankind, and of the Athenian context in 




great relevance. Recalling Aristotle’s Eudemos15, the philosopher explains that the origin of 
tragic representation can only be explained as reflecting on the most representative and all-
encompassing human particularity: suffering. In the dialogue Silenus is reported to be the 
bearer of great knowledge about life and happiness, which King Midas is eager to hear about. 
After being chased and caught by Midas, Silenus is asked what the greatest thing is that a 
human being could aspire to. In reply, according to the Greek myth and as reported by 
Nietzsche, the daemon tells the King: “[w]retched, ephemeral race, children of chance and 
tribulation, why do you force me to tell you the very thing which it would be most profitable 
for you not to hear? The very best thing is utterly beyond your reach not to have been born, 
not to be, to be nothing. However, the second best thing for you is: to die soon” (as cited in 
Nietzsche 1999, 23). 
Mirroring the Hellenic civilisation, the essence of tragedy bears on the dichotomous 
tension, which makes up every individual. Similar to the human inner condition shared by 
the members of the audience, tragedy is balanced between the Dionysian spirit, freedom in 
form, inebriated creation and painful destruction, and the Apollonian side, ordered shape, 
proficient reasonableness and rational competence. Simultaneously universal and individual, 
tragedy stages a collective conflict able to disrupt differences and harmonise humanity under 
the unity of a human portrait. As a communal genre, tragedy has “the enormous power […] 
to stimulate, purify, and discharge the entire life of the people” (Ibid., 99), with a solid 
salvific role in its social implication. In fact, suffering is perceived in tragedy as a form of 
atonement, which is achieved through the personal and collective participation to the most 
faithful representation of the human experience of grief. 
Following tragedy as a genre, it tends toward a performed representation of human 
vicissitudes. In fact, its mimetic essence is oriented to reproducing reality on a staged 
performance. On the other hand, while being a verisimilarly depiction, mimesis is also 
aesthetic creation, appearing as if present reality to the audience (Halliwell 2002, 310-12): 
the story embodied by actors on stage during the mise en scène continues to be illusory and 
artificially manipulated. The discovery through tragedy of the nihilistic human condition is, 
according to Anderson (1939, 35-36), a veritable cathartic epiphany. This dualist 
 
15 This dialogue, of which only few fragments survive today, deals with the Platonic conception of the soul and 
the impossibility of experiencing happiness, since life consists in a permanent state of imprisonment inside 




psychophysical state between the detached awareness of attending to a fictional 
representation and the responsive attraction facing a human dramatic experience balances 
the audience in front of an enticing scenario. In particular, the audience is oriented to seek 
emotions and perceive foreign mental states (Lucas 1927, 23) which, in the specific case of 
tragedy, takes the dramatic form of the inevitable human fate. Once again, the spectator, as 
in intersubjective contexts, tends to experience fictional scenarios as if they were his or her 
own. 
To better understand tragedy and the cognitive underpinnings in its reception, it is 
fundamental to acknowledge that besides being a literary form aimed to be performed on 
stage, it depicts potentially realistic human scenarios, with protagonists characterised by 
plausible peculiarities involved in verisimilar contexts of action. In the frame of these ‘kinds 
of reality’ (Brandt 2004, 34), characterised by social references, habits and beliefs, spectators 
have the power to attribute meaning to imaginative schemes evoked by fiction. Individual 
and collective practices and experiences are essential also in tragic contexts, instrumental to 
the act of decoding representations and relations of social and cultural structures. Thanks to 
the constant reference to human reality, or at least a possible one, tragic plausibility of 
suffering and misfortune appears authentic in both an individual and an intersubjective way, 
in such a way that what is portrayed on stage assumes the characteristics of just a particular 
possibility of the ordinary reality. These deviations, guided by narrative structures and 
storyline resolutions, scrupulously enhance audience to a more profound cognitive and 
empathic involvement with the observed scenario. 
The distinctive structure of tragedy, centred on the alternance of the succession of a 
section to be sung (in lyric meters, interpreted by the chorus) and discursive dialogues (in 
iambic trimeter, based on a twelve-syllable scheme and recited by the actors on stage), 
presents a recurrent narrative configuration, which renders it familiar to the audience. In its 
general structure, the tragic play begins with the prologue16, in the context of which a minor 
protagonist, secondary to the vicissitudes of the main characters or an observing god 
generally delivers an introduction to the story, addressing, directly or indirectly, the 
audience. In a second moment, during the parodos17, the chorus makes its appearance on 
stage to convey its first song, followed by the side-entrance of the different protagonists of 
 
16 Πρóλογος (pro-lógos, preliminary speech). 




the tragedy. The core corpus of the play comprises various episodes18 (three or more) during 
which the sequence of plot’s events takes place. They are generally interspersed with 
stasima19, choral interludes aiming to comment on characters’ feelings and choices of action, 
while developing more thoroughly some sections of the story. After the conclusion of the 
final stasimon, the drama culminates with the exodos20, the tragic conclusive epilogue. 
The repetitive structure of the tragic scheme is significant and plays a crucial role in 
the sense-making process: spectators, familiarised with the singularly emblematic 
configuration of this genre, are especially inclined to focus recollection on emotions 
pertaining to personal experience. As suggested by Hanenberg and Brandt (2010, 182), 
representations’ perception is hardly dissociable from everyday involvement, and for this 
reason it is fundamental to address structural repetitions as “ways of worldmaking” 
(Neumann and Nünning 2007, 6). From their approach, Neumann and Nünning claim that it 
is impossible to actually perceive any world or even be aware of its existence in a single 
form. As human beings we are capable of grasping world versions, which can be 
symbolically depicted in different forms and by different media. In the specific case of 
tragedy, thanks to the fixed structure of the genre and its ease of access, different ways of 
experiencing and understanding the depicted vicissitudes are developed by different 
spectators. In each story, as in the case of Medea which will be addressed later in the chapter, 
the repeated structure of tragedy supports the vicissitudes of a world whose dimension and 
meaning can be constructed and deconstructed by the audience. For this reason, the world 
represented, in this case, by tragedy is not antithetical from, for example, the scientific one, 
but it is just another symbolic variant of it. While the latter relies on a biological and numeric 
description, the tragic world is grounded on the expression of words and their representation 
on stage. 
The way in which we are used to perceive the actual world in which we live functions 
as a reference to decipher fictional ones, which, as any other, are human-based in both their 
conception and reception. The mimetic configuration of the tragic world and the recurrence 
of typical canons allow the audience to follow formulaic patterns, upon which spectators are 
able to make sense of the story through the interpretation of previously gathered knowledge 
following spontaneous deciphering mechanisms. In fact, the experience of recognised states, 
 
18 Ἐπεισόδια (episodes). 
19 Στάσιμον (stationary). 




actions and emotions causes in the public an automatic sharing reaction with the characters, 
leading to wider and deeper understanding. Tragedy is constructed as a mimetic 
representation which goes beyond the individuality of each spectator’s experience and it 
repetitively summons the variety of present perceptions into a comprehensive possibility 
which encompasses any other. In other words, tragedy, through common patterns of 
understanding, is intersubjectively objective. 
Furthermore, according to Stamatopoulou (2007), “tragedies can become a symbolic 
vehicle of experiential learning and empathic morality” (Stamatopoulou 2007, 173). In fact, 
the scholar traces a cognition-based interpretation of the mimetic quality of tragedy, equating 
the dramatic performances’ contemplation with the meaning making process. Starting from 
Aristotle’s On Poetics, Stamatopoulou highlights the essential role of empathy, simulation 
and recollection in the comprehension of the tragic encounter, which, according to her, 
consists in the ability to appreciate characters’ emotional states (negative ones, in the case 
of tragedy). Moreover, she claims that this process allows at first the shift of perspective in 
the cognitive elaboration of the aesthetic perception and then the stimulation of experiential 
learning about the inner self. However, Stamatopoulou insists, the experience of 
spectatorship is not confined to one of these facets. On the contrary, their joint response in 
the audience-play interaction permits to fully live and make sense of what is practiced. 
As for intersubjective empathy, the function of self-projection is crucial, since 
“mimesis may stand as the “bridge” from embodied simulation to mental simulation” (Ibid., 
181): in other words, from the reaction to an elementary attentional stimulus to the 
deciphering of a symbolic meaning. For this reason, Stamatopoulou claims, mimesis is 
ambivalently essential for the understanding of what is staged and as “invitation of 
entertaining a creative constructive process of image-schematic becoming representations 
[…] that we use to formulate and organize our experience” (Ibid., 182), helping to 
symbolically transform our knowledge. 
In addition, while the object of tragedy mimetically reproduces life, the suffering 
portrayal of misery takes the form of a plot-myth detached from personally privileged 
contexts and references. The archetypical representations of its characters, symbolic 
depictions of typified figured rather than simplistic stereotypes, embody the tragic conflict 
before the audience. During the aesthetic experience, the spectator mainly responds, prior to 




depicted by the myth. In this context, the feeling into enacting process involves the 
expressive and embodied mimetic reproduction of reality. The diversified range of emotions, 
for entity and quality, is strictly connected to mechanisms grounded on the attentional 
intensity: in essence, the higher the degree of experiential similitude, the deeper the 
psychophysical reaction is. The construction of mimetic narratives arouses empathic feelings 
in shared understanding-oriented mechanisms, entailing “metaphoric […] identification 
through mimesis as an imaginative act – expressive/embodied enactment” (Ibid., 185). 
In this frame, the situated position of the audience implies a central role of 
embodiment, as a physical response to the dynamic traits of the performative space and the 
actors involved in it, since the tension implicated in the dramatic experience is enhanced by 
physiognomic expressivity in the staging of dramatic tension. In the particular circumstances 
of audience perspective, the affective perception invites the observing subject to share the 
emotional implication of the heinous tragic conflict. The recollective filtering of spectators’ 
experience, guided by the alternance of universal and individual emotions-based action 
outlined by the poet, consents mimesis to become empathically plausible. Implementing the 
complexity of performed actions, the embodied imaginary produces a simultaneously 
complex and clarifying scheme able to amplify and expound the mimetic effect and its 
meaning. 
Shifting the perspective of the public, the tragic experience draws attention to the 
synthetic interpretation of the outer world, through its characters and their intentions, the 
myth and the flexible self-identification and the reflections on embodied imaginaries that it 
invites. As claimed by Stamatopoulou, “a transitional in-between space of shared emotion 
co-regulation, and co-articulation is generated activating a merging of action […] that 
creates the possibility of detached awareness, where even negative feelings […] can be 
experienced for the long-term benefits of the expressive/communicative quality of the 
interaction”, in a context in which “self-focused emotion experience, can be imaginatively 
transformed in a wider context, so that the concerns of the self can be relocated and 
contextualized in a wider perspective which allows analogic comparisons, abstractions and 
emotion thoughts to be made” (Ibid., 191). 
Traditionally, mimesis is opposed to diegesis as forms of literary representation. 
While mimesis shows and imitates what pertains to the world of reality, diegesis presupposes 




examples tragedy and comedy, while epic poetry represents a case of diegetic narration. The 
main difference between these two forms of poetic expression is that the telling of the story 
by its author represents a narrative level other than the one of the story itself (namely, the 
diegesis). On the contrary, in the writing of a mimetic work, the author is called to show the 
vicissitudes of the characters without making his or her voice directly present. However, the 
relationship between mimesis and diegesis should not be seen as inflexible in their contents, 
and there is no rigorous line between the two concepts as the one separating non-fiction from 
fiction. The mimetic function of literary works, and specifically tragedy, does not preclude 
the depicted story to be fictious just because it imitates the physical world, which is precisely 
what Sukenick (1985) claims while introducing the concept of mimetic fiction. The literary 
theorist suggests that “[t]he key idea is verisimilitude: one can make an image of the real 
thing which, though not real, is such a persuasive likeness that it can represent our control 
over reality” (Sukenick 1985, 4). In fact, although such “illusions are fostered by concepts 
of imitation, one cannot have control "over" that of which one is part, or even formulate it 
completely - one can only participate more deeply in it” (Ibid.). 
The power of mimetic fiction has always been central in the process of emotionally 
inducing empathic commitment, “[p]erhaps because in aesthetic experience we can 
temporarily suspend our grip on the world of our daily occupations” (Gallese and 
Wojciehowski 2011, 19). The pause from the reality of the world we live in allows the public 
to fully immerse in the portrayed reality, as well as to evoke those mental domains which 
are essential in understanding. This freedom of thought and inner analysis takes place 
through the access to a vivid represented dimension, which we are able to empathically grasp 
through our sensorimotor system. In brief, tragic human portraits and misfortunes are 
positioned in a mimetic and fictional frame, distant to their audience as a work of art but 
close enough to possibly be part of our physical reality. 
 
3.1.1. The Tragic Space: Audience Response and Embodied Simulation 
 
As the role of embodiment in empathy was acknowledged, behavioural tendencies 
are associated with explicit staged actions also in tragedy, as bodily expressions of 
performed thoughts. In particular, as resulted during studies in cognitive response to 




and more subject to intellectual manipulations and cognitive control” (Davis, Hull, Young 
and Warren 1987, 132), negative emotions are more inclined to provoke “emotional reaction 
[…] heavily influenced by emotional empathy” (Ibid., 126). In fact, the study conducted by 
the four neuroscientists demonstrates emotional variable in empathic perception to be 
dominant while observing negative affective states, while cognitive empathy is dominant in 
positive emotional contexts. These findings contribute to understand that, while in the case 
of positive emotions the process of understanding what is being experienced is first 
cognitively grasped, when people face the depictions of negative states, as in the case of 
tragedy, emotional involvement and perspective taking become central. In the second case, 
the observer is led to imagine himself or herself in the position of the empathised character 
rather than to only make sense of the emotions experienced by others. Thus, negative 
emotional states are less open to mental manipulation but more susceptible to emotional 
reactivity. 
In the case of tragedy, the similarities with personal experiences allow the rise of 
empathic imagination through the association of physiognomic enactment on stage. The 
revealing evolution of the represented myth allows a progressive deepening in individual 
contemplation, since “in art, holistically perceived or imagined fear, embodying a common 
“action” background of motor-affective cues becomes a conditioned psychological space 
that allows reflective imaginative acts, compassion-witnessing emotions and contemplative 
thoughts to unfold” (Stamatopoulou 2007, 197, emphasis in the original). 
The communicative capacity of the tragic genre relies on the verisimilitude with 
imaginary acts in their embodied reproduction, which arouses the engagement of the 
audience in the awakening of emotional response. The deeply relational nature of 
spectatorial emotions is rooted in the questioning of the sense of self trough as if perceptions, 
in which familiar psychophysical states are re-experienced thanks to the bodily simulation 
of tragic protagonists’ condition. 
Moreover, the relevance of pity and fear, as suggested by Aristotle, presupposes a 
path to understanding that is profoundly dependent on empathy. More than the mere 
evolvement of the plot, tragedy deploys physical actions to disclose the myth and its 
structures of meaning. In fact, “tragedy is an imitation, not of human beings, but of actions 
and of life. Both happiness and wretchedness depend on action, and the end is an action, not 




characters because of actions” (Aristotle, On Poetics, 1450a16-22). Precisely in these 
actions, perceived by the audience as patterns of experience, the empathic as if position can 
be assumed by the present audience. The self is involved in its entirety in the observation 
and discernment of these actions, since, as Aristotle suggests, the spectator senses resemble 
not necessarily only the hero’s portrayed individual peculiarities, but the actions and states 
implicated in the unfolding of his or her character. In fact, the mimetic nature of tragic 
embodied acts intrinsically shapes the genre’s praxis from its origin, as the affective 
synchrony with the object of perception has enabled to “feel into” characters’ representations 
and their reactions to the dramatic situation they face on stage. Specifically, Hoffman (1990) 
claims that the experience of empathy is intensified, like in the case of tragedy, when in the 
process of outer states’ perception we distinguish “a sense of injustice, including a 
motivational disposition to right the wrong - so that it could be said that empathic distress 
may be transformed by the lack of reciprocity […] between the character and the outcome 
into a feeling of injustice” (Hoffman 1990, 159). In particular, the psychophysical domain 
of emotions covered by tragedy allows the radical transformation of abstract problematic 
matters into empathy-worthy ones. 
Furthermore, Cairns (2017) highlights the role of embodiment in tragedy. In this 
dramatic frame, the author substantively expresses tragic embodiment with the concept of 
phrikē21, namely a proper bodily experience of shuddering, involving an involuntary 
physical response to an observed dreadful stimulation which needs to be interpreted at both 
the level of mental evaluation and corporeal reaction. In fact, “[w]hether we ourselves see 
the play in the theatre or merely in our mind’s eye as we read, the response of this internal 
audience is, at least in this instance, a guide to our own” (Cairns 2017, 55). Cairns claims 
that the physical response to tragic stimuli is so immediate that it provokes a full-fledged 
somatic reaction to the experienced emotion, despite the differences between collective and 
individual experience previously tackled. Precisely, this pre-conscious answer, in the guise 
of corporal drive, constitutes a sort of unaware action of regulative response by the observing 
audience. Instead, the role of consciousness in empathy, involved only at a later stage, lies 
on the spectators’ phenomenological awareness and refers to the vividness and 
acknowledgement of experiencing a personal process. 
 




Most importantly, the presence “of emotional symptoms in the construction of 
emotional concepts underlines the fundamental importance of physical embodiment in the 
concept of emotion itself” (Ibid., 57). The embodied appearance of performed states is not 
just a symbolic expression of one’s state (mainly the tragic hero’s condition), but an 
intentionally employed medium of tragic narrative communication. The cohesion between 
the bodily resemblance of individual states and the mental conceptualisation of equivalent 
feelings leans on unitary cultural categories which comprehend both experiential sides of 
emotions. Actually, the physical image of the expressed state, vividly described in textual 
and performed form, allows the audience to fully perceive how the experience takes place. 
In fact, “it is impossible for the fearful and the pitiable to come to be from opsis, [… f]or the 
story must have been put together in such a way that, even without seeing, he who hears the 
events as they come to be shudders and pities from what occurs” (Aristotle, On Poetics, 
1453b1-7). The stimulated continuity between visuality and poetic narrative emphasises the 
essential role of corporal action to provoke immediate emotional reaction within the 
audience, which is significant in invigorating spectators’ imaginative capacities. Moreover, 
“the emotional response in question may have a pronounced somatic aspect that underlines 
the phenomenological continuity between narrative representations, dramatic 
representations, and the emotion-eliciting scenarios of everyday life” (Cairns 2017, 64). 
Thanks to these narrative tools and the physicality of emotional expressivity, empathy 
becomes possible in the tragic context. 
Moreover, it would be possible to assert that “tragedy is a praxial-in-structure 
synthesis of the interactions of people in their predicaments so that the deep structure of 
selfhood and social interaction becomes clearer, since we do not only experience the 
emotions and hence the urgency of the human vicissitudes (incidents) and dilemmas-
conflicts that cause them, but we are enabled to reflect on them in such a way as to create 
deeper level abstractions of ourselves and others” (Stamatopoulou 2007, 211). The empathic 
responsiveness in tragic sense-making process, in combination with the mental and physical 
state of feeling into the observed protagonists “and the shaping of our experience in the 
pursuit of knowledge by means of affectively/expressively [… ,] creates a shift from the 
local features to their joint meeting” (Ibid., 212). Suffering in tragedy is oriented to learning, 
and understanding is a precondition for knowledge. The vicarious experience of sorrow 




emotions which, as claimed by Lévinas (1969) guarantee through empathy a comprehensive 
vision on vulnerability, but also the opportunity of appreciating the worth of being and 
empathic perception in tragedy. This experience takes place in tragedy, according to Ellis 
(2000), when empathising with the protagonists on stage, as a vicarious participation of 
somebody else’s state. In fact, “[t]ragedy makes possible the direct experience of that which 
is intrinsically valuable in an ontologically embattled, irreplaceable conscious being, and 
then magnifies the intensity of this direct experience of intrinsic value by continually 
twisting the knife of that very embattlement” (Ellis 2000, 66). 
In conclusion, this first section introduced tragedy and its peculiarities, both 
structural and historical, giving particular relevance to its mimetic nature in relation with 
audience and perception. Specifically, emotional empathy was addressed as central in the 
way it allows the tragic experience of bodily expressed states to take place. In fact, the tragic 
depiction of the human nature through the characters on stage finds in personal experience 
its prerequisite of understanding. The next section of this chapter will investigate the 
modalities according to which empathy takes place in tragedy towards the heroes on stage. 
 
3.2. Tragic Characters and Dramatic Embodiment 
 
Bridging intersubjective empathy and the aesthetic experience presupposes the 
acknowledgment of perceptive distance that distinguishes spectatorship from the object of 
observation. However, as peculiarly distinctive in empathy, “my aesthetic feeling not only 
is objective but is referentially the same feeling that exists in the object” (Depew 2005, 103). 
In the case of tragedy, empathy demands its audience to feel with its heroes, instead of 
experiencing a sympathetic drive for them. In fact, audience members’ empathic 
involvement allows spectators to put themselves in the observed characters’ position. In 
particular, Depew (2005) claims that the aesthetic object does not subsist as a representation 
of a psychophysical ground, but it must be an expression of it, meaning that there is no such 
figurative divergence between the object of empathy and its depiction. On the contrary, they 
correspond. This section will focus on the tragic hero and his or her symbolic value in human 
expression. In particular, the essential mimetic features relevant in the empathic experience 
will be explored and elucidated, maintaining the spectator-protagonist relation as the crucial 




 The relevance of empathy in the experience of fictional characters is premised upon 
a “specific and modular system of understanding that would connect our body with other 
bodies through an internal and automatic imitation of what they do and feel, in such a way 
that it would allow us to feel the phenomenological tone of their experience” (Tobón 2019, 
870-871). In this case, empathy is specifically crucial in the audience-tragic hero relation, in 
particular because through his or her actions, choices and experiences the hero personifies 
the human condition and destiny as conceived by the tragic tradition. However, the empathic 
approach does not exclusively rely on the emotional expression communicated by the actors 
on stage through language and bodily manifestation, but the entirety of tragic narrative is 
fundamental for the implementation of this model. The participative guiding action of the 
chorus, in combination with the observation of the tragic hero and his or her vicissitudes, is 
in fact essential in bringing spectators close to the dramatic act performed on stage. 
Returning to the Nietzschean symbolic analysis of tragedy, the philosopher claims that the 
annihilation of the tragic hero is not only a possibility of the protagonist’s fate, but also the 
complete accomplishment of the human condition. However, “because our primary 
identification is with ‘the one living being’, we see not only that our ‘true’, Dionysian self 
is immune to the annihilation that is the fate of every individual, that it is ‘indestructible and 
eternal’, but also that the destruction of individuals is ‘necessary’, that is to say, justified 
[…] on account of the primordial unity’s ‘exuberant’ creative ‘fertility’ and because one 
cannot create without destroying” (Young 2013, 179). Empathy is, according to this 
philosophical interpretation, essential to accomplish the profound spirit of this performed 
genre, because only through the emotional share is it possible to fully grasp the mimetic 
representation leading to spectators’ catharsis. This section will investigate the mechanisms 
behind the empathic bond between tragic heroes and their audience. 
 
3.2.1. Masks, pathos and the Chorus: Theatrical Devices in Tragic Narratives 
 
Traditionally, the tragic hero should be one “who is neither distinguished by virtue 
and justice nor changing to bad fortune on account of vice and wickedness […], but one who 
changes on account of some mistake and is one of those in great repute and of good fortune” 
(Aristotle, On Poetics, 1453a 7-11). The tragic protagonist is neither morally superior to his 




somehow ethically inferior as typical comic figures. In particular, tragic heroes need to act 
within the same moral frame and according to similar ethical codes of the present spectators 
in order to be fully understood and empathically addressed. As Hegel (1975b, 1194-5) 
suggests, the hero corresponds to a personification of a specific dialectic aspect of tragic 
narrative. Defined by Hegel as proper human sculptures, tragic heroes embodied values, 
roles and typified personas able to represent and bring together the depicted society and its 
members. Usually, each hero goes through his or her misfortunes impersonating a specific 
trait which is employed and conceived as a key element in the development of the plot, able 
to recollect its experiential charge within the audience. 
In fact, as envisioned by Hegel, the exemplification of virtues is essential in tragedy. 
Specifically, “[c]lassical tragic heroes are, as it were, adamantine embodiments of an idée 
fixe [… ; t]he ethical powers that animate classical tragic heroes are, Hegel insists, not 
‘passions’, for passions are liable to be both transitory and things that one ‘suffers’, things 
one is overcome by rather than endorsing with one’s whole being” (Young 2013, 116). And, 
Young continues, the way in which the tragic hero impersonates the virtue results in “a 
commitment so powerful and all-consuming that the destruction of the commitment can 
come about only through the destruction of the hero, for the hero simply is the pathos” (Ibid., 
116-117). The juxtaposition of heroes and statues is elucidated by Hegel affirming that, in 
the time of the story, there is not enough room for the protagonists to be sufficiently 
characterised as real-world persons. On the contrary, the heroic tragic figure stands between 
the archetype and the fully featured individual: the ensemble of his or her traits shall not 
exceed in order not to excessively personalise the heroes’ narrative features (as in the case 
of epic heroes), but the subjectivity of tragic protagonists still needs to figure an entity in its 
wholeness. 
Even if it is essential to acknowledge the profound ethical bond between tragic 
characters and Greek social and moral code, heroes always distinguish themselves for 
fighting till the end of the piece for a deeply personal cause. The traits attributed to these 
heroes are on many levels common to any observer’s experiential attributes and mental 
process, easily accessible to every member of the public. As the audience attends the tragic 
performance “if the exaltation of tragic action were truly a property of the high-bred 
character alone, it is inconceivable that the mass of mankind should cherish tragedy above 




The various peculiarities previously envisioned suggest the qualities that are 
typically attributed to the tragic hero and which make possible an empathic response in the 
audience. Traditionally, tragic actors habitually wear masks when impersonating their roles 
on stage. In fact, the different personalities performing the dramatic plot embody individuals 
with no clear identity. Typically, masks do not feature clear anthropomorphic qualities, 
leaving the present audience free to imagine itself as one of the malleable and anonymous 
characters present on stage. The realities represented are shaped to be verisimilar to any 
possible spectator in a limb between fiction and actual plausibility. Also, following the 
pathetic theory proposed by Hegel (1975a) according to which every tragic hero 
impersonates a specific pathos, in traditional Greek tragic representations masks assume 
exaggerated appearances in order to directly transmit the intended emotion that stands for 
the singular character. Besides having a voice amplifying role, masks embodied in a 
handcrafted way the essence of each character, whose actor must implement with extremely 
explicit corporal gestures, not only mirroring the mask’s expressivity, but adapting 
movements and gesticulations to different vicissitudes and stages of the plot. Embodiment 
is essential in empathic relations, and, in particular in the context of mythic stories and their 
representations, “[s]torytelling is an act of imagination and remembrance which does not 
separate out the religious from the philosophical, the aesthetic from the moral, the mythic 
from the historical, the practical from the theoretical. […] Even so, they embody the memory 
and wisdom of a people, and are so understood, as crucial to the survival and well being of 
the community” (Kimmel 2000, 11). Tragic theatre can be described as a social mirror, 
which, through the constant guidance of the chorus, allows the audience to feel into the 
protagonists of the staged drama. The performed realism of human misfortunes brings the 
enactment on a shared level of experience, in which the emotional, behavioural and 
decisional familiarity allows the audience to completely comprehend the poetic portrayal it 
is assisting to. 
The presence of masks on stage could be addressed as an eventual limit for embodied 
expression and the possibility of an empathic response from the audience. However, the 
centrality of masks in the tragic ritual and spectatorial experience is worth mentioning. 
Besides being mimetic representations of the ethos of the characters, masks, as recurrent 
symbolic figurations in the traditional portrayal of Dionysus, determine an immediate sense 




experience of the physical world and qualifying the actors on stage as dramatis personae. 
As claimed by the classics scholar Meineck (2011), “in an open-air space that allowed the 
external environment to inform the aesthetic experience of watching drama, the mask 
provides a visual focus for emotional communication, and is able to stimulate a deeply 
personal response from the spectators. The mask demands to be watched” (Meineck 2011, 
121). In particular, mask demands to be watched from afar: the voluminous shapes of its 
facial traits compose a cohesive expression, which is meant to be grasped from distant 
observation. Also, masks play a central role in gender identification. While all the actors on 
stage are male, the characteristics of the impersonated protagonist are attributed by the 
features depicted on the mask. 
Moreover, mirror neurons are stimulated within the tragic public through the 
manipulation of the expressivity of the mask. In fact, the facial features represented on the 
mask are malleable according to the angles from which they are observed, and several 
qualities of the depicted expression would change assuming different inclinations depending 
on the function in the development of the plot. In addition, Meineck suggests that “[t]his 
effect may also be linked to our cognitive prowess at recognizing faces, in that we store 
thousands of physiognomies in our memories and match them to the holistic configuration 
of the face before us” (Ibid., 132). This also means that the spectator plays a crucial role in 
situating the expressions observed on the mask and shaping the symbolic sense of it 
according to the development of the plot and the evolution of the character in the story. 
Besides, experiential cognition is not limited to facial expression. Empathy functions also 
on the level of motion, as performed by actors in representation of those collectively 
acknowledged movements which detain a strongly manifest symbolic meaning. As a society 
profoundly accustomed to attend dance performances in both scared rites and contexts of 
leisure, corporeal expression is deeply present in ancient Greek performative traditions. For 
these reasons, masks are not barriers but the actual focus for the spectators to emotionally 
and visually follow staged tragedies. 
Likewise, the action of the chorus is particularly essential in this frame. In opposition 
to other characters, the members of the chorus are not individualised in their peculiarities 
(both in body and personality), but they function as a singular voice in the development of 
the plot. The central role of the chorus is multifaceted and covers different aspects of 




performance, both on the evolution of the vicissitudes of the story and on the psychophysical 
states of the characters. The chorus actively helps interspersing the voice of emotion with a 
reasoning one or accentuating the emotional charge in certain circumstances. Also, the 
chorus plays a key role in suggesting alternatives to the characters (and indirectly to the 
spectators), shifting perspective or expressing particular judgements on events or characters 
on stage. 
 However, the specific role of the chorus in the empathic process is precisely to depict 
the ideal spectator (Schlegel 1846), manifesting through bodily gestures, music and 
expressed opinions the emotions its members are experiencing during the tragic events. This 
constant presence permits the spectators to persistently refer to the chorus which, giving an 
interpretative commentary on the story, helps creating a deeper connection between the 
audience and the heroes and supporting the empathic process. Delaying the tempo of the 
story or accelerating the tension to the climax are just some examples of the different tools 
employed by the chorus. Impersonating for the most part common members of the society 
depicted on stage, the audience easily mirrors the chorus in its actions and reactions. 
The theatrical devices employed in structuring and performing tragic narratives 
addressed in this section are essential for the performance of tragedy itself and the 
engagement of the audience. While the emphasis in the characterisation of the protagonists 
is stressed by the shape and handling of the masks, the chorus guides both the heroes on 
stage and the spectators in the development of the story and its decipherment. The next 
section addresses the relation between empathy and catharsis, highlighting the essential role 
of the empathic process in the act of purification represented by the tragic experience. 
 
3.2.2. Empathy and Purification in the Cathartic Process 
 
The experience of feeling into tragic characters constitutes an essential step for 
catharsis to take place. Act of purification and individual freedom, catharsis is the 
“experience of seeing oneself transformed before one's eyes and acting as if one had really 
entered another body, another character” (Nietzsche 1999, 43). Also, catharsis is first and 
foremost an act of liberation, which successfully takes place through mimetic projection and 
identification with experiences that commonly affect the entirety of the human genre 




the deep experience of empathy opens a possibility of awareness and understanding. 
However, before the act of purification can take place, catharsis implicates an emotional 
involvement. The emotions portrayed are the ones of a shared existence, which is tragically 
lived on stage and indirectly by the audience. The metaphoric representation as discovered 
in tragedy is essential for understanding not only the staged emotions but the human 
experience at large: as proposed by Iacono (2010, 84), the spectator, when exploring a 
fictional world or artistic representation, is able to naturalise the characters involved. In this 
frame, the audience participates in an intermediate dimension between the consciousness of 
being mere presence facing a predetermined scenario and recognizing the truthfulness of the 
staged world’s possibility. 
Furthermore, as the chorus develop the myth and its plot throughout the tragic 
chronicle, the empathic relation established with the represented heroes consolidates the 
immersion and personal understanding of the entire staged narrative. In fact, “it is often 
noted that without an extreme depth of empathy […], the tragic effect fails to be achieved; 
thus we feel no catharsis” (Ellis 2000, 64). Empathy is therefore essential not only to achieve 
a full comprehension of the attended performance, but it is necessary for the tragic effect to 
entirely succeed. The presence of perseverance, vulnerability and exasperation in the 
psychophysical portrays of tragic heroes accomplishes in making empathy pervasively 
possible. In particular, the pronounced expressivity of human corporal expression “form[s] 
a pre-conscious we-relationship that is characterized by lived-body communalizations” 
(Backhaus 2000, 187) of experiencing and having experienced a commonly shared system 
of mental and bodily states. In fact, [w]ithin each body schema as its own field of expression, 
the Other is already present” (Ibid.). The representation of personal states through physical 
actions is essential also in the context of fictional transpositions, in which corporeal 
movements and expressions permit neural associations with familiar bodily manifestations 
acquired through experience. Since tragedy is structured as a mimetic representation of 
reality, empathy can be addressed in this framework as a further step in the simulation of a 
depicted world, which relies on a multi-level imitative consecutio. 
The following section of this chapter will investigate the myth of Medea to 
comprehend the role and modalities of action of empathy in a specific tragic context. In 
particular, the action of embodied simulation, domains of experience and emotional 




addressed with the aim of implementing a meaningful example of their crucial role in the 
process of tragedy and tragic heroes’ comprehension. Specifically, the story of Medea is 
addressed following the words of Euripides (431 BC) and the structure of his literary work, 
and secondly the film adaptation directed by Pasolini (Medea, 1969). 
 
3.3. The Myth of Medea and Its Depiction: A Cognitive Perspective 
 
Portrayed by Greek tradition as the daughter of Aeëtes, King of Colchis and 
granddaughter of Helios, the sun god, the myth concerning Medea’s story and her dreadful 
relationship with Jason has been narrated, and continues to be, in innumerable ways. 
Medea’s vicissitudes were first known from their literary version composed by Apollonius 
Rhodius in the Argonautica (3rd century BC). However, the myth has been replicated till 
nowadays by many different authors with the support of diverse media. Ovid (1st century 
BC), Pindar (462 BC), and Seneca (1st century) are just some of the authors who write about 
Medea’s misfortunes in ancient times. Most recently, one of the most acknowledged 
perspectives concentrating on the myth is Medea, the cinematographic work by Pier Paolo 
Pasolini (1969). The case study of the dissertation is oriented to the understanding of those 
mental, corporeal and psychological traits that make Medea a suitable subject for an 
empathy-based sense-making process of its audience. 
 
3.3.1. Staging Empathy: Literary and Performative Devices in Euripides’ Medea 
 
One of the most excruciating tragic stories, Medea’s misfortunes are deeply 
interconnected with other character’s vicissitudes and choices, in an often unbalanced 
dimension between power and subjugation. After betraying her father and killing her brother 
to help Jason steal the Golden Fleece, Medea finds herself abandoned by her husband and 
decides to kill her sons as an act of vengeance. The figure of Medea is particularly 
representative of the limb between the normal and the extraordinary that renders tragedies 
simultaneously human stories and mythic scenarios. This unique fashion of dramatic staging, 
which finds a perfect example in the Euripidean work, “is self-consciously made of the 
juxtaposition of two kinds of lives. On the one hand heroes cross the boundaries, whether 




sexual (like Oedipus) and on the other ordinary husbands, fathers, and citizens (like Jason in 
Corinth, like Heracles, Oedipus, Agamemnon at home), wives and mothers (like Medea, 
Helen, and Clytemnestra) try to live human lives” (Luschnig 2007, 1). In fact, as central in 
archaic and contemporary times, familial dynamics are the most recurrent representational 
theme in Greek tragedy, able to depict affection and crime, romance and heinous revenge in 
such accessible terms that have allowed the genre to survive for thousand years. 
In the particular case of Medea, she is in the first place daughter and sister, after 
having betrayed her father and brother for Jason. She is then a wife and mother, sacrificing 
her lineage bonds for the love of a man. However, she is also wise, powerful and ultimately 
independent; she is admired for her power and fortitude, but also feared and distrusted for 
her way to both fight for and against the traditional family values that should represent a 
woman in ancient Greek society. In fact, Medea “is able to be the many things a human 
being is capable of, good and evil and much that is in between; weak and powerful; loving 
and hating; rational and passionate; rock, lion, god, all of these and none of these” (Ibid., 2). 
The different stages that the character of Medea assumes throughout the plot’s 
development are essential for the empathic process of sense-making by the audience of the 
tragedy. First of all, the evolution of the tragic hero affects the myth construction, making 
Medea, a character with supernatural capacities, a woman who follows the canons of every 
subject’s life evolution. In particular, the variety of present spectators has the opportunity to 
experientially identify with a specific step of the character’s development which 
predominantly matches the featured state brought into observation. Secondly, Medea’s 
individual transformation as human subject and protagonist is functional for the aesthetic 
understanding of the tragic story in its entirety. In fact, the empathic possibility of 
experiencing Medea’s psychophysical states in their constant transformation supports the 
plot implementation, which has to be immediately and entirely understandable in the short 
time of performative representation. As suggested by Gellie (1988), “Medea seems to turn 
into whatever will ensure that the next thing will happen” (Gellie 1988, 17). In the 
deployment of her personal life, and secondarily in Jason’s one, the plot grows and gains 
sense, since “this is a drama taking place and not just being told, the story is their lives” 
(Luschnig 2007, 3). 
The play starts in medias res, suggesting the familiarity of the spectators with the 




her husband” (Euripides, Medea, 19) is expected to channel her rage towards her children, 
in an act of revenge against Jason. The prologue starts, in this way, creating a tense 
atmosphere, in which the nurse initiates the audience to the themes of revenge and passion. 
However, Euripides separates from the beginning the figure of Medea as the betrayed and 
Jason as the betrayer, since he “has cast aside his children and my mistress, and now goes to 
bed in a royal marriage with the daughter of Creon who governs this land” (Ibid., 16-18). 
The decision to react is thus depicted as an urge for Medea to execute her revenge: the tragic 
essence of the myth is now unfolded starting with the justification of Medea’s subsequent 
actions. 
Later, in the parodos, after Medea’s entrance on stage, she starts mourning her 
misfortunes and invoking gods’ help to do justice. From its external perspective, the chorus 
immediately takes Medea’s side, giving a rational support to her desperate voice. Euripides 
plays on two different ways to direct the emotional focus of the audience on the characters 
of Medea. On the one hand, he represents her in a desperate emotional state: her scream is 
heard before her appearance on the scene, when she exclaims, “I hate my life! How can I 
put an end to it?” (Ibid., 96-7). Immediately, the chorus, stimulating the audience to take a 
position in the conflict, tries to reassure Medea that she will get justice soon. In fact, the 
chorus tries to comfort her with soothing words, “I felt sorry for the troubles of the family, 
since it is dear to me. […] Zeus will set this right” (Ibid., 135-57). 
Furthermore, the first episode is particularly relevant because Euripides takes 
advantage of the conversation between Creon and Medea to clarify not only her position, 
but the condition of women in ancient Greek society22. After expressing her sorrow and rage, 
 
22 “Of all creatures that have life and reason we women are the sorriest lot […] we must at a great expenditure 
of money buy a husband and even take on a master over our body […]. Besides, divorce is unsavory for a 
woman and it is not possible to say no to one's husband. [… A] woman must be a prophet of what she could 
never learn at home: how best to deal with her marriage partner; and if we get it worked out well and a husband 
shares our life with us, and he bears the yoke without violence, life is to be envied. […] They say that we live 
a life free of danger at home while they face battle with the spear. How wrong they are. I would rather stand 
three times in the line of battle than once bear a child” (Euripides, Medea, 229-50). Medea’s speech highlights 
the condition which a woman is forced to live in the ancient world. Jason is addressed as a husband/master 
who exercises an abusive authority on his wife. In fact, Medea claims that violence is recurrent in her domestic 
environment and the biggest danger for her cannot be found outside, but at home. In her words it is possible to 






Medea communicates her desire to punish Jason for what he has done and the chorus, 
directing the public empathic attention from the initial episode, agrees with her, “[i]t is right 
that your husband should pay” (Ibid., 266). In the following episodes of the tragedy, Jason 
is introduced as despicable and constantly negatively judged by the chorus. It is evident that 
throughout the evolution of the plot Euripides directs the empathic drive of the public distant 
from Jason, repetitively moving the action of the chorus in support of Medea, including 
through a collective prayer to Aphrodite (second stasimon). 
Moreover, the evolution of Medea as a tragic hero and human being follows, even if 
in a particular and extra-ordinary context, a natural evolution in intentions and actions. The 
character of Medea develops in a destructive way, discarding behavioural and social 
schemes attributed to a woman in archaic context. In fact, it is essential to consider Medea 
in the light of “her failed relationships in her natal and conjugal families, betrayer of her 
father, killer of her brother, discarded wife, and child-murderer” (Luschnig 2007, 63). At the 
same time, Medea belongs to a divine lineage with superhuman capacities, and she disposes 
of powers which cannot be explained under natural laws. For these reasons, Medea is 
targeted by Jason as barbarian, a sorceress, and he calls her “a lioness, Scylla and worse” 
(Euripides, Medea, 1342-3), since “no Greek woman would have dared this” (Ibid., 1339-
40). However, the Corinthian women members of the chorus already started from the very 
beginning empathising with her. Despite the ferocity and violent actions, her revenge seems 
to be accepted by others even if derived from uncontrollable grief and source of atrocious 
pain. In particular the chorus, in its mediating role between actors and audience, 
demonstrates support to Medea, especially as woman and mother, judging, and therefore 
suggesting to its audience to do the same, her actions as legitimate and even necessary. In 
particular, the way she steps out of the traditional female position, through her non-
traditional marriage, her skilful use of pharmaka and her intelligence and independence, 
places her at distance from the orthodox duties which made her lose, at Jason’s eyes, the 
status of Greek woman. 
The last dialogue between the two guides the spectators to bring, as both Medea and 
Jason are doing, the dispute to an end, shaping a final judgement regarding the previous 
vicissitudes to highlight vindictive actions and failures, both also justify individual reasons 




pertaining to the semantic domains of home and family in the last part of the play23, pushes 
the audience to accept that “her tragedy remains a feminine tragedy, defined by her relation 
to her house and to children, birth, nurture, and burial” (Segal 1996, 39). However, it is 
fundamental for understanding, and specifically for empathic understanding, to 
acknowledge Medea as a female human character, more than a goddess, in the way she is 
perceived and perceives herself. This is because, despite her supernatural powers, the 
domain of both her suffering and vengeance is framed within the context of human passions, 
especially the ones of family, love and private sphere. This framework of commonly shared 
values makes Medea a more accessible target for audience’s empathy. On the one hand, the 
central role of a female character allows access to the story from a wider range of 
perspectives. Choosing a protagonist in an underprivileged social position, in particular a 
woman, is not unusual in tragic narratives (e.g. the story of Antigone). Intensifying the 
experienced injustice and grief, the misfortunes of Medea are easily relatable for the female 
members of the audience. On the other hand, the dialogues between the protagonist and both 
the chorus and Jason explicitly bring into light the condition of unease in which Medea is 
forced to act in such an extreme way. Thus, with the combination of these multiple devices, 
Euripides brings to the same level of awareness all the members who form his audience. 
After being disempowered and deprived of her opportunities, Medea is only able to 
stand out and regain her power at a terrible cost. All of a sudden, after all her misfortunes, 
“although she may be a killer as well as the grandchild of the Sun god, she is genuinely one 
of us. She immediately becomes a mass of contradictions, a personality and a character full 
of complexity, a creature of infinite variety. Her grief, her intelligence, her catalogue of 
emotions ever-present and endless, all of these and more will inform her traffic with us” 
(Stein 2003, 115). 
The decision adopted by Euripides to give voice to a woman only acquires sense if 
that voice can be heard. In the case of Medea, her position “is a true voice because it includes 
many voices: a woman as mother, as wife, as bride, as sister, as daughter, as dependent, and 
 
23 The use of a continuous lexical reference to the spheres of home and family is employed by both Jason, 
“[y]ou there, women standing here at the door, is she still in the house” (Euripides, Medea, 1292-3), “[y]ou 
had the heart to take the sword to your own children to whom you gave birth (Ibid., 1324-5)”, “I brought you, 
so hideous a monster, into Greece, from your home and that barbarous land, betrayer of your father and the 
country that reared you” (Ibid., 1329-31) and Medea, “[y]ou were not going to disrespect your marriage to me 




as a free entity. A woman as a hero and as a powerful goddess” (Luschnig 2007, 82). Since 
it is represented in a tragic context, Medea’s experience is hyperbolically extreme on many 
fronts. Nonetheless, the tragedy truly represents the sense of home, belonging, and loss. It 
shows fury, jealousy and vengeance. But also, and above all, Luschnig claims that Medea is 
about personal, private and social justice and familial and individual representativeness. In 
brief, “[t]ragic characters are often people at the edge, but they show us what we are” (Ibid., 
83). Medea is one of the tragic victims and one of the tragic subjects most prone to be 
criticised in her behaviour, but she is also a strong example of personal, female revenge and 
embodiment of individual resolution, in a constant tension between chaos and justice, blind 
rage and reason. 
This detailed and extensive portrait of Medea’s psychological character is necessary 
to understand on how many levels of identification empathy and particularly the empathic 
understanding process involves the audience and the tragic stage. The empathic response of 
the public towards the portrayed characters, or more generally toward Euripides’ depiction 
of human nature, depends, following a cognitive interpretation of Aristotle’s Poetics, on “the 
sufferer’s deservingness or undeservingness, as well as on the similarity of their situations, 
since, by attending a tragic performance revealing the fragility of human condition, the 
spectators fear for themselves” (Karamanou 2014, 44). The comprehensive portrait of 
Medea displayed throughout the previous paragraphs through a psychological perspective 
does not strictly follow the same steps when performatively experienced during a staged 
representation. In fact, “[u]nderstanding, reason, learning, moral discrimination – these 
things are not […] incompatible with emotion”, on the contrary “our emotions in the theatre, 
far from driving out thought and meaning, are indivisible from them: they are simultaneous 
and mutually dependent” (Taplin 1978, 170). In fact, the empathic perception, which is 
essential to fully appreciate the aesthetic experience, allows the involved audience to order 
and guide emotions, direct intellectual attention and ensure the coherence of a 
psychophysical response. Moreover, while it would be hard to guarantee a complete 
overview on the authorial intentions of an ancient work, in this specific case Euripides’ ones, 
the psychophysical reaction’s enhancement caused by empathy can be placed “between an 
appreciation of emotion as shaped exclusively by phylogenetic factors and a view of 
passions as ‘cultural artifacts’” which “can be mediated by the acknowledgment of both 




the non-uniqueness of behavioural complexes in the expression of human emotions and the 
comparable nonverbal forms of emotional exhibition, the constant and explicit indication of 
clear psychophysical states given by the author24 immediately evokes a complete range of 
foreseeable embodied manifestations of them. 
For these reasons, it seems evident that the Euripidean tragedy, which shares many 
features with other examples of dramatic representations, requires a mental and emotional 
response of the audience to the theatrical enactment. In particular, the tragic performance 
and its characters are able to produce a communicative path which heads the audience 
towards a response of affection to tragic torment25. The staged scenario is capable of 
generating what Greeks defined as ekplexis26, a condition in which “the listener/spectator is 
captivated, enraptured, bewitched […], meaning that the spectator is temporarily suspended 
from his everyday reality and imaginatively transposed into the centre of the ‘performative’ 
world” (Ibid., 100). This emotional response, already arisen by Aristotle’s view on tragedy, 
evokes the centrality of empathy for tragic spectatorship, which, in the context of aesthetic 
appreciation, constitutes a mental and physical imaginary identification of the observing self 
with the multiformity of a depicted other. Here, “‘empathy’ is the notion of congruity 
between the passions - whatever these may be - which qualify the inner life of the object and 
the emotional response of the experiencing subject” (Ibid., 101). This corresponds to a 
psychophysical reaction to an incarnated state as if the conditions in question were primarily 
experienced by the members of the audience. Empathic identification shapes the spectator’s 
experience in a way in which “the sort of sympathy which pity entails requires a certain 
distance between pitier and pitied; if this distance is removed, the predominantly altruistic 
emotion of pity is obliterated by a practically complete affective identification between 
oneself and the other” (Halliwell 1986, 178). The peculiar form of common intersubjective 
experience between audience and tragic heroes connects the empathic process on a shared 
 
24 E.g., “aiai [Oh no!] I am ruined ... desperate! My enemies are unfurling all the sails and there is no clear 
landing place from ruin” (Euripides, Medea, 276-78), “[y]our words are cajoling to my ears, but inside my 
heart I am afraid you are forming some evil new plan” (Ibid., 315-16), “[u]nhappy woman, Feu, feu [Ah, ah] 
unhappy for your miseries” (Ibid., 356-57). 
25 This is mainly evident in the evolution of the position taken by the chorus, which first tries to change Medea’s 
mind on her plans, “[i]s there any way you could get her to come out to see us and hear the sound of our words 
spoken in comfort? If only she would somehow put aside her deeply felt anger and distemper, I am eager to 
help those dear to me” (Euripides, Medea, 172-177), but later fully supports her in her decision to take action 
empathizing with her condition, “[i]t is right that your husband should pay, Medea. I am not surprised that you 
grieve over your loss” (Ibid., 266-67), “[u]nhappy daughter of Creon, done to death, how we pity you for your 
tragedy, all because of your marriage to Jason” (Ibid., 1232-34). 




field of action, in which “the audience’s imaginative projection into the stage-actor’s 
psychological reality […] fundamentally distinguishes Greek drama as a social institution” 
(Lada 1994, 102-3). 
Tragedy has been, and still represents, one of the most significant genres of 
performative representation of humankind. The variety of its meaningful elements (e.g. the 
psychologically complex verisimilitude of the characters, the intensity of the plot’s rhythm 
and the mediation role of the chorus, above all) makes the relationship between audience 
and tragic protagonists particularly relevant for the accomplishment of its representative 
dramatic outcome. However, empathy remains central for the dramatic experience to 
successfully function. The poetic discourse27 evokes in the observers the possibility to 
project themselves into a different staged scenario and hence empathically28 experience the 
characters’ feelings as if they were their own, both in the form of their achievements and 
misfortunes. In particular, participating in a context of experience in which acting, rhythm 
and musicality contribute to a full engagement of its audience permits the spectators to self-
identify with the performed mental and corporeal states. In fact, it is important to situate the 
experience of this tragic text imagining as the attendance of a dramatic performance, which 
“is best exemplified in a theatrical society, for the theatrical skene becomes the space par 
excellence where the experience of the 'other' can be conveyed through the tangible reality 
of body and of flesh” (Ibid., 106). The theatrical context, advantaged frame for emotional 
engagement, constitutes a perfect example to imagine empathy not only as a dual 
relationship of intersubjective exchange, but also as a crucial element in audience’s 
perception of artistic works. Feelings, shared states, identities and physical actions and 
expressions are channelled by the poet and the characters on stage and internalised by the 
public, reflecting the path suggested and covered by the chorus, which empathically follows 
heroes’ grief and sorrows. Thus, the members of the chorus have often been assimilated to 
the audience for the position they assume on stage: close observers of the characters, they 
are not involved in any intimate relationship with the suffering heroes, but they take part in 
the tragic misfortunes encouraging the public with lamentations to feel the same. In fact, as 
Aristotle’s claims, the member of the audience is not alienated in his or her distant position 
 
27 In this case, discourse refers to the literary and philosophical concept of λόγος. 




of spectator, rather he or she “suffers along with the pathetic speaker” (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 
1408a23-4). 
As for intersubjective experience, social structures, cultural beliefs and traditions 
have a solid influence also on aesthetic appreciation. Specific systems of relation, affection 
and mental share are often culturally enforced and modulated in their responsiveness. In 
particular, the predisposition to empathically face emotions of a susceptible group of 
observing people also deeply depends on the cultural context of interaction. Since this 
configuration is both historically and socially conveyed and regulated, it is essential to fully 
comprehend the “transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of 
inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, 
perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (Geertz 1973, 89). 
In this particular context of analysis, the Athenian society, Lada (1994) claims that the 
“spectator can be regarded as culturally oriented towards empathetic transpositions of the 
‘self’” thanks to “(a) the Dionysiac nature of the ancient drama, (b) the culturally shaped 
disposition of the 'self’ when confronted with [… the] 'other', and (c) the collective ethos of 
the polis in which the performances are held” (Lada 1994, 112). First, the Dionysian element 
in tragedy, involving rapture and suspension, begins with the actor impersonation of a 
fictional subject, which serves as a collectively shared model suggesting the path of 
experience. In essence, actors fill the role that is traditionally served by mythical stories, 
ritualised ceremonies and even artistic representation. In other words, “[t]he ‘Aristotelian’ 
spectator […] becomes participant in a performance whose archetypal symbolic action is to 
‘step out’ of oneself and to relinquish temporarily the safe contours of social identity” (Ibid.). 
Then, it is essential to acknowledge the context of representation, the social structures and 
their rules, as well as the imaginary of depicted identities. The staged plot, mirroring its 
spectators’ condition, facilitates the empathic positioning for the member of the audience, 
making the spectator realise that he or she could be exposed, if has not been yet, to a similar 
scenario. 
The last section addressed the textual mechanisms adopted by Euripides to stimulate 
empathy and emotional contagion in the audience, following the evolution of the plot, 
involved characters and sociocultural references. By way of conclusion, the next subchapter 
will focus on the cinematic transposition of the Euripidean play by Pasolini, with the 




and its visual implications, as well as the contemporary adaptational context realised by the 
Italian director, writer and intellectual. 
 
3.3.2. Pasolini, Medea, and a Contemporary Audience for the Myth 
 
The structural role played by empathy in tragic sense-making is not limited to the 
contextual peculiarities of Greek, and particularly Athenian, audience. As proven by 
contemporary transpositions of the mythical portrait of Medea, tragic enactment is in its 
essence first and foremost grounded on an all-encompassing conception of the human 
experience. Considering one of the most well-known contemporary adaptations of the 
tragedy, Medea by Pier Paolo Pasolini (1969), it is possible to detect specific representative 
features that orient cognitive perception and comprehension in an empathic direction. 
 After having directed Oedipus Rex (1967), Pasolini decides to work on the adaptation 
of another Greek tragedy: the myth of Medea. The interest of the director is aroused by the 
fascination resulting from the disruptive role of the female hero in breaking the social, 
cultural and religious patterns of family, loyalty and, most of all, the conception of the sacred 
in the Athenian society. The myth becomes for Pasolini an allegory for a new reality in which 
he remarks a continuity with the contemporary society. In this context, the choice of Maria 
Callas in the role of Medea is not a coincidence. Pasolini insists on having Callas playing 
the character of Medea (she had already performed the tragic hero on stage several times) as 
an embodied metaphor of the social shift that Medea represents for the historical context in 
which Pasolini shapes his work. Coming from a Greek family strongly rooted on rural, 
religious and military values, she was educated to fit in the bourgeois and scandalous society 
of the spectacle. For this reason, Pasolini explicitly chooses Maria Callas for her personal 
and private representation of the complexity of Medea. 
The cinematic expression of Pasolini is rooted, according to Dunghe (2012), on an 
intimate human narrative that through physical and linguistic expressions, as well as cultural, 
social and even biological structures, operates “as a continuum that links the human subject, 
both mentally and physically, to humanity’s pre-cultural origins in nature” (Dunghe 2012, 
582). The atemporal context in which events take place reproduces in Pasolini’s Medea an 
archaic world designed in a contemporary frame of filmic and directing fashion, enabling 




moment as a religious one and highlighting the relevance and sacredness of this form of 
human experience, Pasolini opposes the two main characters as embodied personifications 
of human traits. On the one hand, Jason represents determination, sagacity, personal and 
social success obtained through a long-term strategy of conquest. On the other hand, Medea, 
tragic hero par excellence, finds herself between rationality and madness, traditional rules 
of law and rules of love, nature and supernatural powers. Medea is pre-modern and 
contemporary at the same time in her irrational and inexplicable capacities of barbarian 
woman, in her will of destruction, inflicted and self-inflicted pain. The tension between 
powers, the one desired by Jason and Medea’s superhuman one, depicted by Euripides finds 
in Pasolini’s audience a new sense of social integrity and political order. In fact, “[b]y 
permitting the Medea of Euripides to speak, both verbally and visually, through the free 
indirect subjectivity of his own Medea, Pasolini merges his own sensibility with an ancient 
one in a discourse that truly does address the cultural values of our day” (Ibid., 587). In 
particular, Pasolini opposes the contemporary ruthless exploitation of people and resources 
for the sake of profit (symbolised by Jason and his thirst for conquest) with those victims 
that are misused and ruled by hegemonical powers (Medea and her people). 
The work completed by Pasolini projects the myth in contemporary times, but it 
maintains Medea as the vehicular character imagined by Euripides. In fact, “[i]n an attempt 
to build a cinematic form that could not be reduced to a consumable narrative, Pasolini 
pushed his images beyond the narrative function, to create excess possibilities of meaning” 
(Borgerson 2002, 56). The empathic understanding of Medea in all its facets preserves the 
opportunity of questioning and even dismantling ethical structures and social beliefs, 
something that tragedy has been aiming from the very beginning. The relationship between 
Medea and Jason in adapted by Pasolini for a contemporary audience, and thus follows 
different cultural references despite the ancient context in which the movie is set. In 
particular, Jason, depicted as a rational tactician, impersonates the modern man in opposition 
to the sacred and at the same time vulnerable figure of Medea. Rejecting the tradition, Jason 
stands in representation of logic, profit and personal interest. In fact, according to the classics 
scholar Shapiro (2013), Pasolini’s Jason is the symbol of those “[m]odern industrialized 
societies” which “inhabit a profane or ‘desacralized’ cosmos; they have abandoned symbolic 
and mythic modes of thought and have embraced a linear, rational, and historical concept of 




been colonised and exploited for Jason’s own interest. While achieving personal success, 
Jason ends up failing in his familial responsibilities towards Medea, which led him to the 
loss of his children. The love for Jason rips Medea away from her land, family and people, 
in a sort dimension of sorrow and madness. However, despite the violent nature of her act 
of revenge and the multiple murders she commits, Medea cannot fail to be perceived as a 
victim, exploited by masculine oppression and the subjugation of the dominant culture. 
For this reason, the danger and suffering represented by Jason becomes more 
despicable than death. In fact, as claimed by Deuber-Mankowsky (2012), “Pasolini and 
Callas create a Medea whom we not only comprehend but who leads us to believe that her 
children are better off as dead corpses fleeing with their mother in her chariot than remaining 
with their father in Corinth” (Deuber-Mankowsky 2012, 256). Pasolini positions at the centre 
of his work an intersubjective conflict that transcends historical and contextual collocation 
but is particularly prone to being accessible for its public. The director makes Maria Callas 
embody the tragic suffering of Medea, giving a greater relevance to her experience and 
perspective through the abolition of time and spatial distances and the pragmatic rituality of 
her gestures. In particular, in the dreamlike repetition of the scene of the murder of the two 
children, Pasolini points out the only opportunity for Medea to find rest. 
The profoundly dramatic performance of Maria Callas and her powerful tragic 
expressivity reveal from her flight to Greece to the murdering of her children that behind her 
crimes there is a consuming sense of loss, betrayed love and abandonment. The positioning 
of Medea’s vicissitudes inside the myth makes it possible for Pasolini to abstract her actions 
in an atemporal context in which the human experience is made absolute in its essence. 
Representing the myth in contemporary days means reclaiming its actuality (Tuccini 2011, 
132), and the way the Aristotelean vision of humanity incarnated by tragedy has survived 
for thousand years. Mythology becomes for Pasolini a channel to represent a woman able to 
personify the human conflict in herself. At the same time, the director abandons different 
peculiar mechanisms of tragedy (the chorus and its role of mediation, the use of masks and 
the exclusively dialogical structure of Euripides’ work) taking advantage of the power of 
silent images in the cinematic medium. In fact, Medea is a deeply visual work, 
predominantly focused on Callas’ gaze and facial expressivity. The alternance of head shots, 
favouring her profile in ritualistic and hieratic sequences and frontal closeups in her more 




embodiment of her emotional growth and inner belonging to the earthly dimension. Despite 
her divine nature, Medea is physically depicted as a fragile woman, whose body appears to 
constantly fall under the burden of her grief. Pasolini projects Medea under a contemporary 
perspective, making her, above all, a mother. Even the extreme act of murdering her children, 
depicted with the appearance of a constraint ritual gesture, is committed on the verge of 
tears: Medea is consistently portrayed as a grieving victim of the system that oppresses her, 
including the sequences in which she is the actual executioner. 
In Pasolini’s cinematic language empathy represents the emotional response to 
stimuli not exclusively provoked by human characters. Desolate landscapes, frightening 
objects and rituals and deafening music are central in creating the context able to guide the 
emotional contagion which the director aims to arouse. The environment in which Medea 
finds herself to experience multiple losses is constructed by Pasolini in such an evocative 
form that it is able to stimulate what Smith defines as “[t]he possibility of understanding 
‘from the inside’ […] human agents in social situations more or less radically different from 
our own” (Smith 2011, 111). In this frame, the resonance of Medea’s psychophysical state 
is universal in its despair. Isolated from her loved ones and crushed under the weight of her 
grief, Pasolini’s portrait of Medea makes the spectator shift from the mimetic depiction of 
the hero to the experienced emotions of real life. The stylistic choices featured in the cinema 
of Pasolini help through different mechanisms (e.g. closeups, frontal shots, intense music 
and repetitive views of vast and dry landscapes) to construct a specific narrative pattern that, 
according to Campeggiani (2017), “trains our ability to recognize evaluative properties and 
respond emotionally to them” (Campeggiani 2017, 41). 
Furthermore, despite the absence of the chorus, Pasolini introduces a mediator 
playing a comparable role. In fact, the centaur, Chiron, more than just raising and educating 
Jason, which would be his role in the frame of the myth, talks to the audience about the 
sacredness of nature and the world, soon disillusioned by the ruthless rationality and craving 
for power of his pupil. However, Chiron does not stand on screen from the perspective of 
the audience, but he speaks for the director introducing his philosophical thoughts on “the 
ideological conflict which is at the heart of the entire film” (Dunghe 2012, 585): the 
vulnerability which, according to Pasolini, characterises every human being once the 
connection with nature is cracked. Chiron explains to Jason that, while in ancient times 




Jason and each spectator belong, finds in the physical world an exhaustive perfection. This 
hubris will lead everybody, and Jason above all, to mistakes and destruction. The director 
uses the centaur as an expedient to introduce his audience to both recurrent themes in ancient 
mythology (e.g. the relationship between human and natural, the sacred) and his position as 
a multifaceted intellectual. Growing older, Jason acts on behalf of his interests with a rational 
and desacralised drive, to such an extent that Chiron turns from centaur into a simple man. 
In this way, from the very beginning of the film Pasolini directs the attention of his audience 
to the mythological dimension of the narrated story, addressing the sacrality of tragedy and 
tragic stories. At the same time, the director guides the focus and empathic emotions of his 
audience to Medea, the only figure that all along the movie escapes the downfall that the 
world is experiencing. In this way, Chiron substitutes the chorus and its mediation role 
between the characters of the movie and the audience. Never directly engaging in the plot, 
he impersonates the thoughts and ideas behind the director’s choice to adapt the myth in a 
new cinematic version, while guiding the emotional attention and empathic urge of the 
public towards Medea. 
Moreover, Pasolini escapes the risk of an obsolete reproduction of tragedy and build 
a powerful aesthetic object, in which empathy plays a crucial role on an affective level 
towards the hero and on a comprehensive one towards the tragedy as a whole. Contiguity 
and rational similarities, as well as poetic and acting involvement, make Medea a peculiarly 
unique dramatis persona who carries poetic intentions, mythic and ritual charge together 
with human features which bind her to the audience. In particular, referring to the tragic 
hero, Lada claims that the “spectator for his part can actually engage in a rational empathic 
dialogue with him, for he is culturally conditioned so as to recognise and acknowledge in 
the fate of the ‘other’ the potential fate of the ‘self’” (Lada 1994, 123). The privileged 
perspective from which the spectator cognitively elaborates the represented actions 
experienced by Medea permits to not only feel for her (action which would only assume 
sympathetic modality), but also feel into the action comprehensively grasping it, thanks to 
the contemporary value of an ancient and mythic suffering. Empathy leads, through a first-
person immersion, to a fully experienced understanding of ideas, emotions and actions. 
Assuming another subject’s mental and corporal state positions the viewer on a vantage-
point of observation which even allows to transcend cultural or social discrepancies. In brief, 




irrationality of passion and even the fictional and mythic essence of tragedy in order to fully 
experience catharsis. In fact, empathic sense-making “as an inextricable compound of 
intellect and feeling, sheds some light on the way a Greek audience was likely to be disposed 
towards a theatrical performance and the agents who materialise its action on the on the 
skene of the polis” (Ibid., 125). 
In conclusion, this chapter aimed to specifically address the cognitive perspective on 
aesthetic perception to the specific case of tragedy, in particular to the character of Medea 
in her Euripidean and Pasolinian portrayals. Central to the analysis was the empathic relation 
between the audience, reading today the work by Euripides or watching the inspired movie, 
the tragic hero and her vicissitudes. The examples of the two versions of Medea pointed out 
a variety of mechanisms concerned in this process. While on the one hand Euripides, through 
specific lexical and expressive choices and the constant mediation of the chorus, constructs 
a literary figure which embodies the tragic spirit, Pasolini delivers to his audience a 
contemporary reading of the myth of Medea articulated through a visual language. In both 
cases, the empathic path to cognitive perception and comprehension is crucial for the 






This research project, focusing on empathy and its role in cognition and processes of 
sense-making, demonstrated the impact of the empathic process in both intersubjective 
relations and aesthetic perception. After focusing on interpersonal contexts throughout the 
first chapter, the artistic dimension of Einfühlung, as addressed by Vischer in the first place 
(1994), has been illustrated on a macro level first, and later following the specific case of 
tragedy and the myth of Medea in different narrative depictions. 
 Referring back to the research question behind this study, empathy has been 
demonstrated essential in aesthetic comprehension. Actually, the emotional contagion 
empathically experienced has been claimed as the key shift from contemplation to 
understanding. Even if in everyday life the concept of empathy and its related 
psychophysical processes are almost exclusively employed to describe the experience of 
feeling into subjects other than us, this research focused on those aspects that have 
contributed to the formation of aesthetic theories on empathy, which relate empathic 
cognitive mechanisms to the perception of artistic works and practices. As addressed in 
general and theoretical terms and then specifically following tragedy as a key case study, the 
empathic reaction of the viewer was shown to allow the emotional arousal of psychophysical 
involvement in the subjects contemplating artistic objects. 
In this dissertation, acknowledging that artistic works and their production cannot be 
separated from the human nature of their creation and reception has been central. In fact, the 
reality constructed in cultural production, besides coming from human minds and skills, 
subsists in its manifestation according to human languages of expression. The semantic 
domains evoked by the contemplation of the objects in question allow the observers to fully 
experience, comprehend and ultimately share the depicted reality represented in artistic 
form. For this reason, making a sharp distinction between intersubjective and aesthetic 
experience would not only be incomplete, but also neglect to consider their constant and 
mutual influence. 
Moreover, throughout the analysis and reference to different forms of artistic work 
(literary texts, visual representations, performed stories in theatre and films) a variety of 
cognitive mechanisms have been detected as essential for the empathic process to take place. 
The path to understanding is shaped by narratives, forms of presenting events, characters 




narrative unfolding, in light of individual and collective experience, arouses the emotional 
contagion at the base of empathy: embodied narratives and perspective taking stimulate the 
audience to experience what has been observed as if it were the individual reality of each 
member (and all of them as a collective group) of the public. 
Furthermore, tragedy and the specific case of the myth of Medea have proved to be 
significative objects of analysis in the study of the relevance of empathy in artistic perception 
and comprehension. In particular, the mimetic nature of tragedy allows the observing 
audience to share the depicted psychophysical states thanks to the emotional and mental 
awareness provided by the personal, social and cultural reservoir of experience on which we 
rely. The response of the audience has been proved to be oriented to a condition of emotional 
share leading to comprehension. Different are the tools implied in the tragic frame to provoke 
and guide this reaction. While in the case of Euripides’ Medea (432 BC) literary and 
theatrical devices are essential in the direction and support of the process of sense-making 
conducted by the audience (e.g. the mediation role played by of both masks and chorus in 
supporting the decipherment of the psychophysical states experienced by the characters), the 
cinematic adaptation of the myth directed by Pier Paolo Pasolini in 1969 employs specific 
devices of the filmic medium (present in his technique of directing the camera, the choice of 
Maria Callas as the main protagonist of the movie and the characterisation of environments, 
music and characters) to trigger empathy towards the portrayed characters. 
 This dissertation serves different purposes both in the frame of cognitive semiotics 
and culture studies. Starting with a comprehensive genealogy of the concept of empathy, 
this work bridged a variety of disciplines (phenomenology, narrative and cognitive 
psychology) addressing perception and comprehension in intersubjective exchanges and 
aesthetic appreciation. Considering these two frames throughout the research was essential 
to acknowledge the continuity of cognition in different aspects of the human experience. In 
particular, this work highlighted the all-encompassing nature of cognitive processes. In fact, 
empathy was shown to rely not only on mental stimuli and mechanisms, but also on sensorial 
operations and embodied emotions, which are necessary to comprehensively grasp the outer 
world. As anticipated in the introduction, culture and cognition are experiencing increasing 
contamination and interconnection. For this reason, the study of these macro phenomena 
needs to be approached complementing one another. The choice of a case study with such a 




representation of the human condition was made with the aim of addressing, in light of recent 
studies on cognitive processes of sense-making, a form of narrative from ancient times which 
still influence, more or less directly, contemporary artistic production. The continuous 
mediation of our cultural context and expression is essential to understand not only how we 
perceive, but also who we are. 
 This research was conducted to provide a comprehensive analysis of empathy, its 
influence in perception and comprehension and its application to the specificities of the case 
study. However, many questions remain open for future discussion. In particular, while 
considering here both interpersonal relations and sense-making in artistic contemplation, 
contemporary ways of interacting, under the influence of an increasingly widespread 
digitalisation, are characterised by a strong presence of virtual intersubjective exchanges. In 
fact, the disembodiment that distinguishes digital communication from the contexts that have 
been addressed throughout this research involves different and multiple levels of reality 
which intersect and influence each other in the creation of an innovative dimension and 
requiring further analysis. Involving specific aspects pertaining to both intersubjective 
exchanges and fictional realities, a new way of creating, communicating and sharing is 
shaping a context in which encounter, perception and imagination are temporally and 
spatially disconnected and even suspended, finding a new position in the présence-absence 
spectrum theorized by Lévinas (1979). How will empathy adapt to of the virtual context of 
experience? Will the role of empathy decline in its relevance or will it increasingly rely on 
mechanisms experienced in the frame of fictional stories? Our culture and way of 
communicating are growing in the digital space and further studies on the involved sense-
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